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Abstract 
 This thesis examines the implications of consumer bankruptcy and 
access to consumer credit on approximately 50,000 individuals using 
longitudinal data from a representative sample of households in Great Britain. 
The thesis comprises three inter-related but stand-alone empirical chapters 
along with the introduction and conclusion chapters.  
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, investigates the effects of the 
bankruptcy benefit and adverse events on the consumer bankruptcy decision. 
Employing zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model, the chapter analyses 
whether consumers go into any bankruptcy proceedings and, if they do, their 
choice of the bankruptcy type, either the discharge of debts (fresh start) or the 
reorganisation of debts (income gleaning). The findings are that the bankruptcy 
benefit and becoming unemployed are positively related to the bankruptcy 
decision regardless of the bankruptcy type. However, the effects of the other 
adverse events differ across bankruptcy types. Individuals who experience the 
onset of health problems are more likely to choose the income gleaning, whereas 
individuals who get divorced or separated are more likely to choose the fresh 
start. 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 3, examines the effects of the 
consumer bankruptcy on the access to credit after bankruptcy. Using difference 
in differences (DID) estimation, the chapter analyses the credit availability to 
consumer bankruptcy filers and whether or not they are excluded from credit 
markets for both the short term (1 year) and the long term (3 years). It also 
analyses the existence of financial exclusion, if any, according to the choice of 
the bankruptcy type. The findings suggest that bankrupt consumers are 
excluded from the credit markets for both the short and the long term. However, 
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when the analysis is done based on the bankruptcy types, the results show that 
the exclusion of fresh starters from the credit markets is dramatic, swift but 
short lived, while the exclusion of the income gleaners is gradual, slow but lasts 
longer. 
The third empirical chapter, Chapter 4, analyses the role of 
entrepreneurial activity on the access to consumer credit markets. Employing 
propensity score matching, it analyses the credit availability to the 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and tests whether or not the entrepreneurs 
are excluded from the consumer credit markets. The findings show that 
entrepreneurs are excluded from the credit markets when they are compared to 
their non-entrepreneur counterparts. A typical entrepreneur is likely to receive 
approximately £500 less consumer credit than a typical non-entrepreneur with 
similar characteristics.  
Key words: consumer bankruptcy, bankruptcy benefit, adverse events, 
access to credit, financial exclusion, entrepreneurial activity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The consumer bankruptcy is a formal process for financially distressed 
individuals to discharge their eligible debts under the related bankruptcy law. 
Both the consumer credit and the consumer bankruptcy have increased 
dramatically over the last decades. The total debt held by the average British 
consumer was £30,832 in 2018, which is around 112% of average earnings and 
the average debt has been steadily trending upward. The total number of 
consumer bankruptcy filings has also increased more than five-fold in two 
decades. The number of filings in the UK was around 30,000 in 1998, while it 
was around 150,000 in 2018.  
This rapid increase in consumer bankruptcy filings over the last decades 
has attracted policy makers and researchers. Many researchers have studied 
the bankruptcy to understand why consumers file for bankruptcy and why 
filings have increased dramatically over the last years. Studies on the consumer 
bankruptcy are mostly based on quantitative macroeconomics models. There is 
relatively a small applied literature on the consumer bankruptcy due to the 
lack of suitable micro level data.  
In the UK, a major reform in the bankruptcy law was introduced by 
Enterprise Act 2002. This reform has made the consumer bankruptcy more pro-
debtor by reducing the discharge of debts no later than one year which was 
previously three years. The main objective was to encourage the entrepreneurial 
activity.  Due to this increase in the consumer bankruptcy and the major reform 
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in the bankruptcy law, researchers try to explain the reasons behind the 
decisions of consumers regarding the bankruptcy filing. In addition to the 
consumer bankruptcy decision, these developments have also motivated an 
increasing literature to study the credit availability to bankrupts and the 
individual entrepreneurs. 
1.2 Research Motivations 
Both consumer credit and consumer bankruptcy have increased 
noticeably in the last decades. This increase in the consumer bankruptcy has 
motivated researchers to explain not only this trend but also the reasons behind 
the decisions of consumers to file for bankruptcy. The literature on the 
consumer bankruptcy focuses on two debated theories, the strategic behaviour 
theory and the adverse events theory. The strategic behaviour theory suggests 
that consumers file for bankruptcy when their financial benefit from bankruptcy 
is higher (White, 1998b; Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan, 2015), whereas the adverse 
events theory suggests that consumers file for bankruptcy because of the 
adverse events they experience (Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Himmelstein et 
al., 2005; Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011). A study on this debate contributes to 
the literature.  
These developments have also motivated an increasing literature to 
study the post-bankruptcy credit availability for bankrupt households. In the 
literature, it is argued that the consumer bankruptcy is likely to affect both the 
credit demand and credit supply (Jagtiani and Li, 2015). For credit demand, 
the bankrupt individuals now have a stronger balance sheet with less or no 
unsecured debt and more disposable income; thus, they are likely to have less 
demand for credit. On the other hand, because of the improved balance sheet, 
 
 
3 
the bankrupt individuals may be able to access more and cheaper credit. For 
the credit supply, the improved balance sheet makes borrowers more 
creditworthy to lenders. However, a bankruptcy flag on the credit report also 
signals to lenders that the borrowers may be the risky type and thus more likely 
to default again compared with non-bankrupts with similar balance sheets 
(Musto, 2004; Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). 
The theoretical models regarding to consumer bankruptcy, such as 
Athreya (2004), Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt 
(2007), assume the presence of a market exclusion following bankruptcy, but 
there is a little empirical evidence on the credit access after bankruptcy due 
the lack of individual level data. This suggests that the relationship demands 
empirical investigation. An empirical study on this matter contributes to these 
theoretical models. 
In the literature, it is also discussed that if a bankruptcy law is more 
forgiving in providing entrepreneurs a greater opportunity with a fresh start, it 
will boost the economic activity (Lee and Yamakawa, 2012). In the UK, a major 
reform in the bankruptcy law is introduced by Enterprise Act 2002 to encourage 
the entrepreneurial activity and increase the post-bankruptcy labour market 
participation. This has made the consumer bankruptcy more forgiving by 
introducing a fresh start bankruptcy, reducing the discharge of debts no later 
than one year which was previously three years. It is also argued in the 
literature that this may decrease the credit supply to the individual 
entrepreneurs (Berkowitz and White, 2004). An analysis on the relationship 
between access to consumer credit and the entrepreneurial activity contributes 
to the literature. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
Based on the aforementioned motivations, the thesis comprises three 
empirical chapters which focus on the literature on the consumer bankruptcy, 
financial exclusion and entrepreneurship and try to find answers to the 
following questions.  
Are consumers more likely to file for bankruptcy when the bankruptcy 
benefit is higher? Are they more likely to file for bankruptcy when they 
face an adverse event? Does the consumer bankruptcy decision change 
according to the bankruptcy type? Chapter 2 examines these questions. 
Are consumers more likely to be excluded from the credit markets after 
consumer bankruptcy compared to non-bankrupts? Does the financial 
exclusion change according to the bankruptcy type? These questions are 
analysed in Chapter 3. 
Are individual entrepreneurs more likely to be excluded from the 
consumer credit markets compared to non-entrepreneurs with similar 
characteristics? This question is addressed in Chapter 4. 
1.4 Main Contributions 
The thesis contributes to the literature on consumer finance, specifically 
the literature on consumer bankruptcy, access to credit and financial exclusion. 
The main contributions of the thesis are included in the empirical chapters 
which are Chapter 2, 3 and 4. 
 
 
5 
Chapter 2 primarily analyses the consumer bankruptcy decision by using 
a longitudinal survey which specifically focuses on the economic well-being of 
households in Great Britain. Its contribution is threefold.  
First, previous studies on the consumer bankruptcy decision (such as Fay, 
Hurst, and White, 2002; Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan 2015) treat bankruptcy as 
a uniform case and provide little information about the different bankruptcy 
types. In reality, not all bankruptcy types have the same consequences; so, if 
possible, bankruptcy types should be analysed separately to better understand 
the bankruptcy decision. With the unique data, this study investigates both 
the bankruptcy decision and the bankruptcy types and compares them rather 
than oversimplifying all the bankruptcy decisions as the same type.  
Second, since the consumer bankruptcy is a legal process, bankruptcy 
filers must have formal debts from financial intermediaries in the form of 
consumer loan or a credit card loan. However, it is possible that some 
individuals are excluded from financial market voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Therefore, we suspect that the non-bankrupt individuals belong to one of two 
groups: participants or non-participants of financial markets. A potential 
selection bias problem might be the case in this situation. In their previous 
works, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) do not explore the potential endogeneity, 
while Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan (2015) explore the endogeneity only for the 
strategic behaviour. By applying zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model, 
this study alleviates the potential endogeneity for both the bankruptcy decision 
and the different bankruptcy types. 
Third, the literature on the consumer bankruptcy mostly relates to US 
households under the US laws, it seems there is a gap for UK households. It 
seems that there is no empirical study on the consumer bankruptcy decision in 
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the UK. This study aims to fill this gap and analyse the consumer bankruptcy 
decision by using a new data from a representative sample of households in 
Great Britain applying to the UK consumer bankruptcy procedures.  
Chapter 3 investigates the consequences of consumer bankruptcy by 
studying the availability of credit to consumers after bankruptcy. The 
contribution of the chapter is intended to be threefold.  
First, the literature on the post-bankruptcy consumer credit mostly 
relates to US households, and there is a gap for UK households. It seems that 
there is no empirical study on the access to consumer credit after bankruptcy 
in the UK. This study analyses the credit availability to consumer bankruptcy 
filers and whether they are excluded from the credit markets by using a 
longitudinal data from a representative sample of households in Great Britain. 
Second, there has been a debate about whether or not bankrupt 
individuals are excluded from credit markets, and if so, to what extent. The 
theoretical models, such as Athreya (2004) and Chatterjee et al. (2007), assume 
the presence of the post-bankruptcy market exclusion for a considerable time, 
while, in their empirical study, Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-
Garriga (2013) find that the credit market exclusion after bankruptcy is very 
short lived. This study analyses the post-bankruptcy access to credit both for 
the short term (1 year) and the long term (3 years). The results contribute to 
this debate on whether or not bankrupt individuals are excluded from credit 
markets for the short and the long term. 
Third, most of the previous studies on the post-bankruptcy credit access 
such as Athreya and Janicki (2006) and Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and 
Montoriol-Garriga (2013) analyse the bankruptcy as a uniform event and 
provide little information about the different bankruptcy types. In reality, not 
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all bankruptcy types have the same consequences; so, if possible, bankruptcy 
types should be analysed separately to better understand the post-bankruptcy 
credit access. With the unique data, this chapter studies the different 
bankruptcy types; thus, it analyses the post-bankruptcy consumer credit by 
distinguishing between ‘fresh starters’ and ‘income gleaners’ rather than 
oversimplifying all bankrupts as the same type. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the role of entrepreneurial activity on the credit 
availability to consumers and analyses whether or not entrepreneurs are 
excluded from the credit markets when they are compared to their non-
entrepreneur counterparts. Its contribution is threefold. 
First, empirical studies find that the financial exclusion can be on 
economic grounds such as income, wealth and employment status and/or non-
economic grounds such as ethnicity and race (Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee, 2005; 
Devlin, 2005; Carbo, Gardener and Molyneux, 2007; Simpson and Buckland, 
2009). This chapter contributes to the literature by focusing the role of 
entrepreneurial activity as an economic ground and analyses whether or not 
individual entrepreneurs are excluded from credit markets when they are 
compared to non-entrepreneurs with similar characteristics.  
Second, due to the lack of suitable individual level data, the literature on 
the access to credit for individual entrepreneurs focuses mostly on US 
consumers and the literature specifically devoted to the UK is limited. This 
chapter aims to investigate the credit availability for individual entrepreneurs 
using individual level longitudinal data from representative households in Great 
Britain in order to fill this gap in this area. 
Third, even though it is discussed in the literature that more forgiving 
bankruptcy laws encourage entrepreneurial activity, it has been debated that 
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individual entrepreneurs will be excluded from credit markets as a result of pro-
debtor bankruptcy laws. When a firm is unincorporated, its debts are personal 
liabilities of the firm’s owner, so that lending to the firm is legally equivalent 
to lending to its owner. If the firm fails, the owner has an incentive to file for 
consumer bankruptcy, since the firm's debts will be discharged, and the owner 
is only obliged to liquidate eligible assets to repay creditors. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by analysing whether or not individual 
entrepreneurs are excluded from credit markets, and if so, to what extent. 
1.5 Data Accreditation 
The thesis uses data from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) which 
was provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) that allowed legal 
access to the special use data under the Approved Researcher Scheme. The 
Approved Researcher Scheme is used by the ONS to grant access to data that 
cannot be published openly. To access data, an individual must hold the ONS 
Researcher Accreditation and must meet certain criteria.  
The WAS is a longitudinal survey which focuses on the economic well-
being of households in Great Britain by collecting data on assets, savings, 
income and debt of individuals and households. It is sponsored by a group of 
government departments: Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenues and Customs, HM 
Treasury, Office for National Statistics, and the Scottish Government. Office 
for National Statistics has also undertaken the fieldwork. 
 
 
9 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter, Chapter 2, examines 
research questions on the consumer bankruptcy theories. It also provides 
detailed information about the consumer bankruptcy law in Great Britain and 
the data used in this thesis. Chapter 3 analyses the research questions on post-
bankruptcy credit availability. Chapter 4 investigates the research question on 
the entrepreneurial activity. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the main findings 
of the empirical chapters along with limitations and the future research agenda 
and concludes the thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Consumer Bankruptcy Decision in 
Great Britain: A Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit 
Approach 
2.1 Introduction 
The last two decades have seen a dramatic increase in both consumer 
debt and bankruptcies. The total debt held by the average British consumer 
was £30,832 in 2018, which is around 112% of average earnings and the average 
debt has been steadily increasing.  
With the rapid growth of the unsecured consumer debt, the consumer 
bankruptcy has increased from a rare event to a relatively common 
phenomenon in the last decades. To illustrate, the total number of consumer 
bankruptcy filings has increased five-fold in two decades. The number of filings 
in the UK was around 30,000 in 1998, while it was around 150,000 in 2018. One 
of the main reasons of this increase is arguably the 2002 UK bankruptcy reform 
which have made the consumer bankruptcy more pro-debtor by reducing the 
time period of bankruptcy measures from three years to one year (see Figure 
2.1 in Appendix A for details).  
There have also been similar trends in the US. The consumer bankruptcy 
filings in the US have increased from 341,233 filings in 1985 to 2,039,214 filings, 
including both bankruptcy forms1, in 2005 which is approximately a six-fold 
 
1 In the US, there are two forms of consumer bankruptcy. One is liquidation under Chapter 
7 and the other one is reorganisation under Chapter 13. Debtors have the right to choose 
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increase just in two decades. This also indicates that consumer bankruptcy 
filings have increased from 0.3% to 1.8% of total households in the US during 
the same period. This dramatic increase has forced policy makers to take action 
and finally a new legislative act was enacted in 2005 to make the filing for 
bankruptcy more difficult for some consumers (see Figure 2.2 in Appendix A 
for details). Due to this rapid increase in the consumer bankruptcy, researchers 
try to explain not only this trend but also the reasons behind the decisions of 
consumers to file for bankruptcy2.  
They also discuss the economic objectives of having consumer bankruptcy 
laws (White, 2005; Li and Sarte, 2006; Chatterjee and Gordon, 2012). One of 
the objectives of the consumer bankruptcy is to have a mechanism to repay at 
least partially to creditors in case of insolvency or default. If the creditors were 
not paid in case of default, this would harm the credit markets by increasing 
interest rates and reducing access to credits. A related objective is to protect 
debtors from aggressive collection efforts by creditors because debtors may lose 
their jobs as a result of garnishment of debtors’ vehicles or wages3. Another 
objective of the consumer bankruptcy is to provide partial consumption 
insurance to ‘honest but unfortunate’ debtors against adverse shocks to 
consumption such as divorce, job loss and health problems. If consumption 
decreases dramatically, it may cause bigger problems like effects on debtor’s 
 
between these procedures. See White (2006) for more information. 
2 A partial list includes the following studies. An early work in this area, Sullivan, Warren, 
and Westbrook (1989), discusses the adverse events. White (1998a), Domowitz and Sartain 
(1999), Gross and Souleles (2002), Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) and Han and Li (2011) 
investigate both adverse events and bankruptcy benefits. 
3 See Chatterjee and Gordon (2012) for a discussion on the implications of eliminating 
bankruptcy protection for indebted individuals. 
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family members, untreated health problems becoming permanent illnesses or 
disabilities4.  
Even though the consumer bankruptcy has been becoming a bigger issue, 
the research on this area is limited due to the lack of individual level data. 
Most of the individual level studies on the consumer bankruptcy use a 
representative sample of US households and apply to US bankruptcy 
procedures such as Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) and Han and Li (2011). The 
literature on the consumer bankruptcy focuses on two theories in explaining 
the bankruptcy decision: the strategic behaviour theory and the adverse events 
theory.  
The strategic behaviour theory suggests that consumers file for 
bankruptcy when their financial benefit from bankruptcy is higher, regardless 
of their ability to repay. This view states that consumers act strategically and 
plan to file for bankruptcy in advance (White, 1998b; Zhang, Sabarwal, and 
Gan, 2015). 
The adverse events theory suggests that consumers file for bankruptcy 
because of the adverse events they experience such as unemployment, health 
problems and divorce. These adverse events cause the financial distress in the 
form of income reduction and debt increase which eventually results in 
bankruptcy (Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Himmelstein et al., 2005; Gross and 
Notowidigdo, 2011). This study aims to contribute the literature above by 
investigating the effects of the bankruptcy benefit and adverse events on the 
consumer bankruptcy decision. Its contribution is threefold.  
First, previous studies on the consumer bankruptcy decision such as Fay, 
Hurst, and White (2002) and Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan (2015) treat 
 
4 For a more detailed discussion, see White (2005). 
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bankruptcy as a uniform case and provide little information about the different 
bankruptcy types5. In reality, not all bankruptcy types have the same 
consequences; so, if possible, bankruptcy types should be analysed separately 
to better understand the bankruptcy decision. With the unique data, this study 
investigates both the bankruptcy decision and the bankruptcy types and 
compares them rather than oversimplifying all the bankruptcy decisions as the 
same type.  
Second, since the consumer bankruptcy is a legal process, bankruptcy 
filers must have formal debts from financial intermediaries in the form of 
consumer loan or a credit card loan. However, it is possible that some 
individuals are excluded from financial market voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Therefore, we suspect that the non-bankrupt individuals belong to one of two 
groups: participants or non-participants of financial markets. A potential 
selection bias problem might be the case in this situation. In their previous 
works, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) do not explore the potential endogeneity, 
while Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan (2015) explore the endogeneity only for the 
strategic behaviour. By applying zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model, 
this study alleviates the potential endogeneity for both the bankruptcy decision 
and the different bankruptcy types. 
Third, the literature on the consumer bankruptcy mostly relates to US 
households under the US laws, it seems there is a gap for UK households. It 
seems that there is no empirical study on the consumer bankruptcy decision in 
the UK. This study aims to fill this gap and analyses the consumer bankruptcy 
decision by using a longitudinal data from a representative sample of 
5 There are four different types of bankruptcy procedures in the UK. These types can be 
categorised into two parts as the discharge of debts (fresh start) and reorganisation of debts 
(income gleaning). Similarly, there are two types of bankruptcy in the US. One is liquidation 
under Chapter 7 and the other one is reorganisation under Chapter 13. 
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households in Great Britain6 applying to the UK consumer bankruptcy 
procedures. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
consumer bankruptcy procedures in Great Britain. Then, the related existing 
literature on the consumer bankruptcy is summarised in Section 2.3. Section 
2.4 briefly discusses the theoretical framework. Section 2.5 explains the data 
and variables. Section 2.6 discusses the econometric approach and Section 2.7 
explains the empirical results. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 2.8. 
2.2 Consumer Bankruptcy Procedures in Great Britain 
Bankruptcy is the legal mechanism involving firms and individuals that 
cannot pay their debts7. Bankruptcy procedures can be divided into two parts 
as ‘corporate bankruptcy’ and ‘consumer bankruptcy’8. The corporate 
bankruptcy refers to the bankruptcy of firms, while the consumer bankruptcy 
refers to the bankruptcy of individuals. Great Britain has two legal jurisdictions 
(England and Wales, and Scotland). Even though the bankruptcy law is 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the Scotland Act 1998, consumer 
bankruptcy laws in both jurisdictions are similar. In this section, nevertheless, 
we explain the bankruptcy procedures for both jurisdictions separately.  
 
6   Great Britain includes England, Scotland and Wales, but excludes Northern Ireland and 
97.2% of the UK’s population live in Great Britain. Since our dataset includes representative 
households from Great Britain, we use ‘Great Britain’ rather than the ‘UK’ even though some 
sources use them interchangeably.  
7  There are also bankruptcy procedures for local governments and municipalities in some 
countries. However, there is no bankruptcy procedure at the international level for sovereign 
countries in financial distress. 
8 In the literature, ‘consumer bankruptcy’, ‘household bankruptcy’, ‘individual bankruptcy’ 
and ‘personal bankruptcy’ are used interchangeably. We prefer to use ‘consumer bankruptcy’ 
throughout this study to avoid confusion. 
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2.2.1 England and Wales 
2.2.1.1 Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy9 in England and Wales is a formal process for financially 
distressed individuals to discharge their eligible debts under the Insolvency Act 
1986. To be made bankrupt, a court issues a bankruptcy order after applied by 
either the individual or a creditor who is owed £750 or more by the individual. 
Bankruptcy processes are administered by an official receiver who is an officer 
of the bankruptcy court. Also, a licensed insolvency practitioner as a trustee 
from the private sector can be appointed by the creditors. The debtor’s assets10 
are disposed to pay his or her debts. During the bankruptcy process, the debtor 
is subject to some restrictions such as the prohibition of credit use more than 
£500 and being the owner or the manager of a company. Restrictions last until 
the bankruptcy process ends and the debts are discharged which usually takes 
12 months. There are very limited debt categories that cannot be discharged in 
bankruptcy, most importantly student loans11.  
A major reform in the bankruptcy law was introduced by Enterprise Act 
2002. This reform has made the consumer bankruptcy more pro-debtor by 
reducing the discharge of debts no later than one year which was previously 
three years. The main objective was to encourage post-bankruptcy 
entrepreneurial activity and increase post-bankruptcy labour participation.  
 
9  In the UK context, bankruptcy only applies to individuals. Corporations that cannot pay 
their debts are called ‘insolvent’. 
10 The debtor can keep some job related or household items like tools, clothing and furniture. 
The debtor’s pension wealth is not subject to the bankruptcy either. 
11 Non-dischargeable debts also include criminal penalties, debts arising from fraud and 
liabilities arising from family or domestic court action like claims for child support. 
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2.2.1.2 Debt Relief Orders 
A simpler and quicker form of the bankruptcy order is called ‘Debt Relief 
Order (DRO)’ which is introduced in April 2009. It aims to individuals who 
owe very little and have little or no income. To be eligible for a DRO, along 
with the other requirements12, the debtor’s total unsecured debt must not 
exceed £15,000 and the total gross assets must not exceed £300. Additionally, 
the debtor’s disposable income after deduction of normal household expenses 
must not exceed £50 per month. DROs are a simple form the bankruptcy orders 
for very low-wealth and low-income consumers. Since almost all of the debts 
are discharged under bankruptcy orders and DROs, these two bankruptcy types 
can be considered as ‘fresh start’. There are two main formal alternatives to 
‘fresh start’ bankruptcy types. The first one is ‘Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement (IVA)’ and the other one is ‘Debt Management Plan (DMP)’. 
2.2.1.3 Individual Voluntary Arrangements 
IVAs are a contractual arrangement between the financially distressed 
debtor and the creditors agreed to pay at least 75% of the debt under the new 
repayment plan negotiated by an insolvency practitioner. This new repayment 
plan usually takes five years and the return to creditors is usually higher than 
they would receive under bankruptcy orders. IVAs aim to individuals who have 
enough money left over after essential expenses. When an IVA is approved, it 
applies to all creditors, including any who disagreed to it. 
 
12 The debtor has to live and work in the UK for the last three years and has not applied 
for a DRO within the last six years. 
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2.2.1.4 Debt Management Plans 
DMPs are an agreement between the debtor and the creditors to pay all 
of the debts under a new repayment plan which is negotiated by a licensed debt 
management company. The debtor makes regular payments to the debt 
management company, and the company shares this money out between the 
creditors. DMPs are not legally binding, so the creditors do not have to agree 
on a plan and can pursue individual collections. Based on the expected future 
income, the debts are mostly reorganised rather than discharged under IVAs 
and DMPs. Therefore, these two bankruptcy types can be considered as ‘income 
gleaning’. 
2.2.2 Scotland 
2.2.2.1 Sequestration 
The bankruptcy order in Scotland is called ‘sequestration’ under the 
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985. Sequestration is the equivalent of the 
bankruptcy order in England and Wales and has the similar procedures. All 
sequestrations are administered by a trustee appointed by the court who is a 
public official. The trustee has similar functions with the official receiver in 
England and Wales. As in the bankruptcy order, the debtors surrender their 
eligible assets. In return, they obtain a discharge of all debts and obligations 
for which they were liable at the date of sequestration13. Similar to Enterprise 
Act 2002, a major reform of bankruptcy is introduced with the Bankruptcy and 
Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 which reduced the required time for the 
discharge of debts. 
 
13 For more information, please see Skene and Walters (2006). 
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2.2.2.2 Protected Trust Deeds 
Protected Trust Deeds (PTDs) are the Scottish equivalent of IVAs. Like 
IVAs, PTDs bind all creditors and they generally provide for the debtor to 
make appropriate contributions from income, and in practice many PTDs are 
income-only because the debtor has no non-exempt assets. PTDs are an 
alternative to sequestration for the debtors with income. The debtor obtains 
debt relief and the creditors usually receive better returns than they would have 
in sequestration. 
2.2.2.3 Debt Arrangement Scheme 
Debt Arrangement Schemes (DASs) are an agreement between the debtor 
and the creditors to reorganise the debt repayment schedule. All creditors 
whose debts are included must consent to it. DASs can be considered as the 
Scottish equivalent of DMPs. DASs are primarily an income-based debt 
management tool. Even though it is possible to include assets in DASs, many 
debtors have no assets or choose the DAS precisely because they wish to 
manage their debts without liquidating their assets. 
To summarise, even though there are two separate jurisdictions in Great 
Britain, they have similar bankruptcy types to discharge or reorganise the 
consumer debts. Since almost all of the debts are discharged under bankruptcy 
orders (sequestration in Scotland) and DROs, these two bankruptcy types can 
be considered as ‘fresh start’. On the other hand, the debts are mostly 
reorganised rather than discharged under IVAs (PTDs in Scotland) and DMPs 
(DASs in Scotland) based on the expected future income. Therefore, these two 
bankruptcy types can be considered as ‘income gleaning’. 
 
 
19 
2.3 Literature Review 
The studies on the consumer bankruptcy are mostly published in 
economics, finance and legal journals. Legal literature on the consumer 
bankruptcy mostly focuses on bankruptcy laws, procedures and their 
applications. Some legal studies rely on available survey data to analyse the 
bankruptcy decision, which is closely related to economically oriented empirical 
literature. Economics and finance literature on consumer bankruptcy focus on 
both theoretical and empirical studies. 
2.3.1 Theoretical Literature 
Theoretical studies on the consumer bankruptcy are mostly based on 
quantitative macroeconomic models. These studies typically discuss optimal 
consumer bankruptcy policies. They generally have partial or general 
equilibrium approach which include household maximisation problem with 
other equilibrium conditions such as competition (Athreya, 2002; 2006), 
resource constraints (Li and Sarte, 2006; Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang, 2014) 
and market clearing (Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt, 2007; Narajabad, 2012). 
Athreya (2002) develops a general equilibrium model of personal 
bankruptcy to investigate the trade-off between the consumption smoothing 
role of bankruptcy and the interest rate and finds that the elimination of 
bankruptcy altogether has substantial benefits. Athreya (2006) develops an 
incomplete markets model where secured and unsecured assets coexist and are 
treated differentially in a bankruptcy proceeding and finds that exemptions are 
associated positively with filing rates, but negatively with the availability of 
unsecured credit.  
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On the contrary, Li and Sarte (2006), studying the implications of US 
personal bankruptcy rules for resource allocation and welfare, find that the 
complete elimination of bankruptcy provisions causes significant declines in 
output and welfare. Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2014) develop a model to 
estimate how the bankruptcy fees prevent liquidity-constrained households 
from filing for bankruptcy. They exploit the randomised timing of the rebate 
checks and estimate that the rebates cause a significant short-run increase in 
the number of consumer bankruptcy filings. 
One of the issues discussed is the trade-off between credit availability and 
work incentives after bankruptcy and the partial consumption insurance. In 
their model with two types of debtors, Wang and White (2000) show that the 
‘fresh start’ bankruptcy policy is optimal if the all debtors are non-opportunists. 
However, if the debtors have opportunistic behaviour, then the policy should 
require some payments from post-bankruptcy earnings, because the fresh start 
policy attracts opportunists to file for bankruptcy even if they are able to repay 
their debts. The more debtors file and benefit from bankruptcy, the less access 
to credit at higher interest rates. 
Chatterjee et al. (2007) study the general equilibrium of consumer 
bankruptcy theoretically and quantitatively and finds the existence of a steady‐
state equilibrium. They examine the policy change in the US and find that the 
change yields large welfare gains. Many models assume that if the consumers 
default on their debts, they always file for bankruptcy (Chatterjee et al., 2007; 
Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt, 2007). However, some debtors default without 
filing for bankruptcy. In this case, the creditors may exercise collection efforts 
such as taking money from the debtors’ wages and accounts. The collection 
efforts are sometimes risky, because the debtors may lose their jobs or file for 
bankruptcy in response.  White (1998b) models the default option versus the 
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bankruptcy choice and finds that both creditors and debtors play mixed 
strategies, which means some debtors may default without being pursued by 
the creditors. 
The option value of the consumer bankruptcy is also discussed in the 
literature. If the debtors’ ability to pay decreases in the future, they can exercise 
their option to file for bankruptcy and the creditors bear the burden of debts. 
The price of the performing the option is the debtor’s eligible assets for 
liquidation. White (1998a) calculates the value of the option for households 
using a representative sample of US households and finds that many debtors 
who do not benefit from filing for bankruptcy immediately gain from having 
the option to file in the future. 
2.3.2 Empirical Literature 
The earlier empirical studies on consumer bankruptcy generally use 
aggregate level data due to the lack of suitable household level data (such as 
Shepard, 1984; Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993; Buckley, 1994). There is relatively 
a small household level empirical literature on consumer bankruptcy. Hence, 
relatively fewer studies focus on demographics and behaviour of individuals 
who file for bankruptcy. 
In an early study, Shepard (1984) examines the bankruptcy reform act of 
1978 in the US and argues that bankruptcy code lead to a large increase in the 
number of bankruptcy filings. Similarly, Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) 
investigate the same reform and state that the code extended a variety of new 
benefits and enhanced the position of debtors against creditors which lead to 
increase in the number of bankruptcy cases. Buckley (1994) also discusses 
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explanations for the shift in the U.S. bankruptcy policy in favour of debtors 
against creditors. 
In their study, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1994) find that 
bankrupt individuals have less income and assets, and more debts compared to 
non-bankrupt individuals. Education level also affects the bankruptcy decision.  
Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) find that household heads with more years of 
education are less likely to file for bankruptcy. Similarly, US postal codes with 
higher percentage of residents with undergraduate level education have 
significantly lower bankruptcy rates controlling for income, ethnicity, marital 
status, age, sex and employment among others (Lefgren and McIntyre, 2009). 
Several studies focus on consumers’ financial situation and their 
bankruptcy decision.  Domowitz and Sartain (1999) use two datasets, one is a 
sample of households filed for bankruptcy and the other one is a representative 
sample of US households with financial information. They find that consumers 
with more credit card debt are more likely to file for bankruptcy. Similarly, 
Gross and Souleles (2002) use data from credit card accounts and find that 
bankruptcy rates are associated with the delinquent debt. Furthermore, Zhu 
(2011) uses data from the consumer bankruptcy filers in the US state of 
Delaware and finds that the household expenditure on durable goods such as 
houses and vehicles contributes to the consumer bankruptcy significantly. 
On the other hand, some researchers focus on the relationship between 
adverse events (unemployment, health problems and divorce) and the consumer 
bankruptcy decision. In an early study, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
(1989) use a sample of bankrupt households in the US, and they find that 
adverse events lead to consumer bankruptcy by decreasing consumers’ ability 
to repay.  Domowitz and Sartain (1999) also argue that households with 
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medical debt of 2% or more of their income have more than twenty times higher 
probability of filing for bankruptcy than the overall probability.  Himmelstein 
et al. (2005) survey consumer bankruptcy filers and find that 28.3% of the 
filings were due to illness or injury and 46.2% of the filings are related to major 
medical causes. Similarly, Gross and Notowidigdo (2011) study on Medicaid 
expansions and find that medical costs have crucial importance in roughly 26% 
of consumer bankruptcies among low-income households. 
 Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) analyse both the effect of financial benefit 
and adverse events on the consumer bankruptcy by using data from the 1996 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and find that the consumer 
bankruptcy is mostly related to consumers’ financial benefit, which is simply 
dischargeable debts minus non-exempt assets, from filing for bankruptcy. They 
find that an increase of $1,000 in financial benefit is associated with 7% increase 
in the probability of filing for bankruptcy. For the bankruptcy benefit, they 
find that the dischargeable debt is the dominant consideration in the 
bankruptcy decision. They also find little support for the hypothesis that filings 
for bankruptcy increases when adverse events occur. Their approach to both 
views on the consumer bankruptcy constitutes the basis of this study. 
Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) analyse bankruptcy filing rates in the US 
states by using postal codes and find that filing rates are affected by policies 
such as exemptions and garnishment procedures. Therefore, an optimal 
consumer bankruptcy policy is needed to protect both the debtor and the 
creditors, which is one of the main questions in the literature on the consumer 
bankruptcy. 
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Moreover, some research on the consumer bankruptcy are devoted to the 
social stigma14 and information costs15. In their empirical analysis, Sullivan, 
Warren, and Westbrook (2006) find that increased filings result from increased 
financial distress rather than the declining bankruptcy stigma.  Cohen-Cole and 
Duygan-Bump (2008) study a large sample of individual credit information 
provided by a US credit bureau and argue that the increase in consumer 
bankruptcy filings is more likely associated with the decreased information costs 
rather than the decreased social stigma.  Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) also 
find that households live in districts which have higher bankruptcy rates are 
more likely to file for bankruptcy which implies that the locality is an important 
determinant on the bankruptcy decision. In addition, discussions and empirical 
studies in the literature also include the relationship between the consumer 
bankruptcy and credit markets (Gropp, Scholz, and White, 1997; Dick and 
Lehnert, 2010) and the relationship between the consumer bankruptcy the 
labour supply (Han and Li, 2007; Chen and Zhao, 2017). 
Due to the lack of suitable individual level data, the literature on the 
consumer bankruptcy specifically devoted to the UK is mostly limited to legal 
studies regarding the bankruptcy procedures and reforms (Skene and Walters, 
2006; Ramsay, 2007). This study aims to investigate the consumer bankruptcy 
decision using individual level longitudinal data from representative households 
in Great Britain in order to fill the gap in this area by contributing to the 
empirical literature. 
 
14  Social stigma can be in different forms such as negative views of friends and family or 
inability in obtaining credit. 
15  Knowledge of eligibility, application procedures, bureaucratic details, etc. may matter 
on the bankruptcy decision. 
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2.4 Theoretical Framework 
2.4.1 Strategic Behaviour Theory 
The strategic behaviour theory suggests that consumers are more likely 
to file for bankruptcy when their benefit from bankruptcy is higher, regardless 
of their ability to repay. This view states that consumers act strategically and 
plan to file in advance. The bankruptcy benefit is defined as the financial 
benefit of the consumers under the bankruptcy procedures. The benefit from 
filing for bankruptcy for individual 𝑖, which is mainly drawn from earlier studies 
such as Fay, Hurst, and White (2002), Li, White, and Zhu (2011) and Darolia 
and Ritter (2015), can be calculated as follows: 
𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = max[𝑑𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑡, 0] (2.1) 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the bankruptcy benefit for individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡, which is 
non-negative because consumers file for bankruptcy strategically if their benefit 
from bankruptcy is non-negative. 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 are the individual 𝑖’s 
dischargeable debts in bankruptcy and eligible assets for liquidation at time 𝑡, 
respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑡 is court costs and administrative fees for bankruptcy at 
time 𝑡. 𝑑𝑖,𝑡  is calculated as total net debts of individual 𝑖, excluding non-
dischargeable debts such as student loans at time 𝑡, similarly 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is calculated 
as the total net wealth of individual 𝑖, excluding the non-eligible wealth such 
as the pension wealth and some household items at time 𝑡. Dischargeable debts 
and eligible assets follow the bankruptcy procedures as explained in Section 
2.2. 
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This study slightly modifies the theoretical model introduced by Zhang, 
Sabarwal, and Gan (2015). Consider a standard, two-period decision-making 
framework. In the first period, the consumer borrows money. In the second 
period, one of the two states prevails: a good state or a bad state. The good 
state represents the planned state without any adverse event, while the bad 
state represents the occurrence of adverse events.  Each state corresponds to a 
decision node, and the probability of each state is 𝜋𝑔 and 𝜋𝑏, respectively, 
with 𝜋𝑔 + 𝜋𝑏 = 1. 
As usual, a consumer has to decide how much to consume at each state; 
her consumption is denoted as 𝑐𝑡,  𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1 and 𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1 where  𝑐𝑡 represents the 
consumption in the first period,  𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1 the consumption in the good state and  𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1 the consumption in the bad state in the next period. The consumer has 
a twice continuously differentiable utility function with the following 
conditions:  
 𝑢′(𝑐) > 0,  𝑢′′(𝑐) < 0 (2.2) 
 
 lim𝑐→0 𝑢′(𝑐) = ∞, lim𝑐→∞𝑢′(𝑐) = 0 (2.3) 
 
and the consumer has the following expected utility: 
 
 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛿[ 𝜋𝑔𝑢(𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1)+  𝜋𝑏𝑢(𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1)]				 (2.4) 
 
The endowment in consumption units at each node is denoted 
as 𝑤𝑡, 𝑤𝑔,𝑡+1 and 𝑤𝑏,𝑡+1. We normalise the endowment to zero in the first 
period. Therefore, we assume that  𝑤𝑡 = 0 ≤  𝑤𝑏,𝑡+1 <  𝑤𝑔,𝑡+1 for convenience. 
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Moreover, credit markets are available to the consumer at the market interest 
rate 𝑟. As usual, a single consumer takes interest rates as given. The consumer 
decides how much debt to take subject to a debt limit which is exogenously 
determined by the creditor; so it is assumed that 0 <  𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝑑 ̅where  𝑑𝑡 denotes 
the debt the consumer takes at time 𝑡 and 𝑑 ̅the debt limit. The debt in the 
next period denoted as 𝑑𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟) 𝑑𝑡. 
The strategic behaviour consumer is a rational consumer who includes the 
bankruptcy option in her maximisation problem. In the first period, she takes 
the debt to consume. In the next period, she considers the bankruptcy option 
no matter whether the outcome is good or bad. If she files for bankruptcy, her 
eligible assets will be liquidated but in return, her debts will be discharged. 
Therefore, the strategic behaviour consumer solves the following problem:  max 𝑐𝑡 , 𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1, 𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛿[ 𝜋𝑔𝑢(𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1)+  𝜋𝑏𝑢(𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1)] (2.5) 
subject to 𝑐𝑡 =  𝑑𝑡 𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1 = max[𝑤𝑔,𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1, max[𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑤𝑔,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑡+1, 0]] 𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1 = max[𝑤𝑏,𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1, max[𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑤𝑏,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑡+1, 0]] 0 <  𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝑑 ̅
 
The maximum operator in the constraints corresponds the bankruptcy 
decision. If the consumer, for example, decides not to file for bankruptcy in the 
good state, the constraint becomes 𝑤𝑔,𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1. If she files for bankruptcy, 
the constraint becomes max[𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑤𝑔,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑡+1, 0] which is the 
bankruptcy benefit. The strategic behaviour consumer chooses the most 
profitable option in any case. 
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2.4.2 Adverse Events Theory 
The adverse events theory suggests that consumers file for bankruptcy 
due to adverse events such as job loss, divorce and health problems which 
reduce their income, hence ability to repay their debts dramatically. Sullivan, 
Warren, and Westbrook (1989, 2006) support this theory by using data from 
bankruptcy filings from several US states. They conclude that while some cases 
of strategic behaviour may exist, the bankruptcy is predominantly due to 
adverse events and they state that no one plans to go bankrupt. 
This theory assumes that consumers do not plan to file for bankruptcy. 
If an adverse event occurs, they may be compelled to file for bankruptcy. If 
such an event does not occur, they do not consider filing for bankruptcy. An 
important question arises from this assumption: ‘why do not they include a 
bankruptcy option in the good state?’ One explanation can be utility penalties 
arising from future reputation losses from filing (Dubey, Geanakoplos, and 
Shubik, 2005). Such losses can be the restricted future access to credit markets 
and the negative impact on credit score (Musto, 2004). For example, a 
bankruptcy flag on a consumer credit report stays there for ten years which 
affects the access to credit in the future negatively. If these losses are high 
enough, they may deter consumers to file in the good state even if it is 
financially practical. Therefore, consumers may optimally decide not to 
consider a bankruptcy option (Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan, 2015).  
The adverse events consumer takes decisions sequentially. In the first 
period, she takes the debt to consume and plans accordingly. In the next period, 
if the planned events occur, she consumes as planned and she does not consider 
the bankruptcy option. If an adverse event occurs, she includes the bankruptcy 
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option in her maximisation problem. If she files for bankruptcy, her eligible 
assets will be liquidated but in return, her debts will be discharged.  
The adverse events theory has the same model with the strategic 
behaviour theory. They have the same assumptions regarding decision nodes, 
debts, endowments, utility functions and the expected utilities. The only 
difference is the optimisation problem. The adverse events consumer solves the 
following optimisation problem:   max 𝑐𝑡 , 𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1, 𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛿[ 𝜋𝑔𝑢(𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1)+  𝜋𝑏𝑢(𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1)] (2.6) 
subject to 𝑐𝑡 =  𝑑𝑡 𝑐𝑔,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑔,𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1 𝑐𝑏,𝑡+1 = max[𝑤𝑏,𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1, max[𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑤𝑏,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑡+1, 0]] 0 <  𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝑑 ̅
 
The model suggests that the adverse events consumer only files for 
bankruptcy in the bad state, while the strategic behaviour consumer may file 
for bankruptcy in any state.  
The models presented in this section are simplified models to represent 
the main aspects of the bankruptcy decision. As the case for all models, these 
models have some limitations and do not capture all the relevant aspects of the 
consumer bankruptcy such as the role of social stigma, information, bankruptcy 
types, access to credit in the future, entrepreneurial activities and work 
incentives. Some of these aspects are not possible to capture in the data, 
though. For further studies, it is possible to modify the models to address some 
of these issues in a reduced form by including parameters for access to credit 
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markets in the future, or utility penalties in case of bankruptcy, but it is unclear 
whether such additions would yield tractable models. 
2.5 Data 
We use data from the Wealth and Assets Survey which was provided by 
the Office for National Statistics that allowed legal access to the special use 
data under the Approved Researcher Scheme. This section provides extensive 
information about the data. 
2.5.1 Survey Summary 
Wealth is an important component of the economic well-being of 
households as a household’s resources and economic behaviour can be 
influenced by its stock of wealth. However, data on wealth is sparse and 
consequently measures of household income are often used as the sole gauge of 
economic well-being. To understand the economic well-being of households it 
is increasingly necessary to look further than a simple measure of household 
income. 
The Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS)16 is a longitudinal survey which 
focuses on the economic well-being of individuals in Great Britain by collecting 
data on assets, savings, income, and debts of individuals and households. It is 
sponsored by a group of government departments: Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenues and 
Customs, HM Treasury, Office for National Statistics, and the Scottish 
Government. Office for National Statistics has also undertaken the fieldwork. 
 
16 WAS is also known as ‘Wealth in Great Britain’. 
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Since the survey covers only private households, it excludes people in 
retirement homes, nursing homes, prisons, barracks or university halls of 
residence, and also homeless people.  
The first wave (Wave 1) interviews were carried out from July 2006 to 
June 2008, covering about 53,300 adult individuals17 and 30,500 households. 
For the second wave (Wave 2), same households were interviewed again from 
July 2008 to July 2010. Due to the attrition, interviews were achieved with 
approximately 34,500 adults and 20,000 households. In the third wave (Wave 
3), addition to follow-up respondents at Wave 1 and Wave 2, a new cohort was 
introduced, which is a new random sample of around 12,000 addresses. Wave 
3 covered July 2010-June 2012 and was achieved with about 40,400 adults and 
21,400 households. Finally, the fourth wave (Wave 4) interviewed 38,300 adults 
and 20,200 households.  
Table 2.1 summarises the sample sizes for each wave. 
Table 2.1: Sample Sizes of Each Wave 
Wave Number of Households Number of Adults 
Wave 1 30,500 53,300 
Wave 2 20,000 34,500 
Wave 3 21,400 40,400 
Wave 4 20,200 38,300 
                       Source: Wealth and Assets Survey 
2.5.2 Survey Design and Structure 
The WAS collects information about private household wealth in Great 
Britain. The survey uses the small users Postcode Address File (PAF) as the 
sample frame for residential addresses in Great Britain, that is, England, Wales 
 
17 ‘Adult’ is defined as the respondents aged 16 and over. 
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and Scotland; excluding North of the Caledonian Canal and the Isles of Scilly. 
The ONS copy of the PAF is updated twice a year to ensure that recently built 
addresses are included and demolished, or derelict properties are removed 
quickly. 
The survey estimates are designed to be representative of the population 
of Great Britain, therefore the WAS, like most social surveys uses a ‘probability 
proportional to size’ or PPS method of sampling cases. This means that the 
probability of an address being selected is proportional to the number of 
addresses within a given geographic area, with a higher number of addresses 
being selected from densely populated areas. Table 2.2 compares the 
geographical distribution of the WAS sample and the whole population of Great 
Britain for both individuals and households.  
 
Table 2.2: Geographical Distribution of Population 
 Individuals Households 
  Sample 
Percentage 
Population 
Percentage 
Sample 
Percentage 
Population 
Percentage 
North East 4 4 5 4 
North West 12 11 12 11 
Yorkshire & 
Humber 9 9 9 9 
East Midlands 9 7 9 7 
West Midlands 9 9 9 9 
East of England 10 9 10 10 
London 9 13 9 12 
South East 14 14 14 14 
South West 9 9 9 9 
England 86 86 85 86 
Wales 5 5 5 5 
Scotland 9 9 9 9 
Great Britain 100 100 100 100 
Source: Office for National Statistics and Wealth and Assets Survey 
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In addition to the geographical distribution, the WAS sample is also 
designed to be representative of the population in terms of characteristics of 
individuals and households such as age, sex, marital status, employment status 
and education level. For example, Table 2.3 shows the distribution of 
households by the household type. Households were categorised into one of the 
ten household types according to the number of people living in the household, 
family type and ages of the respondents. The largest group were those 
households with married or cohabiting couples with dependent children (19%) 
and the smallest were those households with a lone parent and non-dependent 
children (3%).  
 
Table 2.3: Household Types 
 Households 
Household Types  Sample Frequency 
Sample 
Percentage 
Population 
Frequency 
Population 
Percentage 
Single person over SPA 3,618 18 3,970,300 15 
Single person below SPA 2,229 11 3,211,100 13 
Couple over SPA 3,411 17 2,840,500 11 
Couple below SPA 2,184 11 2,865,700 11 
Couple, one over one below 
SPA 
964 5 827,300 3 
Couple and dependent 
children 
3,833 19 5,771,700 23 
Couple and non-dependent 
children only 1,286 6 2,102,900 8 
Lone parent and dependent 
children 1,116 6 1,506,800 6 
Lone parent and non-
dependent children only 
674 3 1,136,600 4 
More than 1 family, other 
household types 
932 5 1,382,200 5 
All Households 20,247 100 25,615,200 100 
Source: Office for National Statistics and Wealth and Assets Survey 
Note: SPA is State Pension Age (65 for men, 60 for women) 
 
The percentage of households consisting of married or cohabiting couples 
with dependent children was more than three times greater than the proportion 
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of households consisting of lone parent households with dependent children. 
These numbers regarding the sample are consistent with the whole population. 
This is also the case in other individual characteristics. 
Table 2.4 illustrates the longitudinal design of the Wealth and Assets 
Survey. Wave 1 started in July 2006 with fieldwork being spread over a two-
year period. Wave 2, a follow up to Wave 1, was conducted between July 2008 
and June 2010. The introduction of a new cohort of addresses in Wave 3 and 
Wave 4 is shown in the table. 
 
Table 2.4: Wealth and Assets Survey Wave Structure 
 
  Source: Wealth and Assets Survey 
 
All interviews have a two-yearly interval between waves, therefore 
providing estimates of change in relation to the same period of time. For 
example, Wave 1 interviews conducted during July 2006 would be repeated for 
Wave 2 in July 2008. It is important that this gap remains constant so that 
estimates of change are comparable from wave to wave. 
2.5.3 Specification 
2.5.3.1 Bankruptcy Type 
The WAS estimates physical wealth, property wealth, financial wealth, 
and private pension wealth by asking households about their assets, liabilities 
Jul 06 
Jun 07
Jul 07 
Jun 08
Jul 08 
Jun 09
Jul 09 
Jun 10
Jul 10 
Jun 11
Jul 11 
Jun 12
Jul 12 
Jun 13
Jul 13 
Jun 14
Wave 1 Year 1 Year 2
Wave 2 Year 1 Year 2
Wave 3 Year 1 Year 2
Wave 3 new cohort Year 1 Year 2
Wave 4 Year 1 Year 2
Wave 4 new cohort Year 1 Year 2
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and pension schemes. It also includes household and individual demographics, 
socioeconomic characteristics, and measures of financial attitudes, behaviours, 
and difficulties. 
 Related to financial difficulties, the WAS asks individuals two specific 
questions about the consumer bankruptcy. All adult respondents are asked in 
the survey: 
“Have you entered into any formal insolvency proceedings or into a 
Debt Management Plan (DMP) in the last year?”  
Respondents are required to choose one of the following options: 
1. Yes  
2. No  
If they choose ‘Yes’, then they are asked: 
“What type of insolvency proceedings have you entered into?” 
Respondents are required to choose one of the following options: 
1. Bankruptcy  
2. An Individual Voluntary Arrangement  
3. A Debt Management Plan  
4. A Debt Relief Order  
 
Respondents who choose (1) or (4) from the list above are identified as 
‘fresh start’ bankrupts, while respondents who choose (2) or (3) are identified 
as ‘income gleaning’ bankrupts18. 
 
18 The difference between ‘fresh start’ and ‘income gleaning’ is explained in Section 2.2. 
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2.5.3.2 Bankruptcy Benefit  
As explained in Section 2.4, the strategic behaviour theory suggests that 
consumers are more likely to file for bankruptcy when their benefit from 
bankruptcy is higher, regardless of their ability to repay. 
As explained in Equation 2.1, the bankruptcy benefit is calculated for 
each individual by using their eligible assets and dischargeable debts following 
the bankruptcy procedures. The mean and median values of the bankruptcy 
benefit is negative, but some financially distressed consumers have positive 
benefit values. Table 2.5 gives information on bankruptcy benefits. 6.3% of the 
individuals have a positive bankruptcy benefit, but only 1.4% of them have a 
sizable benefit (more than £10,000). These rates are substantially higher than 
the actual bankruptcy rates19. 
 
Table 2.5: Consumers That Would Benefit from Filing for Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy Benefit Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Total Sample 
Greater than £0 6.30% 6.10% 6.50% 6.40% 6.30% 
Greater than £1,000 4.80% 4.60% 4.90% 4.80% 4.80% 
Greater than £10,000 1.40% 1.40% 1.50% 1.40% 1.40% 
Median (£) -67,421 -74,483 -70,923 -70,654 -70,500 
Mean (£) -127,388 -134,530 -140,425 -133,897 -133,273 
Observations 53,092 34,362 37,643 36,857 161,954 
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey    
 
2.5.3.3 Adverse Events  
Another view on the consumer bankruptcy is that individuals file for 
bankruptcy due to adverse events such as unemployment, divorce and health 
 
19 For a discussion on why the actual rate is considerably low compared to bankruptcy 
benefits suggest, see White (1998a). 
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problems which reduce their income, hence ability to repay their debts 
dramatically. 
In addition to data regarding wealth, the WAS also keeps track of 
characteristics of the individuals. Thanks to the panel structure of data, adverse 
events between waves for each individual can be observed. This study specifies 
three adverse events based on the literature (e.g. Domowitz and Sartain,1999; 
Fay, Hurst, and White, 2002; and Himmelstein et al., 2005). These are 
unemployment, divorce and health problems. Since the study focuses on 
adverse events as negative shocks, it observes each individual two periods and 
notes any change in these characteristics. Therefore, the adverse events are 
becoming unemployed (job loss), getting divorced or separated and the onset 
of a serious health problem which limits the physical activity. 
Since the adverse events reduce the income dramatically, an 
interpretation of the adverse events view implies that income should be 
negatively and significantly related to probability of filing for bankruptcy, but 
not the bankruptcy benefit; because the bankruptcy benefit is mostly related 
to individuals’ wealth rather than their income. In contrast, the bankruptcy 
benefit view implies that the benefit from bankruptcy should be positively and 
significantly related to probability of filing for bankruptcy, but not the income; 
because the income is not directly related to individuals’ bankruptcy benefit 
from filing. Therefore, a regression of the bankruptcy benefit and the income 
on individuals’ bankruptcy decision should show the significance of the 
bankruptcy benefit and income. 
The effects of adverse events on the bankruptcy decision can be also tested 
by using related dummy variables for becoming unemployed, getting divorced 
or separated, and the onset of a serious health problem which limits the physical 
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activity, rather than the variable for income. The study also includes some 
demographic variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, education level and 
number of people in the household which may be related to the consumer 
bankruptcy decision. The variables used in this study are explained in the next 
section. 
2.5.4 Variables 
2.5.4.1 Dependent Variables 
The main dependent variable for the bankruptcy decision models is 
Bankruptcy, which is defined as whether the individual filed for bankruptcy or 
not. It is binary variable. If the individual files for any type of bankruptcy, it 
takes the value of 1, otherwise 0.  
The main dependent variable for the bankruptcy type models is 
Bankruptcy Type, which is the bankrupt individual’s choice of bankruptcy type, 
either ‘income gleaning’ or ‘fresh start’. It is a categorical variable which takes 
three values (0 for non-bankrupts, 1 for income gleaners, 2 for fresh starters). 
The WAS asks individuals whether or not they filed for bankruptcy. If 
the answer is yes, it also asks the bankruptcy type.  
2.5.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variable for the strategic behaviour model is 
Bankruptcy Benefit. The bankruptcy benefit is calculated as explained in 
Equation 2.1. Eligible Assets and Dischargeable Debts are also tested as 
explanatory variables in a variant of the strategic behaviour model.  
The adverse events model has three explanatory variables. The first one 
is Becoming Unemployed which indicates whether the individual gets 
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unemployed, in other words loses his or her job. It is a binary variable and 
takes the value of 1 if the individual gets unemployed, otherwise 0.  
The second one is Getting Divorced or Separated which indicates whether 
the individual get divorced or separated. It is binary variable and takes the 
value of 1 if the individual gets divorced or separated, otherwise 0. 
The third one is Health Problem which indicates the onset of a serious 
health problem which limits the physical activity. It is a binary variable. If the 
individual experiences the onset of serious health problem, it takes the value of 
1, otherwise 0. 
2.5.4.3 Control Variables 
In addition to explanatory variables, several variables are used as control 
variables. Income indicates the annual income of the individual. Age represents 
the age of the consumer. Since the study only analyses the adult individuals, 
this variable takes the minimum value of 16 which the defined minimum age 
for an adult by the ONS.  
Education Level is the educational attainment of the consumer. It takes 
the value of 1 if the consumer has a bachelor’s degree or above, 0 otherwise. 
Family Size indicates the number of persons in the household. Ethnicity is the 
racial origin of the individual and it takes the value of 1 if the individual’s 
racial origin is white, 0 otherwise. Gender indicates the sex of the individual 
and it takes the value of 1 if the individual is female or 0 if the individual is 
male. 
All these variables are mainly drawn from the empirical studies on the 
consumer bankruptcy (e.g. Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Fay, Hurst and White 
2002; Gross and Souleles, 2002; Zhu, 2011). 
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2.6 Econometric Methodology 
Since the consumer bankruptcy is a legal process, bankruptcy filers must 
have formal debts from financial intermediaries in the form of a consumer loan 
or a credit card loan. However, it is possible that some individuals are excluded 
from financial market voluntarily or involuntarily. On the one hand, some 
individuals may have informal debts from friends or relatives and do not use 
any formal credit options voluntarily. On the other hand, some individuals may 
be rejected by financial institutions even though they apply for credit, hence 
are excluded from the market involuntarily. These individuals are not 
technically able to file for bankruptcy even though they have positive financial 
benefits or have experienced adverse events. Therefore, a potential selection 
bias may exist. This study employs the zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) 
model to alleviate this problem.  
Even though there is a dramatic increase in the number of the consumer 
bankruptcy in the recent decades, it is naturally a rare event. Less than one 
per cent of households go bankrupt each year in the UK, therefore our data 
include high fraction of non-bankrupts. The zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) 
model fits very well when the data exhibit a high fraction of observations in 
the lowest category, what we refer as zero; hence the name ‘zero-inflated’. In 
the context of ZIOP models, zero is an actual 0 value or the lowest outcome 
category (non-bankrupts in this case).  
When using survey data to gather information on the bankruptcy 
decision, two questions are asked: whether filed for bankruptcy and if so, the 
bankruptcy type. Two types of consumer prevail: bankrupts and non-
bankrupts. However, in reality, three types of consumer exist: non-participants 
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(who never participate in the credit markets, thus are not technically able to 
file for bankruptcy), participant non-bankrupts (who participate in the credit 
markets, but never filed for bankruptcy) and bankrupts (who filed for 
bankruptcy). Even though both the non-participants and the participant non-
bankrupts are reported as non-bankrupts, they are driven by different factors. 
In previous studies, probit models have been combined with Heckman models 
to deal with sample selection and instrumental variables to deal with 
endogeneity to solve this problem (Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan 2015). As in all 
such studies, it is difficult to identify variables which affect selection but not 
the outcome.20 As an alternative method to deal with these problems, this study 
uses the zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model. 
2.6.1 Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit (ZIOP) Model 
The ZIOP model is developed by Harris and Zhao (2007) who start by 
defining a discrete random variable 𝑦 that is observable and assumes the 
discrete ordered values of 0, 1, … , 𝐽 . A traditional Ordered Probit (OP) model 
would map a single latent variable to the observed outcome 𝑦 that being related 
to a set of covariates. However, the ZIOP model involves two latent equation. 
It uses a probit selection equation and an ordered probit equation. In this 
model, each individual has to overcome two hurdles: whether to participate in 
the credit markets, and then, conditional on participation, whether to file for 
bankruptcy. Two type of non-bankruptcy may occur. A non-participant 
individual is automatically ineligible to file for bankruptcy regardless of his 
financial and adverse events situation, while a participant non-bankrupt 
individual may file for bankruptcy once the circumstances require.  
 
20 For more information, please see Sartori (2003). 
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First, the participation group (participants versus non-participants in the 
credit markets) can be modelled using a probit model. Following Harris and 
Zhao (2007), let 𝑟 denote indicating 𝑟 = 0 if the individual belongs to the non-
participation group or  𝑟 = 1  if the individual belongs to the participation 
group. 𝑟 is related to a latent variable 𝑟∗ via the mapping: 𝑟 = 1 for 𝑟∗ > 0 and 𝑟 = 0 for 𝑟∗ ≤ 0. The latent variable 𝑟∗ represents the propensity for 
participation and is given by 
 𝑟∗ = 𝒙′𝜷+ 𝜀 (2.7) 
where 𝒙 is vector of covariates that determines participation, 𝜷 is a vector of 
coefficients that have to be estimated, and  𝜀 is the error term. With the probit 
model, the probability of participation is given by 
 Pr(𝑟 = 1|𝒙) = Pr(𝑟∗ > 0|𝒙) =  Φ(𝒙′𝜷) (2.8) 
 
where Φ(·)	 is the cumulative distribution function of the univariate standard 
normal distribution. Next, conditioning on  𝑟 = 1, participation levels 𝑦 ̃(𝑦̃ =0,1, … , 𝐽)  are modelled using an ordered probit (OP) model via a second 
underlying latent variable 𝑦∗̃; these levels may also include 0. 
 𝑦∗̃ = 𝒛′𝛾 + 𝑢 (2.9) 
 
where 𝒛 is vector of explanatory variables, 𝛾 is a vector of coefficients that have 
to be estimated, and  𝑢 is the error term. In the ZIOP model, there is no 
expectation that both 𝒙 and 𝒛 are the same in each equation. For example, it 
might be argued that the participation in the credit markets is more likely to 
be affected by socioeconomic factors, whereas being a non-bankrupt after 
participation is more likely to be affected by financial situation and adverse 
shocks. In this analysis, 𝒛 includes the control variables in Section 2.5.4, while 
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𝒙 includes both explanatory and control variables. The mapping between 𝑦(∗ 
and 𝑦( is given as follows. 
 
 𝑦 ̃= ⎩{⎨{
⎧ 0  if 𝑦∗̃ ≤ 0,            1  if 𝜇0 < 𝑦∗̃ ≤ 𝜇1,    2  if 𝜇1 < 𝑦∗̃ ≤ 𝜇2,    and so on.           ⎭}⎬}
⎫
 (2.10) 
 
where 𝜇 is a boundary parameter to be estimated with the assumption of 𝜇0 =0. The ordered probit probabilities are given as follows. 
 
 Pr(𝑦)̃ = ⎩{{⎨
{{⎧Pr (𝑦 ̃= 0|𝒛, 𝑟 = 1)  = Φ(−𝒛′𝛾)),                       Pr (𝑦̃ = 𝑗|𝒛, 𝑟 = 1) = Φ(𝜇𝑗 − 𝒛′𝛾) − Φ(𝜇𝑗−1 − 𝒛′𝛾)                                          (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 − 1), Pr (𝑦̃= 𝐽 |𝒛, 𝑟 = 1)  = 1−Φ(𝜇𝐽−1−𝒛′𝛾).            ⎭}}⎬
}}⎫ (2.11) 
 
Note that 𝑟 and 𝑦 ̃ are both unobservable in terms of the zeros. The observed 
response variable is 𝑦 = 𝑟𝑦.̃ Thus, the zero outcome occurs when 𝑟 = 0 (the 
individual is a non-participant in the credit markets) or occurs when 𝑟 = 1 and 𝑦̃ = 0 (the individual is a participant non-bankrupt). To observe a positive 𝑦, 
it is a joint requirement that 𝑟 = 1 and 𝑦∗̃ > 0. It is assumed that 𝜀 and 𝑢 identically and independently follow standard Gaussian distributions. Therefore, the full probabilities for 𝑦 are given as follows.  
 Pr(𝑦) = ⎩{{⎨
{{⎧Pr (𝑦 = 0|𝒛,𝒙) = [1−Φ(𝒙′𝜷)] + Φ(𝒙′𝜷)Φ(−𝒛′𝛾),       Pr (𝑦 = 𝑗|𝒛,𝒙) = Φ(𝒙′𝜷)[Φ(𝜇𝑗 − 𝒛′𝛾) −Φ(𝜇𝑗−1 − 𝒛′𝛾)]                                                 (𝑗 = 1,… ,𝐽 − 1), Pr (𝑦 = 𝐽 |𝒛,𝒙)  = Φ(𝒙′𝜷)[1−Φ(𝜇𝐽−1−𝒛′𝛾)].            ⎭}}⎬
}}⎫ (2.12) 
 
The equation above indicates the inflation of non-bankruptcy as it is a 
combination of non-participation in the credit markets from the probit model 
and participant non-bankrupts from the ordered probit process. After the full 
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set of probabilities has been specified and given an i.i.d. sample of size 𝑁  from 
the population on (𝑦𝑖,𝒙𝑖, 𝒛𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁 , the parameters of the full model 𝜃 =(𝛽′, 𝛾′,𝜇′)′ can be estimated using maximum likelihood (ML) criteria. The log-
likelihood function is given as follows. 
 𝑙(𝜃) = ∑∑ℎ𝑖𝑗ln[Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒙𝑖, 𝒛𝑖, 𝜃)]𝐽𝑗=0𝑁𝑖=1  (2.13) 
 
where ℎ𝑖𝑗 will be 1 if individual 𝑖 chooses outcome 𝑗, and 0 otherwise. 
Traditional ordered probit models treat all observations with zero-valued 
outcomes as a homogeneous group. By contrast, the ZIOP models assume that 
zeros could occur in the data as members of two unobservable groups. 
Individuals in the non-participant group have outcome 0 as the only possible 
value. The second group, in addition to 0, may also assume any of the other 
values, 0,1, … , 𝐽 . In a non-nested situation, information-based model selection 
criteria, such as AIC and BIC, are appropriate for choosing between the OP 
and ZIOP model. 
 Harris and Zhao (2007) further develop the ZIOP model by allowing the 
error terms of the two latent equations to be correlated. This zero-inflated order 
probit model with correlated errors is termed as the ZIOPC model. In their 
analysis, with the exception of AIC, the information criteria marginally favour 
the ZIOP model to the ZIOPC model. The results for the ZIOP and ZIOPC 
models were very similar so that they only present the results for one model. 
Due to the convergence issues with the ZIOPC model in our analysis, this study 
only estimates the ZIOP model and assumes the correlated errors would 
perform similar to the independent errors. 
In this study, the outcome is an ordered discrete response with three levels 
coded as 0 for ‘non-bankrupts’, 1 for ‘income gleaning’, 2 for ‘fresh start’. At 
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this level, it is better to understand these discrete categories have natural 
ordering. In the UK bankruptcy code, the bankruptcy types can be categorised 
into two parts: ‘income gleaning’ and ‘fresh start’. For income gleaning, the 
debts are mostly reorganised and partially discharged rather than full 
discharge. It is expected that the income gleaner will pay a part of his debts 
from his future income. Therefore, the income gleaning can be considered as 
‘semi-bankruptcy’. On the other hand, almost all of the debts are discharged 
under the ‘fresh start’ bankruptcy and no debt payment are made from the 
future income after the bankruptcy procedure. Therefore, the fresh start can be 
considered as ‘full-bankruptcy’. This situation shows the natural ordering in 
bankruptcy categories which justifies the use of an ordered model rather than 
a multinomial model. 
To be able to file for bankruptcy, an individual must participate in credit 
markets. Conditional on participating, they can decide whether to file for 
bankruptcy or not. The first decision is a binary choice and is modelled using 
a probit model, while the second is an ordered choice and is modelled using an 
ordered probit model. In other terms, to account for the excess of zeros, the 
ZIOP model allows for zero observations to occur in two ways: as a realisation 
of the probit model (non-participants) and as a realisation of the ordered probit 
model when the binary random variable in the probit model is 1 (participant 
non-bankrupts). 
We first investigate the role of the financial benefit and adverse events 
on the bankruptcy decision regardless of the bankruptcy type in the bankruptcy 
decision models. We then detail our model and investigate for the bankruptcy 
types in the bankruptcy type models. 
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2.6.2 Bankruptcy Decision Models  
First, the study tests the strategic behaviour theory by examining the 
impact of the financial benefit on the consumer bankruptcy decision using the 
framework developed by  Fay, Hurst, and White  (2002). Each individual 𝑖 is 
observed over two periods, 𝑡 and 𝑡+ 1. The financial situation and the 
characteristics of individuals are observed at time t and their bankruptcy 
decision at time 𝑡+ 1 to investigate whether or not the financial situation and 
the characteristics lead to bankruptcy the next period. The general form of the 
strategic behaviour model, which explains a dichotomous variable as a function 
of the financial benefit and other characteristics, is given by: 
 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.14) 
 
where 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes a binary variable indicating whether the individual 𝑖 have filed for consumer bankruptcy at time 𝑡+ 1. 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents the 
bankruptcy benefit if the individual files for bankruptcy. 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of 
control variables, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 the error term, all at time 𝑡. 𝑿 includes the covariates 
which are explanatory and control variables from Section 2.5.4., which are 
mainly drawn from the empirical studies on the consumer bankruptcy such as 
Domowitz and Sartain (1999), Gross and Souleles (2002) and Zhu (2011). This 
model is named as ‘bankruptcy benefit model’ in the tables. 
Since the aforementioned bankruptcy benefit model imposes the 
restriction that two components of 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡, which are dischargeable debts 
and eligible assets, must have the same absolute value but opposite sign 
coefficients. This restriction can be relaxed by slightly modifying the model as 
follows: 
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 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.15) 
 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is replaced by 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡 which denote dischargeable 
debts and eligible assets at time 𝑡, respectively for the individuals who have 
positive financial benefits or else zero as stated in Equation 2.1. In this case, 
we can separately compare the impacts of the two main components of the 
bankruptcy benefit. This model is named as ‘debts and assets model’ in the 
tables. 
Next, the study investigates the role of adverse events on the bankruptcy 
decision. It derives the adverse events from the previous studies on bankruptcy 
decision such as Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989), Domowitz and 
Sartain (1999), Himmelstein et al.  (2005) and Gross and Notowidigdo (2011). 
These adverse events are getting divorced or separated, becoming unemployed, 
and the onset of a serious health problem. In this case, the adverse events model 
becomes as follows: 
 
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1+ 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.16) 
 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes getting divorced or separated, 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 becoming 
unemployed, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 the onset of a serious health problem that limits the 
physical activity, all between time 𝑡 and 𝑡+ 1. 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 indicates the vector of 
covariates which are the explanatory and control variables explained 
previously. This model is named as ‘adverse events model’ in the tables. 
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2.6.3 Bankruptcy Type Models 
In addition to the bankruptcy decision, the study also investigates the 
impact of the financial benefit and adverse events on the bankruptcy types 
which are classified as ‘income gleaning’ and ‘fresh start’ as explained in Section 
2.2. The study slightly modifies the aforementioned bankruptcy decision models 
by replacing the main dependent variable, the bankruptcy decision with the 
bankruptcy type. The first model to test the role of the bankruptcy benefit on 
the bankruptcy type becomes as follows:  𝑏𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.17)  
where 𝑏𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the bankruptcy type of individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡+ 1. It 
is a categorical variable which takes three values (0 for non-bankrupts, 1 for 
income gleaners, 2 for fresh starters). As in Equation 2.9, 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 denotes 
the bankruptcy benefit, 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 the vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 the error 
term, all at time 𝑡. 
It also investigates the impact of dischargeable debts and eligible assets 
instead of the bankruptcy benefit on the choice of bankruptcy type. The slightly 
modified debts and assets model becomes as follows:  𝑏𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.18)  
where we replace 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡 which denote dischargeable 
debts and eligible assets at time 𝑡, respectively. 
Moreover, the study investigates the role of adverse events on the choice 
of bankruptcy type. It derives the same adverse events from the previous 
section on the bankruptcy decision. It slightly modifies the adverse events 
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model by replacing the main dependent variable, the bankruptcy decision with 
the bankruptcy type. Therefore, the modified model becomes as follows: 
 𝑏𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1+ 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.19)  
where, as explained before, 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 denotes getting divorced or separated, 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 becoming unemployed, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖;𝑡,𝑡+1 the onset of a serious health 
problem that limits the physical activity, all between time 𝑡 and 𝑡+ 1. 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 
indicates the vector of covariates which are the explanatory and control 
variables explained previously. 
2.7 Empirical Results 
2.7.1 Summary Statistics 
The following subsections describes the summary statistics. The first 
subsection compares bankrupts and non-bankrupt individuals. The second 
subsection compares the income gleaners and the fresh starters. 
2.7.1.1 Bankrupts vs. Non-bankrupts 
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 2.6. Columns 
report both mean values and standard deviations for the total sample, non-
bankrupts and bankrupts, respectively. The total sample includes 66,050 adult 
individuals. 485 of them are bankrupts, who have entered into a type of 
insolvency proceedings. Since bankrupts are less than 1% of the total sample, 
summary statistics for total sample and non-bankrupts are very close to each 
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other, whereas summary statistics for bankrupts differ substantially from the 
non-bankrupts. 
On average, the non-bankrupts have greater annual income, more assets 
and less debts than the bankrupts have. Average annual net income is £16,418 
for the non-bankrupts, while £13,412 for bankrupts. The bankruptcy benefit 
from filing is calculated as described in Equation 2.1, and the mean value for 
non-bankrupts is considerably less than that for bankrupts. A typical non-
bankrupt’s bankruptcy benefit is £453, while a typical bankrupt’s benefit is 
£6,163 from filing for bankruptcy.  
 
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics (Bankruptcy Decision) 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Bankrupt (= 1)(t + 1) 0.007 0.085 0 0 1 0
Bankruptcy benefit (£)(t) -41,268 159,735 -41,606 160,269 4,409 16,718
Bankruptcy benefit (if bbenefit >0)(£)(t) 975 5,410 453 936 6,163 12,603
Dischargeable debts (£)(t) 1,726 6,554 1,684 6,465 7,436 12,921
Dischargeable debts (if bbenefit >0)(£)(t) 1,270 6,294 1,228 6,198 7,005 12,985
Eligible assets (£)(t) 42,095 159,377 42,390 159,926 2,126 10,751
Eligible assets (if bbenefit >0)(£)(t) 178 1,402 177 1,403 335 1,256
Annual net income (£)(t) 16,397 22,258 16,418 22,311 13,412 13,047
Age (t) 53.19 16.699 53.27 16.704 42.99 12.364
Education (degree or above) (= 1)(t) 0.232 0.422 0.233 0.423 0.088 0.284
Family size (t) 2.55 1.244 2.54 1.242 2.97 1.425
White (= 1)(t) 0.938 0.239 0.939 0.239 0.927 0.259
Female (= 1)(t) 0.527 0.499 0.527 0.499 0.538 0.499
Adverse events
Get divorced or separated (= 1)(t;t + 1) 0.014 0.116 0.013 0.115 0.031 0.173
Get unemployed (= 1)(t;t + 1) 0.018 0.134 0.018 0.133 0.054 0.225
Get health problems (= 1)(t;t + 1) 0.081 0.274 0.041 0.273 0.109 0.312
Number of observations
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey
Total Sample (t + 1) Non-bankrupts (t + 1) Bankrupts (t + 1)
66,050 65,565 485
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Bankruptcy filers also have significantly higher debts. Bankruptcy filers 
in the total sample have £7,436 dischargeable debts on average, compared to 
£1,684 for the non-bankrupts. Additionally, bankruptcy filers have lower assets 
for liquidation in case of bankruptcy. The value of assets of a typical bankrupt 
is £2,126, while a typical non-bankrupt’s assets are worth £42,390.  
Bankruptcy filers are younger. A typical bankruptcy filer in the sample is 
42.99 years old, while a typical non-bankrupt is 53.27 years old. Bankrupts are 
also less educated. Only 8.8% of the bankrupts have a bachelor’s degree or 
above compared 23.3% for non-bankrupts. The number of individuals in the 
household is greater for bankrupts which is 2.97 persons, while it is 2.54 persons 
for non-bankrupts on average. 
Related to adverse events, 1.3% of non-bankrupts get divorced or 
separated, while it is 3.1% for bankrupts. Bankrupt individuals have higher job 
loss percentage. 5.4% of bankrupts become unemployed, whereas it is only 1.8% 
for non-bankrupts. 10.9% of bankrupts experience a serious health problem, 
this ratio is 4.1% for non-bankrupts. 
Apart from all these differences, bankrupts and non-bankrupts have 
some similarities. Both bankrupts and non-bankrupt individuals are similar in 
term of ethnic origin and gender. Approximately 93% of bankrupts and non-
bankrupts are white and around 53% of them are female. 
2.7.1.2 Income Gleaners vs. Fresh Starters 
 Table 2.7 gives a more detailed information on bankrupts, in which they 
are divided into two parts as income gleaners and fresh starters. 382 of 
bankrupts are identified as income gleaning bankrupts, while only 103 of them 
are identified as fresh start bankrupts. Even the characteristics of bankrupts 
differ each other regarding the bankruptcy type.  
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics (Bankruptcy Types) 
 
 
Fresh starters have lower incomes than the income gleaners. The annual 
income of a typical income gleaner is £14,915 which is very close to a typical 
non-bankrupt, whereas on average, it is just £8,074 for a fresh starter. The 
income gleaners have slightly more debts than the fresh starters both before 
and after bankruptcy. On average, an income gleaner has £7,739 of 
dischargeable debts before bankruptcy, while a typical fresh starter has £6.308 
of formal debt before bankruptcy. The value of assets of a typical income 
gleaner is £2,306, while a typical non-bankrupt’s assets are worth only £1,459. 
As expected, it seems that having a regular income plays an important role in 
the choice bankruptcy type. 
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Bankrupt (= 1)(t + 1) 0.007 0.085 0 0 1 0 1 0
Bankruptcy benefit (£)(t) -41,268 159,735 -41,606 160,269 4,533 17,438 3,949 13,787
Bankruptcy benefit (if bbenefit > 0)(£)(t) 975 5,410 453 936 6,343 12,963 5,495 11,198
Dischargeable debts (£)(t) 1,726 6,554 1,684 6,465 7,739 13,295 6,308 11,418
Dischargeable debts (if bbenefit > 0)(£)(t) 1,270 6,294 1,228 6,198 7,256 13,359 6,076 11,504
Eligible assets (£)(t) 42,095 159,377 42,390 159,926 2,306 11,487 1,459 7,421
Eligible assets (if bbenefit > 0)(£)(t) 178 1,402 177 1,403 391 1,386 1,267 5,071
Annual net income (£)(t) 16,397 22,258 16,418 22,311 14,915 13,123 8,074 11,260
Age (t) 53.19 16.699 53.27 16.704 42.59 12.613 44.42 11.228
Education (degree or above) (= 1)(t) 0.232 0.422 0.233 0.423 0.099 0.299 0.049 0.216
Family size (t) 2.55 1.244 2.54 1.242 3.05 1.421 2.67 1.409
White (= 1)(t) 0.938 0.239 0.939 0.239 0.929 0.256 0.922 0.269
Female (= 1)(t) 0.527 0.499 0.527 0.499 0.531 0.499 0.563 0.498
Adverse events
Get divorced or separated (= 1)(t;t + 1) 0.014 0.116 0.013 0.115 0.026 0.159 0.049 0.215
Get unemployed (= 1)(t;t + 1) 0.018 0.134 0.018 0.133 0.055 0.228 0.051 0.216
Get health problems (= 1)(t;t + 1) 0.081 0.274 0.041 0.273 0.119 0.313 0.076 0.311
Number of observations
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey
Non-bankrupts (t + 1) Bankrupts (t + 1)
Income Gleaning Fresh Start
66,050 65,565 382 103
Total Sample (t + 1)
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The fresh starters and the income gleaners have similar age categories. 
A typical fresh starter is 44.4 years old, while a typical income gleaner is 42.6 
years old. The fresh starters are less educated than the income gleaners. Only 
5% of the fresh starters have a bachelor’s degree or above compared 10% for 
the income gleaners. The income gleaners have relatively larger families. The 
number of persons in the household is greater for the income gleaners which is 
on average 3.05 persons, while it is 2.67 persons for the fresh starters.  
Related to adverse events, 4.9% of the fresh starters get divorced or 
separated, while it is only 2.6% for the income gleaners. Job loss rate is similar 
for both types, which is 5.5% for the income gleaners and 5.1% for fresh starters. 
Health problem as an adverse event differ according to the bankruptcy types. 
11.9% of the income gleaners experience a serious health problem, this ratio is 
lower for the fresh starters which 7.6%. 
The fresh starters and the income gleaners are similar in terms of ethnic 
origin. Around 92% of the fresh starters and the income gleaners are white. In 
terms of gender, 55% of the income gleaners are female, while it is 51% for the 
fresh starters. 
2.7.2 Bankruptcy Decision Results 
The study first analyses the impact of the bankruptcy benefit in the 
bankruptcy decision. The results in Table 2.8 show that there is a positive 
relationship between the bankruptcy benefit and the bankruptcy decision. It is 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level. The relationship between the 
income and the bankruptcy decision is negative as expected. It is also 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level. Among other covariates, 
variables for age and the education level are also statistically significant at 1% 
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confidence level, while the family size is marginally significant at 10% 
confidence level. The coefficients of Annual Net Income, Age and Education 
suggest that individuals are less likely to file bankruptcy if they have a higher 
income, are older and more educated. 
 
Table 2.8: Bankruptcy Benefit Model (Bankruptcy Decision) 
 
 
The bankruptcy benefit model imposes the restriction that dischargeable 
debts and eligible assets must have the same absolute value but opposite sign 
coefficients. This restriction can be relaxed, and these two variables can be 
tested separately. If the dischargeable debts and eligible assets affect the 
bankruptcy decision equally, then their coefficients will be equal in absolute 
value but opposite in sign.  
Variables Coef. (Std. Err.) Margin
Bankruptcy Benefit 0.142*** (0.025) 0.269***
Annual Net Income -0.109*** (0.018) -0.175***
Age                                              -0.017*** (0.001) -0.003***
Education (degree or above)(=1)      -0.283*** (0.056) -0.387***
Family Size                                     0.030* (0.016) 0.032*
White (=1) 0.005 (0.076) 0.001
Female (=1) -0.008 (0.056) -0.000
Number of Observations
Wald 
Prob > 
Pseudo 
Bankruptcy
Notes: The numbers reported are the coefficients estimated using probit model. 
Robust standard errors are computed using the so-called ‘sandwich estimator’ of 
White (1980). Probit regression does not have an equivalent to the R-squared that is 
found in OLS regression. Instead, McFadden's pseudo R-sqaured is estimated. We use 
the usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate whether 
independent variables are statistically significant. All pound values are in £10,000 
increments.
66,050
454.92
0.0000
0.0794
𝜒2 𝑅2 
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Table 2.9: Debts and Assets Model (Bankruptcy Decision) 
 
 
The results, as shown in the debts and assets model in Table 2.9, indicate 
that the coefficient of the dischargeable debt is positive, and the coefficient of 
the eligible assets is negative as expected. Both of them are statistically 
significant at 1% confidence level. However, the margin value of the 
dischargeable debts is considerably greater than the margin value of the eligible 
assets in magnitude. These results suggest that the discharge of debts is the 
dominant factor in the bankruptcy decision when it is compared to the assets 
liquidated under the bankruptcy procedures. The findings support the strategic 
behaviour theory which argues that consumers are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy when their benefit from bankruptcy is higher.  
Variables Coef. (Std. Err.) Margin
Dischargeable Debts 0.183*** (0.024) 0.343***
Eligible Assets -0.047*** (0.011) -0.088***
Annual Net Income -0.103*** (0.011) -0.177***
Age                                              -0.017*** (0.001) -0.003***
Education (degree or above)(=1)      -0.281*** (0.059) -0.385***
Family Size                                     0.027* (0.016) 0.001*
White (=1) 0.006 (0.076) 0.001
Female (=1) -0.009 (0.037) -0.000
Number of Observations
Wald 
Prob > 
Pseudo 
Notes: The numbers reported are the coefficients estimated using probit model. 
Robust standard errors are computed using the so-called ‘sandwich estimator’ of 
White (1980). Probit regression does not have an equivalent to the R-squared that is 
found in OLS regression. Instead, McFadden's pseudo R-sqaured is estimated. We use 
the usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate whether 
independent variables are statistically significant. All pound values are in £10,000 
increments.
Bankruptcy
66,050
501.22
0.0000
0.0850
𝜒2 𝑅2 
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This study also estimates the effect of adverse events on the bankruptcy 
decision. As shown in the adverse events model in Table 2.10, all of the adverse 
event variables have positive signs as expected and all of them are statically 
significant at 1% level. This means that adverse events (negative shocks) have 
a positive impact in the bankruptcy decision. The margin value of the 
unemployment variable is also slightly greater than the coefficients of the other 
two variables. The coefficient of the bankruptcy benefit remains almost the 
same as in the bankruptcy benefit model. These results suggest that adverse 
events affect the bankruptcy filings and becoming unemployed is the dominant 
factor among adverse events in the bankruptcy decision. Age and education 
level remain statistically significant at 1% level, while the family size becomes 
insignificant. 
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Table 2.10: Adverse Events Model (Bankruptcy Decision) 
  
 
The findings support the adverse events theory which suggests that 
consumers file for bankruptcy due to adverse events such as job loss, divorce 
and health problems. All three analysed adverse events are positively correlated 
with the bankruptcy decision and they are all statically significant. The results 
suggest that adverse events affect the bankruptcy filings and becoming 
unemployed is the dominant factor among adverse events in the bankruptcy 
decision. Age and education level remain statistically significant at 1% level, 
while the family size becomes insignificant. These results support earlier works 
such as Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) and Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan (2015). 
Variables Coef. (Std. Err.) Margin
Bankruptcy Benefit 0.141*** (0.025) 0.268***
Age                                              -0.014*** (0.001) -0.002***
Education (degree or above)(=1)      -0.265*** (0.058) -0.324***
Family size                                     0.009 (0.016) 0.001
White (=1) 0.012 (0.073) 0.002
Female (=1)      0.009 (0.037) 0.001
Adverse Events
Get Divorced or Separated (=1) 0.243*** (0.087) 0.461***
Get Unemployed (=1) 0.338*** (0.106) 0.543***
Get Health Problems (=1) 0.211*** (0.056) 0.400***
Number of Observations
Wald 
Prob > 
Pseudo 
Notes: The numbers reported are the coefficients estimated using probit model. 
Robust standard errors are computed using the so-called ‘sandwich estimator’ of 
White (1980). Probit regression does not have an equivalent to the R-squared that is 
found in OLS regression. Instead, McFadden's pseudo R-sqaured is estimated.We use 
the usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate whether 
independent variables are statistically significant. All pound values are in £10,000 
increments.
Bankruptcy
66,050
383.64
0.0000
0.0733𝑅2 𝜒2 
𝜒2 
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To have a better understanding on the bankruptcy decision, we need to analyse 
the bankruptcy decision in detail using bankruptcy types. 
2.7.3 Bankruptcy Type Results 
In addition to the aforementioned bankruptcy decision models, the study 
also estimates the impact of the bankruptcy benefit and adverse events on the 
bankruptcy types which are classified as ‘income gleaning’ and ‘fresh start’. 
This study estimates these ordered categories using the ordered probit and the 
ZIOP model. 
Table 2.11 shows the summary statistics from the ordered probit (OP) 
and ZIOP models. As for the information-based model selection criteria, we can 
see that for bankruptcy filings, the AIC and BIC suggest the superiority of the 
ZIOP model over the OP model. 
 
Table 2.11: Summary Statistics from OP and ZIOP Models 
 
 
The results are presented as marginal effects on non-bankrupts  
(Pr(𝑦 = 0)) using the ZIOP model, compared with the results from the probit 
and ordered probit models which are shown in Table 2.12. For the ZIOP model, 
OP ZIOP
Log Likelihood -32,867 -32,483
AIC 66,016 65,141
BIC 66,224 65,474
LR versus OP 916**
Filing for bankruptcy
Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level. Preferred 
model with regard to each information criteria is indicated with bold.
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the overall marginal effect on Pr(𝑦 = 0) was divided into two parts: the effect 
on non-participant (Pr(𝑟 = 0)) and the effect on the participant non-bankrupt 
(Pr(𝑟 = 1, 𝑦 ̃= 0)). 
 
Table 2.12: Marginal Effect for Non-participant and Non-bankrupt 
 
 
The marginal effects in Table 2.12 show some interesting differences. For 
example, annual net income is significantly positively correlated with being 
non-bankrupt in probit and OP models, However, if non-bankruptcy and nan-
participation are separated by the ZIOP model, the income is significantly 
Non-participant
Participant 
non-bankrupt Full
Probit OP
Variables Pr(y =0) Pr(y =0) Pr(r=0) Pr(r=1, ỹ =0) Pr(y =0)
Bankruptcy Benefit -0.176*** -0.149*** - -0.145*** -0.145***
(0.033) (0.028) - (0.027) (0.027)
Annual Net Income 0.095*** 0.114*** -0.136*** 0.257*** 0.121***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.031) (0.016)
Age                                              0.014*** 0.018*** -0.001*** 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (degree)(=1)      0.219*** 0.274*** -0.146*** 0.412*** 0.266***
(0.075) (0.078) (0.064) (0.101) (0.081)
Family Size                               -0.011 -0.021 0.001 -0.014 -0.013
(0.062) (0.059) (0.057) (0.046) (0.069)
White (=1) -0.009 -0.009 0.001 -0.009 -0.008
(0.051) (0.054) (0.0039) (0.081) (0.067)
Female (=1)       0.011 0.014 0.004 0.007 0.011
(0.047) (0.053) (0.039) (0.079) (0.045)
Number of Observations 66,050 66,050 66,050
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are corrected by allowing error terms for the same 
individual to be correlated over time, are reported in parentheses. We use the usual 
convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate statistical significance. All 
pound values are in £10,000 increments. OP stands for Ordered Probit, while ZIOP is 
Zero-inflated Ordered Profit.
ZIOP
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negatively correlated with being non-participant, but positively correlated with 
being participant non-bankrupt. Similarly, having a degree level education is 
positively correlated with non-bankruptcy. The ZIOP model identifies that 
education is negatively correlated with non-participation, but positively 
correlated with participant non-bankruptcy. They are all statistically 
significant. This means that individuals with higher education level and income 
are more likely to participate in the credit market (which makes them eligible 
for bankruptcy), but less likely to file for bankruptcy when compared to lower 
income and education level individuals.  
 
Table 2.13: Marginal Effect for Income Gleaning and Fresh Start 
 
OP ZIOP OP ZIOP
Variables Pr(y =1) Pr(y =1) Pr(y =2) Pr(y =2)
Bankruptcy Benefit 0.154*** 0.178*** 0.138*** 0.145***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035)
Annual Net Income -0.149*** -0.166*** -0.313*** -0.359***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.044) (0.042)
Age                                              -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (degree or above)(=1) -0.312*** -0.367*** -0.416*** -0.468***
(0.081) (0.088) (0.095) (0.101)
Family Size                               0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.055) (0.057) (0.041) (0.038)
White (=1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.055) (0.056) (0.068) (0.076)
Female (=1)       -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.058) (0.057) (0.085) (0.089)
Number of Observations 66,050 66,050 66,050 66,050
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are corrected by allowing error terms for the same 
individual to be correlated over time, are reported in parentheses. We use the usual 
convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate statistical significance. All 
pound values are in £10,000 increments. OP stands for Ordered Probit, while ZIOP is 
Zero-inflated Ordered Profit.
Income Gleaning Fresh Start
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Marginal effect results for bankrupts using the OP and ZIOP models are 
presented in Table 2.13. The bankrupt individuals are categorised based on the 
bankruptcy type: income gleaning (Pr(𝑦 = 1)) and fresh start (Pr(𝑦 = 2)). The 
results for the bankruptcy type model are similar to results in the bankruptcy 
decision model. Both bankruptcy benefit and the income are statistically 
significant for both bankruptcy types at 1% confidence level. However, the 
margin value of the income for fresh start bankrupts is noticeably greater than 
the margin value of the income for income gleaning bankrupts. This result 
suggests that the income factor is more important for the fresh starters. Age 
and education level are also statistically significant at 1% level, while the family 
size is now insignificant. 
A variation of the bankruptcy types model is also estimated. Two main 
components of the bankruptcy benefit, the dischargeable debts and eligible 
assets, are tested separately. If the dischargeable debts and eligible assets affect 
the bankruptcy decision equally, then their coefficients will be equal in absolute 
value but opposite in sign. The results for the debts and assets are shown in 
Table 2.14. The results indicate that the coefficient of the dischargeable debt 
is positive, and the coefficient of the eligible assets is negative as expected for 
both bankruptcy types. However, the margin value of the dischargeable debts 
for fresh starters is considerably greater than the margin value of the 
dischargeable debts for the income gleaners. These results suggest that the 
discharge of debts is more important for the fresh starters than it is for the 
income gleaners.  
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Table 2.14: Marginal Effect (Debts and Assets) 
 
 
On the contrary, the margin value of the eligible assets for income gleaners 
is considerably greater than the margin value of the eligible assets for the fresh 
starters. These results suggest that the assets liquidated under the bankruptcy 
procedures is more important for the income gleaners than it is for the fresh 
starters. These results show that debts and assets play different roles in 
different bankruptcy types. Similar to the bankruptcy benefit model, income, 
age and education are also statistically significant at 1% confidence level. 
OP ZIOP OP ZIOP
Variables Pr(y =1) Pr(y =1) Pr(y =2) Pr(y =2)
Dischargeable Debts 0.142*** 0.165*** 0.236*** 0.247***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.035)
Eligible Assets -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.169*** -0.165***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001)
Annual Net Income -0.095*** -0.106*** -0.244*** -0.259***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.036) (0.042)
Age                                              -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (degree or above)(=1) -0.293*** -0.315*** -0.384*** -0.418***
(0.061) (0.068) (0.184) (0.198)
Family Size                               0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.036) (0.043) (0.034) (0.039)
White (=1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.054) (0.062) (0.079) (0.088)
Female (=1)       -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.051) (0.057) (0.080) (0.089)
Number of Observations 66,050 66,050 66,050 66,050
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are corrected by allowing error terms for the same 
individual to be correlated over time, are reported in parentheses. We use the usual 
convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate statistical significance. All 
pound values are in £10,000 increments. OP stands for Ordered Probit, while ZIOP is 
Zero-inflated Ordered Profit.
Income Gleaning Fresh Start
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The study finally estimates the effect of adverse events in the consumers’ 
decision on the bankruptcy types and the results are shown in Table 2.15. All 
of the adverse event variables have positive signs as expected but only becoming 
unemployed and the onset of a serious health problem are statistically 
significant for income gleaners at 1% confidence level, while getting divorced or 
separated is insignificant. On the other hand, for fresh starters, becoming 
unemployed and getting divorced or separated are statistically significant at 
1% confidence level but the onset of a serious health problem is statistically 
insignificant. 
These results suggest that adverse events affect the choice of bankruptcy 
type and becoming unemployed is an important factor in both bankruptcy 
types. Individuals who become unemployed are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy regardless of their choice of the bankruptcy type. The margin value 
of becoming unemployed for income gleaning is greater than that of the fresh 
start. It suggests that becoming unemployed is more important in income 
gleaning.  
The coefficient of getting divorced or separated is positive for both types 
and it is statistically significant at 1% level for the fresh start, but it is 
statistically insignificant for the income gleaning. This result suggests that 
individuals who get divorced or separated are more likely to choose the fresh 
start bankruptcy type, aiming to discharge almost all debts. The main driver 
of this finding could be that since the judge decides how to share the 
accumulated wealth and debts after the divorce decision, some individuals may 
end up with a huge debt but a little wealth. This situation may force them to 
file for the fresh start bankruptcy as their wealth decreases dramatically. 
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Table 2.15: Marginal Effect (Adverse Events) 
 
 
Individuals who experience the onset of a serious health problem are more 
likely to choose the income gleaning instead of the fresh start. A plausible 
explanation could be that health problems may reduce the income dramatically 
and increase health care expenses, but they do not affect the assets directly. 
Additionally, job loss is significant for both types. This situation may be 
interpreted that if consumers become unemployed (job loss), this adverse event 
OP ZIOP OP ZIOP
Variables Pr(y =1) Pr(y =1) Pr(y =2) Pr(y =2)
Bankruptcy Benefit 0.198*** 0.210*** 0.228*** 0.247***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.031)
Age                                              -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (degree or above)(=1) -0.318*** -0.357*** -0.403*** -0.418***
(0.077) (0.087) (0.177) (0.193)
Family Size                               0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.027) (0.024) (0.033) (0.041)
White (=1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.101) (0.113) (0.153) (0.170)
Female (=1)       -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.051) (0.056) (0.082) (0.089)
Adverse Events
Get Divorced or Separated (=1) 0.117 0.142 0.632*** 0.657***
(0.286) (0.272) (0.212) (0.223)
Get Unemployed (=1) 0.291*** 0.282*** 0.191*** 0.184***
(0.139) (0.133) (0.073) (0.088)
Get Health Problems (=1) 0.303*** 0.315*** 0.093 0.083
(0.077) (0.085) (0.151) (0.145)
Number of Observations 66,050 66,050 66,050 66,050
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are corrected by allowing error terms for the same 
individual to be correlated over time, are reported in parentheses. We use the usual 
convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate statistical significance. All 
pound values are in £10,000 increments. OP stands for Ordered Probit, while ZIOP is 
Zero-inflated Ordered Profit.
Income Gleaning Fresh Start
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may force them to choose between the fresh start and the income gleaning 
depending on their wealth. The coefficients of the bankruptcy benefit for both 
types remain statistically significant as in the bankruptcy benefit model. These 
results show that even though adverse events may affect the bankruptcy 
decision, their effects may differ widely on the bankruptcy types. 
In addition, the coefficient of the onset of a serious health problem is 
positive for both types and statistically significant at 1% level for the income 
gleaning, but it is statistically insignificant for the fresh start. This result 
indicates that individuals who experience the onset of a serious health problem 
are more likely to choose the income gleaning bankruptcy type. The coefficients 
of the bankruptcy benefit for both types remain statistically significant as in 
the bankruptcy benefit model. These results show that even though adverse 
events may affect the bankruptcy decision, their effects may differ widely on 
the bankruptcy types. Age and education level are also statistically significant 
at 1% level, while the family size is statistically insignificant. 
The results show that individuals who get divorced or separated are more 
likely to choose the fresh start bankruptcy type, aiming to discharge almost all 
debts. The main driver of this finding could be that since the judge decides 
how to share the accumulated wealth and debts after the divorce decision, some 
individuals may end up with a huge debt but a little wealth. This situation 
may force them to file for the fresh start bankruptcy as their wealth decreases 
dramatically. Individuals who experience the onset of a serious health problem 
are more likely to choose the income gleaning instead of the fresh start. A 
plausible explanation could be that health problems may reduce the income 
dramatically and increase health care expenses, but they do not affect the assets 
directly. The coefficients of the bankruptcy benefit for both types remain 
statistically significant as in the bankruptcy benefit model. These results show 
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that even though adverse events may affect the bankruptcy decision, their 
effects may differ widely on the bankruptcy types. 
The findings may inform policy makers to weigh the trade-off between 
the strategic behaviour and the adverse events. A fair consumer bankruptcy 
system is often necessary to smooth the consumption after adverse events; 
however, it should also deter the strategically oriented individuals. Otherwise, 
the bankruptcy system may harm the credit markets and cause interest rates 
to increase. 
2.8 Conclusion 
In the last two decades, we have seen a rapid growth of unsecured 
consumer debt in Great Britain. As a consequence, the consumer bankruptcy 
has also increased from a rare event to a relatively common phenomenon. As 
consumer bankruptcy has become an important issue not only in the UK but 
also globally, studies attempted to explain not only the increasing trend but 
also the reasons behind the decisions of consumers to file for bankruptcy. 
Understanding the motivations in the consumers bankruptcy decision is 
essential in order to design the consumer bankruptcy laws and procedures. For 
example, if consumers act strategically and file for bankruptcy due to the 
bankruptcy benefit, a more forgiving bankruptcy law will cause an increase in 
the number of filings.  If it is determined that number of filings are too high, 
then policy makers should reduce the number of filings by tightening access to 
bankruptcy courts or making bankruptcy more expensive. To reduce the 
number of filings, policy makers may restrict access to bankruptcy types by 
lower exemptions, applying longer repayment plans or increasing minimum 
time required between filings. However, if consumers file for bankruptcy to the 
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adverse events such as job loss, health issues and divorce, then policy makers 
may aim to minimize the impact of these adverse events. 
In the debate on the consumer bankruptcy, the literature focuses on two 
theories, the strategic behaviour and the adverse events. This study analyses 
the effect of the bankruptcy benefit, which is simply equal to the dischargeable 
debts minus eligible assets for liquidation under bankruptcy procedures and the 
court fees, on the consumer bankruptcy decision. Then, it also analyses adverse 
events on the consumer bankruptcy decision using a new data from the Wealth 
and Assets Survey (WAS) which is a longitudinal survey that specifically 
focuses on the economic well-being of individuals in Great Britain. 
For the strategic behaviour theory, it first tests whether the consumers 
are more likely to enter into any bankruptcy proceedings when the bankruptcy 
benefit increases. The findings are that that the bankruptcy benefit is positively 
and significantly related to the bankruptcy decision. However, when it tests the 
dischargeable debts and eligible assets separately as the two main components 
of the bankruptcy benefit instead of testing the bankruptcy benefit alone, the 
findings suggest that the dischargeable debt is the dominant factor in the 
consumer bankruptcy decision.  
For the adverse events theory, the study tests the effects of adverse events 
which are commonly used in the literature. The adverse events are becoming 
unemployed (job loss), getting divorced or separated and the onset of a serious 
health problem which limits the physical activity. The results show that 
becoming unemployed is the dominant factor among adverse events in the 
bankruptcy decision. The results complement earlier works such as Fay, Hurst, 
and White (2002) and Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan (2015). 
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As the major contribution of this research, it also tests the strategic 
behaviour and adverse events theories according to the bankruptcy type which 
is either the discharge of debts or the reorganisation of debts. These bankruptcy 
types are termed as ‘fresh start’ and ‘income gleaning’, respectively. The 
findings show that the bankruptcy benefit is positively and significantly related 
to the bankruptcy decision regardless of the bankruptcy type. When it is 
separated as the dischargeable debts and eligible assets, the findings show that 
the discharge of debts is more important for the fresh starters than it is for the 
income gleaners. The findings also show that the assets liquidated under the 
bankruptcy procedures is more important for the income gleaners than it is for 
the fresh starters. These results show that debts and assets play different roles 
in different bankruptcy types and they are consistent with the strategic 
behaviour theory. 
The study also tests the effects of adverse events and find that becoming 
unemployed is significant for both types of bankruptcy. However, the onset of 
a serious health problem is significant for the income gleaning but insignificant 
for the fresh start. This result suggests that individuals who experience the 
onset of health problems are more likely to choose the income gleaning 
bankruptcy type. The main reason of the result may be that the health 
problems may reduce the income dramatically and increase health care 
expenses, but they do not affect the assets directly. Therefore, the individuals 
face serious health problems prefer the income gleaning instead of the fresh 
start. 
In contrast, the results show that getting divorced or separated is 
significant for the fresh start but insignificant for the income gleaning. This 
result suggests that individuals who get divorced are more likely to choose the 
fresh start bankruptcy type which is the discharge of almost all debts. The 
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main reason for this result might be that since the judge decides how to share 
the accumulated wealth and debts after the divorce decision, some individuals 
may end up with a huge debt but a little wealth. This situation may force them 
to file for the fresh start bankruptcy as their wealth decreases dramatically. 
These results can be seen as a support for the adverse events theory and also 
provide insight to different bankruptcy types.  
The findings of this research may help to weigh the trade-off between the 
strategic behaviour and the adverse events. A fair consumer bankruptcy system 
is necessary to smooth the consumption after adverse events but should deter 
the strategically oriented individuals at the same time because otherwise it may 
harm the credit markets and cause interest rates to increase.  
The models presented in this study are simplified models to represent the 
main aspects of the bankruptcy decision. As it is case for all models, these 
models have some limitations and do not capture all relevant aspects of the 
consumer bankruptcy such as the role of social stigma, information, access to 
credit after bankruptcy, entrepreneurial activities and work incentives. 
However, data limitations prevent to analyse all these related aspects. For 
further studies, additional research on the access to consumer credit after 
bankruptcy and the role of the entrepreneurial activity would help understand 
the consumer bankruptcy in a more detailed manner. To fill this gap, Chapter 
3 analyse access to credit after the consumer bankruptcy, and Chapter 4 
investigates the relationship between the entrepreneurial activity and the access 
to consumer credit. 
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2.9 Appendix A 
 
Figure 2.1: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings in the UK 
 
  
2002 Reform 
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Figure 2.2: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings in the US 
  
2005 Reform 
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Chapter 3: Access to Consumer Credit after 
Bankruptcy: Evidence from Great Britain 
3.1 Introduction 
Both consumer credit and consumer bankruptcy have increased 
dramatically over the last decades. The total debt held by the average British 
consumer is over £30,000 which is more than 100% of average earnings. The 
average debt has been steadily increasing. The total number of consumer 
bankruptcy filings has also increased more than five-fold in the last two 
decades. The number of filings in the UK was around 30,000 in 1998, while it 
was around 150,000 in 201821. These developments have motivated an 
increasing literature to study the post-bankruptcy credit availability for 
bankrupt households. Due to this rapid increase in the consumer bankruptcy, 
researchers try to explain not only the credit availability but also the reasons 
behind the bankruptcy decision22.  
In the literature, it is argued that the consumer bankruptcy is likely to 
affect both credit demand and credit supply (Jagtiani and Li, 2015). For credit 
demand, the bankrupt individuals now have a stronger balance sheet with less 
or no unsecured debt and more disposable income; thus, they are likely to have 
less demand for credit. On the other hand, because of the improved balance 
 
21 See Figure 2.1 for details. 
22 A partial list includes the following studies. An early work in this area, Sullivan Warren, 
and Westbrook (1989), discusses the negative shocks that lead to the bankruptcy. Among 
others, White (1998a), Domowitz and Sartain (1999), Gross and Souleles (2002), Fay, Hurst, 
and White (2002), Han and Li (2011) investigate the bankruptcy decision. 
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sheet, the bankrupt individuals may be able to access more and cheaper credit. 
For credit supply, the improved balance sheet makes borrowers more 
creditworthy to lenders. However, a bankruptcy flag on the credit report also 
signals to creditors that the individual may be the risky type and thus more 
likely to go bankrupt again compared to non-bankrupts with similar balance 
sheets (Musto, 2004; Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). 
The theoretical models regarding to consumer bankruptcy, such as 
Athreya (2004), Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 
(2007), assume the presence of a market exclusion after bankruptcy, but there 
is a little empirical evidence on the credit access after bankruptcy due the lack 
of individual level data. This study aims to understand the consequences of the 
consumer bankruptcy by studying the availability of credit to consumers after 
bankruptcy. The contribution of the study is threefold.  
First, the literature on the post-bankruptcy consumer credit mostly 
relates to US households, and it seems there is a gap for UK households. It 
seems that there is no empirical study on the access to consumer credit after 
bankruptcy in the UK. This study aims to fill this gap and analyses the credit 
availability to consumers after bankruptcy and tests whether they are excluded 
from the credit markets by using a new data from a representative sample of 
households in Great Britain.  
Second, there has been a debate about whether or not bankrupt 
individuals are excluded from credit markets, and if so, to what extent. The 
theoretical models, such as Athreya (2004) and Chatterjee et al. (2007), assume 
the presence of the post-bankruptcy market exclusion for a considerable time, 
while, in their empirical study, Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-
Garriga (2013) find that the credit market exclusion after bankruptcy is very 
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short lived. This study analyses the access to consumer credit after bankruptcy 
for both the short term (1 year) and the long term (3 years). The results may 
contribute to this debate on whether or not bankrupt individuals are excluded 
from credit markets for the short and the long term.  
Third, most of the previous studies on the post-bankruptcy credit access 
(such as Athreya and Janicki 2006; and Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013) analyse the bankruptcy as a uniform event and 
provide little information about the different bankruptcy types23. In reality, not 
all bankruptcy types have the same consequences; so, if possible, bankruptcy 
types should be analysed separately to better understand the post-bankruptcy 
credit access. With our unique data, we are able to study the different 
bankruptcy types; thus, we can analyse the post-bankruptcy consumer credit 
by distinguishing between ‘fresh starters’ and ‘income gleaners’ rather than 
oversimplifying all bankrupts as the same type.  
This paper is organised as follows. The next section, Section 3.2, discusses 
the consumer bankruptcy laws and their effect on the credit access. Then, the 
literature on the post-bankruptcy credit access is summarised in Section 3.3. 
Section 3.4 explains the data and variables. Section 3.5 discusses the 
econometric methodology and Section 3.6 explains the empirical results. 
Concluding remarks are offered in Section 3.7. 
 
23 There are four different types of bankruptcy procedures in the Great Britain. These types 
can be categorised into two parts as the discharge of debts (fresh start) or reorganisation of 
debts (income gleaning). Similarly, there are two types of bankruptcy in the US. One is 
liquidation under Chapter 7 and the other one is reorganisation under Chapter 13 of the US 
bankruptcy law. 
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3.2 Consumer Bankruptcy Laws in Great Britain 
Bankruptcy is a formal process for financially distressed individuals to 
discharge their eligible debts under the bankruptcy law24. To be made bankrupt, 
a court issues a bankruptcy order after applied by either the individual or a 
creditor who is owed £750 or more by the individual. The debtor’s assets25 are 
disposed to pay her debts. The debts are discharged which usually takes 12 
months. There are very limited debt categories that cannot be discharged in 
bankruptcy, the most importantly student loans26.  
A simpler and quicker form of the bankruptcy order is called ‘Debt Relief 
Order (DRO)’. It aims to individuals who owe very little and have little or no 
income. The debtor’s total unsecured debt must not exceed £15,000 and the 
total gross assets must not exceed £300. Additionally, the debtor’s disposable 
income after deductions must not exceed £50 per month. Therefore, DROs are 
for very low-wealth and low-income consumers. There are two main formal 
alternatives to the bankruptcy orders and DROs. The first one is ‘Individual 
Voluntary Arrangement (IVA)’ and the other one is ‘Debt Management Plan 
(DMP)’. 
IVAs are a contractual arrangement between the financially distressed 
debtor and the creditors agreed to pay at least 75% of the debt under the new 
repayment plan negotiated by an insolvency practitioner. This new repayment 
plan usually takes five years and the return to creditors is usually higher than 
 
24 Since the bankruptcy procedures are extensively explained in Chapter 2, this chapter only 
summarises the procedures and explain their impacts on the post-bankruptcy credits access. 
25 The debtor can keep some job related or household items like tools, clothing and furniture. 
The debtor’s pension wealth is not subject to the bankruptcy either. 
26 Non-dischargeable debts also include criminal penalties, debts arising from fraud and 
liabilities arising from family or domestic court action like claims for child support. 
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they would receive under bankruptcy orders. IVAs aim to individuals who have 
enough money left over after essential expenses. When an IVA is approved, it 
applies to all creditors, including any who disagreed to it. 
DMPs are an agreement between the debtor and the creditors to pay all 
of the debts under a new repayment plan which is negotiated by a licensed debt 
management company. The debtor makes regular payments to the debt 
management company, and the company shares this money out between the 
creditors. DMPs are not legally binding, so the creditors do not have to agree 
on a plan and can pursue individual collections.  
Since almost all of the debts are discharged under bankruptcy orders and 
DROs, these two bankruptcy types can be considered as ‘fresh start’. On the 
other hand, the debts are mostly reorganised based on the expected future 
income rather than being discharged under IVAs and DMPs. Therefore, these 
two bankruptcy types can be considered as ‘income gleaning’. 
3.2.1 The Impact of the Laws on the Access to Credit 
Since the debts are discharged through the bankruptcy, the bankrupt 
individuals will have improved balance sheets and increased disposable incomes. 
As a result of their improved balance sheet and increased disposable income, 
bankruptcy filers may reduce their credit demand in the short run, but as they 
are able to access credit at a lower cost, they can increase their credit demand 
in the long run. This immediate effect, ceteris paribus, is likely to be larger for 
‘fresh starters’ than ‘income gleaners’ because the unsecured debts of fresh 
starters are discharged, while ‘income gleaners’ continue to repay some of their 
debts for a longer payment schedule.  
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On the other hand, an improved balance sheet makes borrowers are more 
creditworthy to lenders. However, a bankruptcy flag on the credit report also 
signals to lenders that the borrowers may be the risky type and thus more likely 
to default again compared with non-bankrupts with similar balance sheets. 
Therefore, lenders may reduce their lending to these borrowers or lend at an 
increased cost.  
It is reasonable to expect a decreased post-bankruptcy credit demand and 
credit supply in the short run, but both credit demand and credit supply 
recover in the long run. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that this process 
is slower for income gleaners than fresh starters since income gleaners continue 
to pay their debts for a longer time. 
3.3 Literature Review 
Access to credit is generally considered as a financial necessity, but the 
ability of individuals to access the credit varies dramatically (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Klapper, 2012). The inability to obtain financial products and services is 
termed as financial exclusion (Simpson and Buckland, 2009). Financially 
excluded individuals face difficulties in participating fully in everyday 
transactions and this can play an important role as a drag on economic and 
social progress (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2013).  
Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) provide the first analysis of the 
Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, a new set on the financial 
behaviour of individuals from 148 countries. They find that 50% of adults 
worldwide have an account at a formal financial institution, though account 
penetration varies widely across regions, income groups and individual 
characteristics. Half of adults around the world remain unbanked and the most 
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commonly reported barriers are high cost, physical distance, and lack of proper 
documentation. They also state that these barriers to account use can be 
addressed by public policy. 
Empirical studies find that financial exclusion can be on economic grounds 
such as income, wealth and employment status and non-economic grounds such 
as ethnicity and race (Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee, 2005; Devlin, 2005; Carbo, 
Gardener and Molyneux, 2007; Simpson and Buckland, 2009).  
Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee (2005) explore the factors affecting bank 
account ownership in the US, focusing on bringing low-to-moderate income 
families into the financial mainstream. They use data from Survey of Consumer 
Finances and find that socioeconomic characteristics play an important role in 
access to financial institutions. Their results indicate that account ownership 
increased from 1995 to 1998. 
Devlin (2005) analyse the financial exclusion in the UK. He uses a 
common model to test and compare influences on the financial exclusion for a 
wide range of financial services, not just bank accounts. His findings show that 
the most important factors affecting the financial exclusion are employment 
status, household income and housing tenure, closely followed by marital 
status, age and education level. 
Similar to studies focusing on the UK and the US, Carbo, Gardener and 
Molyneux (2007) analyse the financial exclusion in Europe. They find that after 
intense deregulation and globalisation pressures within the process of 
completing the internal market and the development of European monetary 
union, the financial exclusion emerged as a major issue. They suggest that this 
issue should be addressed by taking the institutional context of different 
countries in consideration.  
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In their analysis, Simpson and Buckland (2009) develop a model that 
identifies observable measures of credit constraint and financial exclusion and 
relate them to consumer characteristics. They find that the financial exclusion 
increases as income and wealth fall. They also find potential important links 
between financial literacy, formal education, asset building and financial 
constraint and exclusion. 
The consumer bankruptcy can be considered as a determinant of financial 
exclusion as an economic phenomenon. The literature on the post-bankruptcy 
access to consumer credit can be divided into two parts as theoretical and 
empirical literature. Theoretical literature mostly relies on quantitative 
macroeconomic models, while empirical literature generally uses aggregate level 
or individual level data on the consumer bankruptcy to analyse the post-
bankruptcy credit access. 
Theoretical studies on the consumer bankruptcy mostly discuss optimal 
consumer bankruptcy policies. They generally have partial or general 
equilibrium approach in which they usually assume the existence of market 
exclusion after the consumer bankruptcy. Examples include Athreya (2002), 
Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) and Narajabad (2012).  
Athreya (2002) develops a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model 
of personal bankruptcy to investigate the trade-off between the consumption 
smoothing role of bankruptcy and the interest rate and finds that the 
elimination of bankruptcy altogether has substantial benefits. Livshits, 
MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) state the consumer bankruptcy provides partial 
insurance against adverse event, but it also makes lifecycle smoothing more 
difficult by driving up the interest rates. They develop a quantitative model of 
consumer bankruptcy to assess this trade-off and find that persistent adverse 
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events make the bankruptcy option more desirable. Narajabad (2012) analyses 
the relationship between the technological improvements and the consumer 
bankruptcy. He finds that these improvements provide lenders more accurate 
signals as to a borrower’s type affect bankruptcies, and also finds that this is 
an important channel. These studies incorporate the existence of market 
exclusion after the consumer bankruptcy filing in their model.  
The models alleviate moral hazard problems by imposing the non-
negotiable financial exclusion after bankruptcy, but debt negotiations occur 
and there are no legally binding restrictions on providing credit to a bankrupt. 
Even though the existence of an automatic exclusion in a model serves as a 
reasonable assumption, Athreya and Janicki (2006) state that this is a 
‘commonly used but rarely justified assumption’. They argue that such 
exclusion is not easily supported and deserves more justification and they 
identify that choosing to punish the bankrupts ex-post by exclusion is a key 
problem, because this assumption ignores that lenders and borrowers forgo 
opportunities for mutually beneficial trade that exist after bankruptcy. They 
conclude that such an assumption is hard to justify from a theoretical 
perspective and should be supported by related empirical studies. Our study 
contributes to the literature to fill this gap in the area. 
The empirical studies regarding post-bankruptcy credit access has been 
small due to the lack of individual level data. Earlier studies include Staten 
(1993), Stavins (2000) among others. Staten (1993) analyses credit reports of a 
random sample of 2,000 individuals and finds that consumers are able to obtain 
new credits one year after bankruptcy filing. He reports that 73 per cent of 
bankruptcy filers in the sample could access at least one line of credit within 
one year. On the contrary, Stavins (2000) investigates data from Survey of 
Consumer Finances and finds that 8.5 per cent of households in the US have 
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filed for bankruptcy at some point and the bankrupt individuals are less likely 
to have credit cards than non-bankrupt individuals. 
Furthermore, Fisher, Filer and Lyons (2000) and Musto (2004) provide 
evidences in support of the market exclusion. Fisher, Filer, and Lyons (2000) 
use a panel study of households and find that the consumptions of households 
have higher income sensitivity in the post-bankruptcy period than the pre-
bankruptcy period, and they state that this is consistent with binding 
borrowing constraints in the post-bankruptcy period.  
Musto (2004) uses credit bureau files to analyse the impact of the removal 
of the bankruptcy record from an individual’s credit record. He finds that 
individuals get more credit cards and credit limits are increased immediately 
after the removal of the bankruptcy flag, suggesting that lenders reduce the 
credit supply to the borrowers who have a bankruptcy flag on their credit 
report. He concludes that we observe boost in apparent creditworthiness, 
especially for the more creditworthy bankrupts, delivering a substantial 
increase in both credit scores and the access to credit in the short term. 
However, we also observe lower scores and higher delinquency than initial full-
information scores predict in the long term. 
Recently, Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) use 
a large sample of credit reports from 2003 and 2004, and they find that the 
bankrupt individuals are indeed excluded from the credit markets, but this 
exclusion is very short lived. They report that more than 90% of bankrupt 
individuals receive credit shortly after filing. Individuals with good credit score 
before filing have reduced credit availability after bankruptcy while those with 
low credit score before filing receive more credit. They also find that the default 
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probability on new debts increases after bankruptcy, especially for individuals 
with good credit score before filing. 
On the contrary, Jagtiani and Li (2015) use a dataset on consumer credit 
find that bankrupt individuals have much reduced credit limits even though 
they recover their credit scores after bankruptcy, and the impact is longer than 
the discharge period. The data used in their study allow to distinguish between 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy types. They report four main findings. 
First, despite speedy recovery in their risk scores after bankruptcy filing, most 
bankrupts have much reduced and long-lasting access to credit. Second, the 
reduction in access to credit stems mainly from the supply side. Even though 
the consumer demand for credit recover significantly after bankruptcy, credit 
limits remain low. Third, creditors do not treat Chapter 13 (income gleaning) 
bankruptcy more favourably than Chapter 7 (fresh start) bankruptcy. Fourth, 
on average, income gleaning bankrupts end up with a slightly larger credit 
access than fresh start bankrupts because they are able to maintain more of 
their old credit before the bankruptcy filing. 
Due to the lack of suitable individual level data, the literature on the 
consumer bankruptcy specifically devoted to the UK is limited. There is a 
growing literature on the credit market exclusion in the UK, but the existing 
studies mostly focus on the exclusions based on the non-economic grounds. For 
example, in a recent article, Deku, Kara and Molyneux (2015) use data from 
the Living Cost and Food Survey and investigate household access to consumer 
credit in the UK between 2001 and 2009. They find that non-white households 
are less likely to access to consumer credit than white households. They also 
find that even if non-white households have access to credit, the intensity of 
credit access is lower than that of white households. 
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It seems that there is no empirical study on the credit access after 
consumer bankruptcy in the UK, a gap this study hopes to fill. This study 
investigates the access to consumer credit after bankruptcy using individual 
level longitudinal data from representative households in Great Britain in order 
to fill this gap in this research area. 
3.4 Data and Variables 
The study uses data from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS)27 which 
was provided by the Office for National Statistics that allowed legal access to 
the special use data under the Approved Researcher Scheme. This section 
provides brief information about the data28.  
3.4.1 Survey Summary 
The WAS is a longitudinal survey which focuses on the economic well-
being of individuals in Great Britain by collecting data on assets, savings, 
income, and debts of individuals and households. It is sponsored by a group of 
government departments: Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenues and Customs, HM 
Treasury, Office for National Statistics, and the Scottish Government. Office 
for National Statistics has also undertaken the fieldwork. Since the survey 
covers only private households, it excludes people in retirement homes, nursing 
homes, prisons, barracks or university halls of residence, and also homeless 
people. 
 
27 WAS is also known as ‘Wealth in Great Britain’. 
28 Since the extensive information about the data is provided in Chapter 2, this chapter 
only provides brief information in this section. 
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The first wave (Wave 1) interviews were carried out from July 2006 to 
June 2008, covering about 53,300 adult individuals and 30,500 households. For 
the second wave (Wave 2), the same households were interviewed again from 
July 2008 to July 2010. Due to the attrition, Interviews were achieved with 
approximately 34,500 adults and 20,000 households. In the third wave (Wave 
3), addition to follow-up respondents at Wave 1 and Wave 2, a new cohort was 
introduced, which is a new random sample of around 12,000 addresses. Wave 
3 covered July 2010-June 2012 and was achieved with about 38,000 adults and 
21,000 households. Finally, the fourth wave (Wave 4) interviewed 38,300 adults 
and 20,200 households. 
The WAS estimates physical wealth, property wealth, financial wealth, 
and private pension wealth by asking households about their assets, liabilities 
and pension schemes. It also includes household and individual demographics, 
socio-economic characteristics, and measures of financial attitudes, behaviours 
and difficulties. 
3.4.2 Specification 
The study first identifies the individuals based on their access to credit. 
The WAS asks individuals whether or not they have access to unsecured credit 
such as credit cards or store cards. A ‘credit user’ is an individual who use and 
have access to consumer credit, while a ‘non-credit user’ is an individual who 
has never used and has no access to credit. Since the bankruptcy is a formal 
process that individuals can discharge their debts, they must be a credit user 
in the first place.  
The study then identifies the credit users based on their bankruptcy 
situation. Related to financial difficulties, the WAS asks individuals two specific 
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questions about the consumer bankruptcy. All adult respondents are asked in 
the survey: “Have you entered into any formal insolvency proceedings or into 
a Debt Management Plan (DMP) in the last year?” If the answer is yes, then 
respondents are required to choose one of the following options: 
1. Bankruptcy  
2. An Individual Voluntary Arrangement  
3. A Debt Management Plan  
4. A Debt Relief Order  
 
These are the available bankruptcy types under the current bankruptcy 
laws. Individuals who answered ‘yes’ to the first question are identified as 
bankrupts. As explained in the section regarding the bankruptcy laws, we can 
categorise the individuals based on their bankruptcy type. Respondents who 
choose (1) or (4) from the list above are identified as ‘fresh start’ bankrupts, 
while respondents who choose (2) or (3) are identified as ‘income gleaning’ 
bankrupts. The following diagram illustrates this identification process.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Individual Identification Process 
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3.4.3 Variables 
3.4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is Credit Access which is defined as the value of 
accessible unsecured credit available to the consumer. The WAS asks 
individuals whether or not they have access to unsecured consumer credit such 
as credit cards or store cards. If they have access to credit, it also asks the 
value of the available credit. 
3.4.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variable is Bankruptcy Decision. The bankruptcy 
decision is a binary variable and takes the value of 1 if the individual files for 
bankruptcy, otherwise 0. For the analysis of bankruptcy types, the study also 
uses Fresh Start and Income Gleaning as explanatory variables. 
The study first identifies the individuals based on their access to credit. 
The WAS asks individuals whether or not they have access to unsecured 
consumer credit. A ‘credit user’ is defined as an individual who uses and has 
access to consumer credit, so is a participant of the credit markets. On the 
other hand, a ‘non-credit user’ is an individual who has never used and has no 
access to credit, so is a non-participant of the credit markets. The analysis 
focuses on the consumer credit availability to the bankrupts and the participant 
non-bankrupts and test whether or not the entrepreneurs are excluded from the 
consumer credit markets.  
3.4.3.3 Control Variables 
In addition to explanatory variables, several variables are used as control 
variables. Income indicates the annual income of the individual. Age represents 
the age of the consumer. Since the study only analyses the adult individuals, 
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this variable takes the minimum value of 16 which the defined minimum age 
for an adult by the ONS.  
Education Level is the educational attainment of the consumer. It takes 
the value of 1 if the consumer has a bachelor’s degree or above, 0 otherwise. 
Marital Status indicates the marital status of the consumer categorised as 
couple (including married and civil partners) or single (including divorced, 
separated and widowed). It is a binary variable and takes the value of 1 if the 
individual is single, 0 otherwise. Family Size indicates the number of persons 
in the household. Ethnicity is the racial origin of the individual and it takes the 
value of 1 if the individual’s racial origin is white, 0 otherwise. Gender indicates 
the sex of the individual and it takes the value of 1 if the individual is female 
or 0 if the individual is male. 
All these variables are mainly drawn from the empirical studies on the 
access to credit and the consumer bankruptcy (e.g. Fay, Hurst and White 2002; 
Zhu, 2011; Jagtiani and Li, 2015). 
3.5 Econometric Methodology 
3.5.1 Estimation of the Cost of Bankruptcy on Credit Access 
Following the empirical method designed by Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump 
and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), the study defines the bankruptcy cost on credit 
access as the difference between the credit access for each individual who filed 
for bankruptcy and the credit access that would have been if they had not filed 
for bankruptcy. This requires the estimation of a counterfactual credit access 
for individuals who file for bankruptcy. Using the time dimension of the dataset, 
the study estimates the credit cost of bankruptcy of those individuals that file 
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for bankruptcy between two observations. It proceeds in three steps. First, 
using the sample of individuals that have never filed for bankruptcy between 
two consecutive observations, it estimates the following model for the 
availability of credit at time 𝑡+ 1 using observables at time 𝑡 as follows:  𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (3.1)  
where 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the credit available to 
individual 𝑖 who never filed for bankruptcy at time 𝑡 and 𝑡+ 1, respectively. 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of control variables, and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term, both at time 𝑡. 𝑿 includes the covariates which include the explanatory and control 
variables as explained in Section 3.4.3. It is assumed that creditors determine 
the credit availability based on information for each individual. 
The study now predicts the credit access for the individuals who filed for 
bankruptcy between time 𝑡 and 𝑡+ 1 by using the aforementioned model. This 
estimates the credit limit that would have been available at 𝑡+ 1 if they had 
not filed for bankruptcy.  𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝚤𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠̂ 𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝛽?̂?𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾̂𝑿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗,𝑡 (3.2)  
where 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝚤𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠̂ 𝑗,𝑡+1 is the predicted credit access for individuals at time 𝑡+ 1 who filed for bankruptcy between time 𝑡 and 𝑡+ 1. The difference between 
the actual credit access and the predicted credit access is the cost of bankruptcy 
on access to credit which can be shown as follows:  𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗,𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝚤𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠̂ 𝑗,𝑡+1 (3.3)  
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where 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡+1 denotes the cost of bankruptcy which takes a 
negative value if the individual obtains less credit after filing for bankruptcy 
than the predicted credit access.  
3.5.2 Difference in Differences  
Since the study analyses the credit access of bankrupt individuals 
compared to non-bankrupt individuals, a potential selection bias problem might 
be the case; because the differences between the two types (bankrupts and non-
bankrupts) may stem from various other observable characteristics, so being a 
bankrupt individual may be more likely to be endogenous. To alleviate the 
endogeneity problem, if any, the study follows Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and uses the propensity score matching to reduce the selection bias.  
Following a similar structure with Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), the 
study defines the sample of bankrupt individuals as the treatment group, 
denoted as 𝐷 = 1, and non-bankrupt participants as the control group, denoted 
as 𝐷 = 0. Then, the treatment group is matched with the control group based 
on its propensity score which is a function of observable characteristics of the 
individuals:  𝑝(𝑋) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷 = 1|𝑋) = 𝐸(𝐷|𝑋) (3.4)  
where 𝑋 denotes the individual characteristics drawn from the existing 
literature (Jagtiani and Li, 2015). If it is assumed that there is no significant 
difference in the unobservable variables between the matched groups, the 
difference in access to consumer credit can stem from having the treatment 
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which is being a bankrupt individual in this case29. Following Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002), this study matches the individuals based on the nearest 
neighbour with the replacement and propensity scores are estimated with a 
probit model. As robustness checks, it also matches the individuals using 
radius, kernel and stratification methods with common support and estimates 
the results.  
The nearest neighbour matching requires that for each treated 
observation 𝑖, we select a control observation 𝑗 with the closest propensity 
score, min |𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗|. Replacement means that each control observation can be 
used as a match to several treated observations. For the radius matching, each 
treated observation 𝑖 is matched with control observations 𝑗 that fall within a 
specified radius, |𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗| < 𝑟. For this study, we choose 𝑟 = 0.1 which is 
commonly used in the literature. For kernel matching, each treated observation 𝑖 is matched with all control observations, with weights inversely proportional 
to the distance between treated and control observations. Stratification 
matching partitions the common support of the propensity score into a set of 
intervals and compare the outcomes within these intervals. All these matching 
methods are defined in the region of common support which restricts matching 
only based on the common range of propensity scores. Propensity scores are 
estimated using a probit model utilising the individual’s characteristics. These 
characteristics are age, income, formal loans, informal loans, education level, 
family size, marital status, ethnicity and gender. The details of these matching 
methods are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
29 It is acknowledged that the limitations of this assumption which relies on the selection 
on observables and PSM only corrects the selection bias among included observable 
characteristics. While this study controls for a set of covariates to explain access to consumer 
credit, it cannot be completely ruled out that the existence of unobservable characteristics may 
still bias the treatment effect (Berkovec et al., 1996; Pager and Shepherd, 2008; Han, 2011). 
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The treatment effects are calculated comparing the outcomes 𝑌  between 
the treated and the control observations: 
 𝑌 = {𝑌1 if 𝐷 = 1𝑌0 if 𝐷 = 0} (3.5) 
 
The fundamental evaluation problem arises because only one of the outcomes 
is observed for each individual. The unobserved outcome is called 
counterfactual outcome.  
Average treatment effect (ATE) is the difference between the outcomes 
of treated and control observations:  𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(Δ) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑋,𝐷 = 1)−𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋,𝐷 = 0) (3.6) 
 
where Δ = 𝑌1 − 𝑌0. This can be estimates with a simple test between the 
outcomes for the treated and control groups. For random experiments, ATE is 
sufficient, but for observational studies like this one, the results may be biased 
if treated and control observations have different characteristics. 
 This requires the estimation of average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). ATT is the difference between the outcomes of treated and the 
outcomes of the treated observations if they had not been treated:  𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(Δ|D = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑋,𝐷 = 1)−𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋,𝐷 = 1) (3.7) 
 
The second term is unobservable, so it is counterfactual, and it needs to be 
estimated. Instead of the counterfactual, we find a close match using the control 
observations and use their outcome. After matching on propensity scores, we 
can compare the outcomes of treated and control observations: 
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𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(Δ|𝑝(𝑋),𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑝(𝑋),𝐷 = 1)−𝐸(𝑌0|𝑝(𝑋),𝐷 = 0)   (3.8) 
 
One possible identification strategy is to assume, that given a set of observable 
covariates 𝑋 which are not affected by treatment, potential outcomes are 
independent of treatment assignment:  𝑌0,𝑌1  ⊥  𝐷|𝑋 (3.9) 
 
A further requirement besides independence is the common support condition. 
For each value of 𝑋, there are both treated and control observations, and for 
each treated observation, there is a matched control observation with similar 𝑋.   0 < 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷 = 1|𝑋) < 1 (3.10) 
 
Additionally, balancing condition requires that assignment to treatment is 
independent of the 𝑋 characteristics, given the same propensity score:  𝐷 ⊥  𝑋|𝑝(𝑋) (3.11) 
 
For a robust estimation of the propensity score, a balancing property 
above must be satisfied. Lee (2013) states that the propensity scores only serve 
as a device to balance the observed distribution of covariates across the 
treatment and the control groups. The quality of matches is assessed by 
comparing the situation before and after matching to check whether there is 
any difference after conditioning on the propensity score. In addition, Sianesi 
(2004) recommends additional assessments of the matching quality which 
requires the comparison of pseudo 𝑅2 and 𝑝-values of the likelihood ratio test 
before and after matching the samples. After matching, there should be no 
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systematic differences in the distribution of covariates between the two groups. 
The matching procedure balances the covariates very well if the pseudo 𝑅2 
after matching is fairly low and the 𝑝-values of the likelihood ratio are 
insignificant which means that the joint significance of covariates are rejected. 
Since this study uses longitudinal data, it does not have to employ 
propensity score matching at the cross-sectional level. It rather uses the 
differential-trend-adjusted difference-in-differences (DID) matching estimation 
which allows to observe the consumers before and after the treatment. The DID 
propensity score matching is an improvement to standard matching estimators. 
The standard matching methods have strong assumption of selection on 
observables, but the DID estimation can improve the quality of non-
experimental evaluation results significantly (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). 
Moreover, the DID matching can additionally eliminate unobserved time-
invariant differences (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) argue that the type of information 
available to the researcher is an important factor to determine the appropriate 
methodology for non-experimental data. If only single cross-sectional data are 
available, two estimators will be considered such as the instrumental variables 
(IV) and the two-step Heckman selection estimators. If the longitudinal data 
are available, difference-in-differences (DID) can provide a more robust 
estimate of the impact of the treatment.  
The DID estimator measures the excess outcome for the treated group 
compared with the non-treated group which can be shown as follows, 
  𝛼?̂?𝐼𝐷 = (𝑌?̅?1𝑇 − 𝑌?̅?0𝑇 )− (𝑌?̅?1𝐶 − 𝑌?̅?0𝐶) (3.12) 
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where 𝑌̅ 𝑇  and 𝑌 ̅𝐶 are the mean outcomes for the treatment (bankruptcy) and 
the control (non-bankruptcy) groups, respectively. There are two main 
weaknesses in the simple DID model. The first one is the lack of control for 
unobserved temporary individual-specific components that influence the 
participation decision and the second one occurs if the macro effect has a 
differential impact across the two groups. If the two groups have different 
unknown characteristics, they may react differently to common macro shocks. 
To alleviate these problems, Bell, Blundell and Van Reenen (1999) suggest the 
differential-trend-adjusted difference-in-differences estimator. If we take 
another time interval  𝑡∗ to  𝑡∗∗ over which a similar macro trend has occurred, 
the differentially adjusted estimator becomes as follows: 
 𝛼?̂?𝐷𝐼𝐷 = [(𝑌?̅?1𝑇 − 𝑌?̅?0𝑇 )− (𝑌?̅?1𝐶 − 𝑌?̅?0𝐶)]− [(𝑌?̅?∗∗𝑇 − 𝑌?̅?∗𝑇 )− (𝑌?̅?∗∗𝐶 − 𝑌?̅?∗𝐶)]       (3.13) 
 
which will now consistently estimate 𝛼. 
The study first analyses the credit cost of bankruptcy for the short term. 
It defines the short term as a one-year period due to the fact that the discharge 
of debts usually takes one year under the fresh start bankruptcy types. It then 
analyses the credit cost of bankruptcy for the long term, which is three years, 
using the same econometric model.  
 The study also analyses the relationship between access to credit and 
the bankruptcy types using the aforementioned model.  It simply distinguishes 
between ‘fresh starters’ and ‘income gleaners’ rather than oversimplifying all 
bankrupts as the same type. In the bankruptcy types models, it replaces the 
treatment variable with ‘fresh start’ in the first model and ‘income gleaning’ 
in the second model. 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
3.6.1 Summary Statistics 
The following subsections describes the summary statistics. The first 
subsection compares bankrupt and non-bankrupt individuals. The second 
subsection compares the income gleaners and the fresh starters. 
3.6.1.1 Bankrupts vs. Non-bankrupts 
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 3.1. Columns 
report both mean values and standard deviations for the total sample, non-
bankrupts, and bankrupts, respectively.  
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics (Bankrupts vs. Non-bankrupts) 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Bankrupt (=1)                                       0.006 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Income 15511.31 20272.34 15525.43 20299.15 13186.48 15089.36
Total credit access (£) (1 year) 766.33 2916.12 751.12 2856.86 3272.15 7617.73
Change in total credit access (£) (1 year) 31.11 3001.88 35.98 2932.78 -771.52 8736.09
Change in total credit access (£) (3 years) 54.91 3369.68 69.45 3303.38 -2239.78 8882.19
Total value of formal loans (£) (1 year) 1387.78 5772.39 1371.14 5690.05 4127.64 13499.00
Change in formal loans (£) (1 year) 133.14 7805.39 138.51 7776.02 -751.08 11674.23
Change in formal loans (£) (3 years) 20.10 10194.15 29.81 10186.96 -1579.28 11234.57
Total value of informal loans (£) (1 year) 59.50 1290.84 58.64 1283.38 201.48 2198.95
Change in informal loans (£) (1 year) 8.25 1755.33 7.16 1752.25 188.35 2202.21
Change in informal loans (£) (3 years) 15.56 1722.69 14.56 1720.07 179.32 2109.74
Age                                              55.42 15.88 55.48 15.88 45.60 13.01
Education (degree or above) (=1)         0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.10 0.30
Family size                                     2.51 1.22 2.50 1.22 2.86 1.49
Single (=1) 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.40 0.49
Unemployed (=1) 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.21
White (=1)                                    0.95 0.23 0.95 0.23 0.91 0.29
Female (=1)                                   0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
Number of Observations
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey
Total Sample Non-bankrupts Bankrupts
29,160 28,984 176
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The total sample includes 29,160 adult individuals, 176 of them are 
bankrupts regardless of their bankruptcy type. The consumer bankruptcy is a 
rare event in nature, thus only 0.6% of the total sample is identified as 
bankrupt. Since bankrupts constitute a very small percentage of the total 
sample, summary statistics for total sample and non-bankrupts are very close 
to each other, whereas summary statistics for bankrupts differ substantially 
from the total sample.  
The bankrupt individuals have lower incomes than the non-bankrupts. 
The annual income of a typical non-bankrupt individual is £15,525 while on 
average, it is £13,186 for a bankrupt individual. Bankrupt individuals are also 
more likely to be unemployed compared to non-bankrupts. 
The bankrupts have more debts than the non-bankrupts. On average, a 
bankrupt individual has £4,128 of unsecured formal debt, while it is £1,371 for 
a non-bankrupt individual. The bankrupts have initially greater access to 
unsecured credits than the non-bankrupts which possibly help them to 
accumulate unsecured debt in the first place. Total value of unsecured credit 
access is £751 for an average non-bankrupt, while it is £3,272 for an average 
bankrupt. However, after filing for bankruptcy, access to consumer credit 
decreases dramatically. Total credit access decreases by £772 in a year and 
£2,240 in three years after the filing. On the other hand, it is observed that 
total credit access for non-bankrupts increases slowly in the same period. The 
increase is £36 in a year and £69 in three years for a typical non-bankrupt. 
As it is argued in the literature that the consumer bankruptcy is likely 
to affect both credit demand and credit supply (Jagtiani and Li 2015). 
Therefore, the decrease in the credit access can possibly be caused by the 
decrease in credit demand or the decrease in credit supply. To distinguish the 
 
 
97 
change in the credit demand from the change in the credit supply, the study 
also observes the change in the total value of formal and informal loans as 
proxies for one year and three years. Formal loans are defined as loans from 
financial intermediaries and legally binding but also can be discharged in the 
bankruptcy process. On the other hand, informal loans are loans from friends 
and relatives and have no legal implications. For a typical bankrupt, total value 
of formal loans decreases by £751 in a year and £1,579 in three years after 
filing for bankruptcy, while total value of informal loans increases by £188 from 
just £13. Even though it is small in magnitude, more than tenfold increase in 
informal loans may be considered as demand for credit. For the non-bankrupts, 
the change in the total value of both formal and informal loans are minimal 
during the same period. 
Bankruptcy filers are younger and less educated. A typical bankruptcy 
filer in the sample is 45.6 years old, while a typical non-bankrupt is 55.4 years 
old. Only 10% of the bankrupts have a bachelor’s degree or above compared 
24% for non-bankrupts. They have relatively larger families. The number of 
individuals in the household is greater for bankrupts which is on average 2.86 
persons, while it is 2.51 persons for non-bankrupts. There is also difference in 
marital status. 28% of non-bankrupts are single (including divorced, separated 
and widowed) while 40% of bankrupts are categorised as single.  
Apart from all these differences, bankrupts and non-bankrupts have 
some similarities. Both bankrupts and non-bankrupts are similar in term of 
ethnic origin and gender. More than 90% of bankrupts and non-bankrupts are 
white and 53% of them are female. 
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3.6.1.2 Income Gleaners vs. Fresh Starters 
In most studies, the consumer bankruptcy is considered as a uniform 
event due to the lack of suitable data, but in reality, there are different 
bankruptcy types. Therefore, if possible, it should also be analysed based on 
the bankruptcy types. Table 3.2 gives detailed information on the bankruptcy 
types. Columns report both mean values and standard deviations for the non-
bankrupt credit users, ‘income gleaning’ bankrupts and ‘fresh start’ bankrupts, 
respectively. We identify 136 individuals as income gleaners and 40 individuals 
as fresh starters. Summary statistics show that the fresh starters and the 
income gleaners also differ substantially from each other.  
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (Bankruptcy Types) 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Bankrupt (=1)                                       0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Income 15525.43 20299.15 15307.62 15643.99 5974.60 10270.73
Total credit limit (£) (1 year) 751.12 2856.86 4219.73 8503.03 50.38 207.14
Change in total credit limit (£) (1 year) 35.98 2932.78 -430.95 9072.50 -1929.48 3848.99
Change in total credit limit (£) (3 years) 69.45 3303.38 -2467.71 9894.65 -1304.83 3554.73
Total value of formal loans (£) (1 year) 1371.14 5690.05 5157.41 15154.62 626.43 2532.11
Change in formal loans (£) (1 year) 138.51 7776.02 -219.10 12241.07 -2559.79 9408.22
Change in formal loans (£) (3 years) 29.81 10186.96 -1156.93 11807.79 -3015.27 8999.69
Total value of informal loans (£) (1 year) 58.64 1283.38 253.09 2499.69 126.14 1164.44
Change in informal loans (£) (1 year) 7.16 1752.25 236.10 2503.75 102.34 1178.43
Change in informal loans (£) (3 years) 14.56 1720.07 230.15 2399.59 101.45 1087.82
Age                                              55.48 15.88 45.15 13.16 47.18 12.52
Education (degree or above) (=1)         0.24 0.43 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.27
Family size                                     2.50 1.22 3.04 1.53 2.28 1.22
Single (=1) 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.65 0.48
Unemployed (=1) 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21
White (=1)                                    0.95 0.23 0.90 0.31 0.95 0.22
Female (=1)                                   0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50
Number of Observations
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey
28,984 136 40
Non-bankrupts Income Gleaners Fresh Starters
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The fresh starters have lower incomes than the income gleaners. The 
annual income of a typical income gleaner is £15,308 which is very close to a 
typical non-bankrupt, whereas on average, it is just £5,975 for a fresh starter. 
The income gleaners have more debts than the fresh starters both before and 
after bankruptcy. On average, an income gleaner has £5,377 of unsecured 
formal debt before bankruptcy and £5,157 within a year after the bankruptcy 
filing, while a typical fresh starter has £3,186 of formal debt before bankruptcy 
and £626 within a year after the bankruptcy filing. The dramatic decrease in 
debts for fresh starters is due to the discharge of debts in a year under the fresh 
start bankruptcy types. On the other hand, debts are only reorganised and 
partially discharged for income gleaners and the process takes longer than one 
year.  
The income gleaners have greater access to unsecured credits than the 
fresh starters both before and after bankruptcy. Total credit access is £4,220 
for an average income gleaner within one year after bankruptcy which is a 
decrease of £431 in the credit access before bankruptcy. For a typical fresh 
starter, the credit access is just £50 in the first year after the bankruptcy filing 
which a decrease of £1,929 in the credit access before bankruptcy. However, 
one year after the bankruptcy, the credit access for the income gleaners 
continues to decrease and it becomes £2,183 three years after bankruptcy, 
whereas the credit access for fresh starters recovers and it becomes £675. These 
changes in the credit limits show that the exclusion of fresh starters from the 
credit markets is dramatic, swift but short lived, while the exclusion of the 
income gleaners is gradual, slow but lasts longer. Both for the income gleaners 
and the fresh starters, total value of formal loans decreases, while total value 
of informal loans increases after the bankruptcy filing. The increase in informal 
loans can be interpreted as the existence of credit demand for both types.  
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The fresh starters and the income gleaners have similar age and 
education levels. A typical fresh starter is 47.2 years old, while a typical income 
gleaner is 45.2 years old. Only 8% of the fresh starters have a bachelor’s degree 
or above compared 10% for the income gleaners. Income have relatively larger 
families. The number of persons in the household is greater for income gleaners 
which is on average 3.04 persons, while it is 2.28 persons for the fresh starters. 
There is also difference in marital status. 33% of the income gleaners are single 
(including divorced, separated and widowed) while 65% of the fresh starters 
are categorised as single. Both the fresh starters and the income gleaners are 
similar in terms of ethnic origin and gender. Over 90% of the fresh starters and 
the income gleaners are white and 53% of them are female. 
3.6.2 The Results for the Short-Term Model 
The study presents propensity score estimations for the bankrupts, the 
income gleaners and the fresh starters in Table 3.3. The findings suggest that 
younger and less educated individuals are more likely to file for bankruptcy. 
The results, sign and significance of the coefficients are also consistent for 
income gleaners and fresh starters. The bankrupt individuals are also more 
likely to have lower incomes. Even though single individuals are more likely to 
file for bankruptcy with 5% statistical significance, its statistical significance 
disappears when it is analysed for the bankruptcy types. As a robustness check, 
a variation of model (3.1) is also estimated. A variable for credit access is 
included in the probit regression to estimate the counterfactual. The results of 
this modified model are reported in Appendix B. The results are robust to this 
variation and consistent with the main model.  
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Table 3.3: Propensity Score Estimations 
 
 
 The matching quality indicators are presented in Table 3.4 which shows 
substantial reduction in absolute bias for bankrupts, income gleaners and fresh 
starters. The last two columns of the table indicate that there is a significant 
total bias reduction and the mean standardised bias after matching is below 
the 20% level of bias as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The 
standardised mean difference for overall covariates used in the propensity score, 
which was around 18-20% before matching, is reduced to about 8-11% after 
Variables Coef./(SE) Margin Coef./(SE) Margin Coef./(SE) Margin
Income -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age                                              -0.017*** -0.001*** -0.015*** -0.001*** -0.019*** -0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Education (degree or above)      -0.355*** -0.007*** -0.347*** -0.007*** -0.338*** -0.007***
(0.088) (0.095) (0.081)
Family size                                     0.030 0.000 0.044 0.000 -0.038 -0.000
(0.026) (0.027) (0.055)
Single 0.152** 0.004** 0.065 0.002 0.315 0.008
(0.066) (0.075) (0.125)
Unemployed -0.011 -0.000 0.083 0.001 -0.395 -0.008
(0.144) (0.150) (0.337)
White -0.100 -0.002 -0.133 -0.002 -0.128 -0.002
(0.103) (0.110) (0.244)
Female              -0.042 -0.000 -0.034 -0.000 -0.060 -0.000
(0.056) (0.061) (0.105)
Constant -1.510*** -1.690*** -1.888***
(0.206) (0.224) (0.413)
Number of Observations
Notes: The numbers reported are the coefficients and marginal effects of probit models 
estimating the propensity score, defined in this case as the probability of being bankrupt, income 
gleaner and fresh starter, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and we use 
the usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate whether independent 
variables are statistically significant.
Bankrupts Income Gleaners Fresh Starters
29160 29120 29024
 
 
102 
matching. This reduces total bias around 50% through matching and indicates 
that the covariates were significantly balanced as a result of the propensity 
score matching procedure. Furthermore, as suggested by Sianesi (2004), pseudo 𝑅2 after matching is fairly low and  𝑝-values after matching are insignificant, 
suggesting that the overall results from the matching procedure are satisfactory 
in balancing the covariates between the bankrupts and non-bankrupts.  
 
Table 3.4: Matching Quality Indicators Before and After Matching 
 
 
The study then matches the bankrupt individuals with corresponding 
non-bankrupt individuals using nearest neighbour with replacement, radius, 
kernel and stratification matching methods. Table 3.5 reports the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for the short-term model which simply 
analyses the effect of treatment in one year. The results suggest that the credit 
access for bankrupts are around £900 less than the credit access that would 
have been if they had not filed for bankruptcy. As robustness checks, the results 
are also consistent in all matching methods and all of them are statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. The findings support Cohen-Cole, 
Outcome
Matching 
Method
Pseudo  . 
before 
matching
Pseudo  .  
after 
matching
p-Value  
before 
matching
p-Value  
after 
matching
Mean 
standardised 
bias before 
matching
Mean 
standardised 
bias after 
matching
Total % 
|bias| 
reduction
Bankruptcy NNM 0.121 0.044 0.000 0.216 18.171 8.154 55.1
KM 0.121 0.051 0.000 0.254 18.171 7.943 56.3
Income Gleaning NNM 0.087 0.032 0.000 0.476 15.216 9.532 37.4
KM 0.087 0.039 0.000 0.439 15.216 8.326 45.3
Fresh Start NNM 0.177 0.052 0.000 0.615 20.514 11.789 42.6
KM 0.177 0.043 0.000 0.582 20.514 10.521 48.7
NNM: Nearest neighbour matching with replacement and common support.
KM: Kernel matching with bandwith 0.06 and common support.
𝑅2 𝑅2 
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Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) who find that the bankrupt 
individuals are indeed excluded from the credit markets. 
 
Table 3.5: Average Treatment Effect (Short Term Model) 
 
 
The study also analyses the bankruptcy types and similarly, the findings 
suggest that both income gleaners and fresh starters are excluded from the 
credit market to some extent. The credit access for the income gleaners is 
around £500 less than the credit access that would have been if they had not 
filed for bankruptcy, whereas the credit access is approximately £2,000 less for 
the fresh starters. These results suggest that fresh starters are excluded from 
the credit market more severely than the income gleaners in the short term. 
These results are comparable to the literature. For example, similar to our 
findings, Jagtiani and Li (2015) state that income gleaning bankrupts end up 
with a larger credit access than fresh start bankrupts because they are able to 
maintain more of their old credit before the bankruptcy filing. 
Matching method ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.)
Nearest neighbour matching -930.261*** (436.409) -434.743*** (275.475) -2019.118*** (752.340)
Radius matcing -874.312*** (362.218) -472.312*** (287.513) -1946.612*** (656.834)
Kernel matching -818.686*** (423.025) -467.149*** (282.836) -1960.809*** (671.258)
Stratification matching -847.997*** (495.507) -506.777*** (293.555) -1939.407*** (643.056)
Number of Observations
Notes: The numbers reported are the results for the propensity score matching estimates of the average 
treatement effect (ATT) of being a bankrupt, an income gleaner and a fresh starter on the access to 
credit, respectively. Robust standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parentheses. We use the 
usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate the statistical significance.      
Bankrupts Income Gleaners Fresh Starters
29160 29120 29024
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3.6.3 The Results for the Long-Term Model 
The study also analyses the post-bankruptcy credit access for the long 
term which is three years. Table 3.6 reports the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) for the short-term model which simply analyses the effect 
of treatment in one year. The credit access for bankrupts are approximately 
£2,500 less than the credit limits that would have been if they had not filed 
for bankruptcy three years after filing for bankruptcy. For the bankruptcy 
types, the income gleaners can access around £2,500 less credit than their non-
bankrupt counterparts. The fresh starters can also access around £1,350 less 
credit than they would have received if they had not filed for bankruptcy. The 
results are consistent in all matching methods and all of them are statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 
Table 3.6: Average Treatment Effect (Long Term Model) 
 
 
 
These results suggest that the exclusion of income gleaners becomes more 
severe in the long term. The cost of bankruptcy was around £500 in the short 
Matching method ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.)
Nearest neighbour matching -2511.031*** (608.752) -2471.993*** (925.821) -1384.988*** (331.121)
Radius matcing -2483.742*** (703.209) -2516.943*** (817.216) -1372.095*** (391.204)
Kernel matching -2406.143*** (888.034) -2532.311*** (916.830) -1362.862*** (485.165)
Stratification matching -2464.736*** (717.919) -2597.558*** (797.526) -1340.819*** (179.080)
Number of Observations
Notes: The numbers reported are the results for the propensity score matching estimates of the average 
treatement effect (ATT) of being a bankrupt, an income gleaner and a fresh starter on the access to 
credit, respectively. Robust standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parentheses. We use the 
usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate the statistical significance.
Bankrupts Income Gleaners Fresh Starters
29160 29120 29024
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term, but it increases by around £2,000 and becomes £2,500 in the long term. 
On the other hand, the exclusion of fresh starters softens in the long term. The 
cost of bankruptcy was approximately £2,000 in the short term but it decreases 
to £1,350 in the long term. Jagtiani and Li (2015) argue that creditors do not 
treat income gleaning bankruptcy more favourably than fresh start bankruptcy. 
This argument is supported by our findings. Access to credit for income gleaners 
worsens in the long term, while it gets better for the fresh starters.  
Furthermore, Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) 
state that bankrupts are excluded from the credit markets, but this exclusion 
is very short lived. Our findings suggest that this statement is true for fresh 
starters, but not income gleaners. The bankrupt individuals are indeed excluded 
from the credit markets, but the characteristics of the financial exclusion are 
different for different bankruptcy types. The exclusion of fresh starters from 
the credit markets is dramatic, swift but short lived, while the exclusion of the 
income gleaners is gradual, slow but lasts longer. 
The study has important policy implications. The results may help 
policymakers to assess the effectiveness of the current bankruptcy law in 
providing relief to income gleaners. Even though fresh starters are excluded 
from the credit markets immediately after the bankruptcy filing, they are able 
to regain access to credit soon thereafter. Our findings suggest that fresh 
starters can get the easiest access to credit afterwards and they are punished 
less than the income gleaners. The impact of the consumer bankruptcy on the 
credit access for income gleaners seem to be long-lasting. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
As consumer bankruptcy has become an important issue not only in the 
UK but also globally, studies attempted to explain not only the increasing trend 
but also the reasons behind the decisions of consumers to file for bankruptcy. 
It is discussed that the bankrupt individuals can be the restricted future access 
to credit markets, and this may have the negative impact on credit score 
(Musto, 2004). For example, a bankruptcy flag on a consumer credit report 
stays there for ten years which affects the access to credit in the future 
negatively. If these losses are high enough, they may deter consumers to file in 
the good state even if it is financially practical. 
This study aims to contribute to the debate on whether or not bankrupt 
individuals are excluded from the credit markets. It analyses the effects of the 
consumer bankruptcy on the access to consumer credit for approximately 
30,000 consumers in Great Britain.  
First of all, the study defines the bankruptcy cost on credit access as the 
difference between the credit access for each individual who filed for bankruptcy 
and the credit access that would have been if they had not filed for bankruptcy 
following the empirical method designed by Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and 
Montoriol-Garriga (2013). This method requires the estimation of a 
counterfactual credit access for individuals who file for bankruptcy. Using the 
time dimension of the dataset, the study observes the credit access of those 
individuals that file for bankruptcy before and after the bankruptcy filing. 
The study then compares the credit access to bankrupt individuals and 
non-bankrupt individuals using difference in differences (DID) method and 
finds that bankrupt individuals are indeed excluded from the credit markets to 
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some extent both in the short and the long term and the exclusion increases 
over time from one year to three year after the bankruptcy filing. The results 
show that one year after the bankruptcy filing, the credit access for bankrupts 
are around £900 less than the credit access that would have been if they had 
not filed for bankruptcy. This value is considered as the short-term cost of 
bankruptcy on the access to credit. Three years after bankruptcy, the cost of 
bankruptcy becomes approximately £2,500. These figures show that the 
financial exclusion becomes more severe in three years. The findings support 
Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) who find that the 
bankrupt individuals are indeed excluded from the credit markets. 
The study also analyses the existence of the financial exclusion according 
to the bankruptcy types, income gleaning or fresh start. Both bankruptcy types 
are excluded from the markets but in a different manner. Since the debts are 
discharged in a year in the fresh start bankruptcy, the exclusion from the 
market is quick and severe. The cost of bankruptcy on the access to credit is 
approximately £2,000 for the fresh starters in the short term. However, the 
fresh starters regain access to markets after one year. The cost of bankruptcy 
on the access to credit decreases to £1,350 in the long term. 
On the other hand, since the debts are reorganised and partially 
discharged in the income gleaning bankruptcy, the exclusion process is slow, 
but the exclusion continues to increase three years after the filing. The cost of 
bankruptcy on the access to credit is approximately £500 for the income 
gleaners in the short term, but the exclusion of income gleaners becomes more 
severe three years after the bankruptcy filing. The cost of bankruptcy on the 
access to credit increases by around £2,000 and becomes £2,500 in the long 
term. 
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These results suggest that bankrupt individuals are indeed excluded from 
the credit markets, but the financial exclusion differ according to the 
bankruptcy types. The exclusion of fresh starters from the credit markets is 
dramatic, swift but short lived, while the exclusion of the income gleaners is 
gradual, slow but lasts longer. The findings support, Jagtiani and Li (2015) 
who argue that creditors do not treat income gleaning bankruptcy more 
favourably than fresh start bankruptcy. Access to credit for income gleaners 
worsens in the long term, while it gets better for the fresh starters.  
Access to credit is generally considered as a financial necessity, and the 
inability of individuals to access the credit may harm the economic activity. A 
fair consumer bankruptcy system is also necessary to smooth the consumption 
after adverse events, but it should deter the strategically oriented individuals 
at the same time because otherwise it may harm the credit markets and may 
cause a decline in the access to consumer credit by ‘honest by unfortunate’ 
bankrupt individuals. Even though data limitations prevent to analyse all 
aspects of the relationship between the consumer bankruptcy and the financial 
exclusion, this study contributes to the literature to better understand this 
relationship. 
The results may help policymakers to assess the effectiveness of the 
current bankruptcy law in providing relief to income gleaners. Even though 
fresh start bankrupts are severely excluded from the credit markets 
immediately after they file for bankruptcy, they are able to regain access to 
consumer credit soon after a year. Therefore, the fresh starters can get the 
easiest access to credit afterwards and they are punished less than the income 
gleaners. The impact of the consumer bankruptcy on the credit access for 
income gleaners seem to be long-lasting. 
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The models presented in this study are simplified to represent the main 
aspects of the bankruptcy decision. As it is case for all models, our models have 
some limitations. They do not capture all relevant aspects of the consumer 
bankruptcy such as the role of social stigma, information, entrepreneurial 
activities and work incentives. However, data limitations prevent to analyse all 
these related aspects. For further studies, additional research on the role of the 
entrepreneurial activity would help understand the consumer bankruptcy in a 
more detailed manner. Therefore, Chapter 4 focuses the relationship between 
access to credit and the entrepreneurial activity to fill this gap.  
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3.8 Appendix B 
Table 3.7: Propensity Score Estimations (v.2) 
 
Variables Coef./(SE) Margin Coef./(SE) Margin Coef./(SE) Margin
Income -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Access -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Age                                              -0.015*** -0.001*** -0.013*** -0.001*** -0.017*** -0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Education (degree or above)      -0.363*** -0.007*** -0.336*** -0.007*** -0.321*** -0.007***
(0.081) (0.085) (0.080)
Family size                                     0.031 0.000 0.042 0.000 -0.039 -0.000
(0.027) (0.025) (0.052)
Single 0.149** 0.004** 0.061 0.002 0.325 0.008
(0.063) (0.071) (0.119)
Unemployed -0.010 -0.000 0.079 0.001 -0.374 -0.008
(0.145) (0.140) (0.331)
White -0.095 -0.002 -0.123 -0.002 -0.136 -0.002
(0.106) (0.109) (0.237)
Female              -0.041 -0.000 -0.033 -0.000 -0.057 -0.000
(0.057) (0.065) (0.100)
Constant -1.586*** -1.615*** -1.912***
(0.215) (0.231) (0.405)
Number of Observations
Notes: The numbers reported are the coefficients and marginal effects of probit models 
estimating the propensity score, defined in this case as the probability of being bankrupt, income 
gleaner and fresh starter, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and we use 
the usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate whether independent 
variables are statistically significant.
Bankrupts Income Gleaners Fresh Starters
29160 29120 29024
 
 
111 
Table 3.8: Average Treatment Effect (Short Term Model v.2) 
 
  
Matching method ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.)
Nearest neighbour matching -916.361*** (425.491) -412.356*** (223.122) -1954.833*** (719.066)
Radius matcing -863.218*** (344.853) -465.670*** (233.932) -1933.783*** (666.670)
Kernel matching -805.643*** (412.167) -484.193*** (274.395) -1954.610*** (692.877)
Stratification matching -875.452*** (437.390) -498.348*** (277.445) -1966.792*** (639.712)
Number of Observations
Notes: The numbers reported are the results for the propensity score matching estimates of the average 
treatement effect (ATT) of being a bankrupt, an income gleaner and a fresh starter on the access to 
credit, respectively. Robust standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parentheses. We use the 
usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate the statistical significance.      
Bankrupts Income Gleaners Fresh Starters
29160 29120 29024
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Table 3.9: Average Treatment Effect (Long Term Model v.2) 
 
  
Matching method ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.) ATT (Std. Err.)
Nearest neighbour matching -2564.122*** (596.890) -2465.832*** (912.346) -1354.648*** (327.631)
Radius matcing -2517.389*** (669.784) -2498.184*** (801.721) -1398.192*** (407.490)
Kernel matching -2442.569*** (812.128) -2522.927*** (899.395) -1401.385*** (490.711)
Stratification matching -2492.844*** (739.767) -2626.903*** (767.932) -1369.932*** (371.392)
Number of Observations
Notes: The numbers reported are the results for the propensity score matching estimates of the average 
treatement effect (ATT) of being a bankrupt, an income gleaner and a fresh starter on the access to 
credit, respectively. Robust standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parentheses. We use the 
usual convention *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate the statistical significance.
Bankrupts Income Gleaners Fresh Starters
29160 29120 29024
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Chapter 4: Access to Consumer Credit: The Role 
of Entrepreneurial Activity 
4.1 Introduction 
Access to financial services such as a bank account and financial products 
such as a consumer loan is termed ‘financial inclusion’. Financial inclusion is 
generally considered as a financial necessity, but the ability of individuals to 
access the credit varies dramatically (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). On 
the other hand, the inability to access to these financial services and products 
is termed ‘financial exclusion’ (Simpson and Buckland, 2009). Financially 
excluded individuals face difficulties in full participation in daily transactions 
and this can play a negative role on economic and social progress (Demirguc-
Kunt and Klapper, 2013).  
There is a growing literature on the credit market exclusion in the UK. 
The literature on financial exclusion focuses on two dimensions, economic and 
non-economic exclusion. In a detailed study of financial exclusion, Devlin (2005) 
focuses on the economic ground and find that the most consistent and 
significant influences on financial exclusion are employment status, household 
income, marital status, age, and level of education. There are also studies 
focusing on the exclusions based on the non-economic grounds. For example, 
in a recent article, Deku, Kara and Molyneux (2015) use data from the Living 
Cost and Food Survey and find that non-white households are less likely to 
access to consumer credit than white households. 
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Another determinant of the financial exclusion is the consumer 
bankruptcy law of the country. Since the consumer loans are mostly discharged 
in the bankruptcy procedures, the creditors adjust their policies based on the 
bankruptcy law. In a pro-debtor bankruptcy law, creditors are willing to 
provide less credit to consumers when it is compared to more pro-creditor 
consumer bankruptcy laws due to the risk of default (White, 2005). 
A major reform in the bankruptcy law in the UK was introduced by 
Enterprise Act 2002. This new law has made the consumer bankruptcy more 
pro-debtor by reducing the discharge of debts no later than one year which was 
previously three years. The main objective was to encourage entrepreneurial 
activity by providing a partial insurance to entrepreneurs. It is argued that this 
reform is the main reason for the dramatic increase in the consumer bankruptcy 
filings. Consumer bankruptcy filings have risen rapidly after the 2002 reform. 
The total number of consumer bankruptcy filings in the UK has tripled in five 
years. The number of filings was around 40,000 in 2002, while it was around 
120,000 in 2007 (see Figure 2.1 for details). 
In the literature, it is discussed that when a bankruptcy law is more 
forgiving in providing entrepreneurs a greater opportunity for a fresh start, it 
will boost the entrepreneurial and economic activity (Lee and Yamakawa, 
2012). The main rationale behind this argument is that a pro-debtor 
bankruptcy law encourages the entrepreneurs to take more risks because they 
know that if they fail, they can file for bankruptcy to fresh start. 
However, even though a pro-debtor bankruptcy law encourages the 
entrepreneurship to boost the economic activity, it may also tighten the credit 
availability to individual entrepreneurs. It is also argued in the literature that 
a pro-debtor bankruptcy law may decrease the credit supply to the individual 
entrepreneurs (Berkowitz and White, 2004). When a firm is unincorporated, 
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i.e. a sole trader, its debts are personal liabilities of the firm’s owner, so that 
lending to the firm is legally equivalent to lending to its owner. If the firm fails, 
the owner has an incentive to file for consumer bankruptcy. Since the firm's 
debts will be discharged, the owner is only obliged to liquidate eligible assets, 
if any, to repay to creditors. Therefore, in a pro-debtor bankruptcy law, 
creditors tighten the credit availability for individual entrepreneurs because of 
the potential risk of the consumer bankruptcy. This study focuses on this 
dilemma and aims to analyse the role entrepreneurial activity on the credit 
availability to consumers. Its contribution is intended to be threefold. 
First, empirical studies find that financial exclusion can be on economic 
grounds such as income, wealth and employment status and/or non-economic 
grounds such as ethnicity and race (Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee, 2005; Devlin, 
2005; Carbo et al., 2007; Simpson and Buckland, 2009). As an additional 
economic ground, this study analyses whether or not individual entrepreneurs 
are excluded from credit markets when they are compared to non-entrepreneurs 
with similar characteristics.  
Second, due to the lack of suitable individual level data, the literature on 
the access to credit for individual entrepreneurs focuses mostly on US 
consumers and the literature specifically devoted to the UK is limited. This 
study aims to investigate the credit availability for individual entrepreneurs 
using individual level longitudinal data from representative households in Great 
Britain in order to fill this gap in this area. 
Third, even though it is discussed in the literature that more forgiving 
bankruptcy laws encourage entrepreneurial activity, it has been debated that 
individual entrepreneurs will be excluded from credit markets to some extent 
or may be charged higher interest rates to compensate the potential risks when 
they are compared to non-entrepreneurs with similar characteristics. This study 
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contributes the literature by analysing whether or not individual entrepreneurs 
are excluded from credit markets, and if so, to what extent. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The literature on the financial 
exclusion and access to credit is summarised in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 explains 
the data and variables. The econometric approach is discussed in Section 4.4 
and the empirical results are in Section 4.5. Concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 4.6. 
4.2 Literature Review 
There is an extensive literature on financial exclusion30 including cross 
country analyses such as Honohan (2008), or country specific analyses such as 
Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee (2005) for the US, Devlin (2005) for the UK, 
Simpson and Buckland (2009) for Canada and Carbo, Gardener and Molyneux 
(2007) for the EU. These studies typically find that the most important 
influences on financial exclusion are employment status, household income, 
marital status, age, and level of education. 
In a cross-country analysis, Honohan (2008) examines more than 160 
countries using formal financial intermediaries and finds correlation between 
financial exclusion and poverty. He constructs the estimates by combining 
information on banking, banking depth and GDP data. The results suggest 
that greater access to consumer credit may be associated with lower inequality 
as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
30 A detailed literature on financial exclusion is discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, the 
literature is summarised here, and it focuses on the relationship between the financial exclusion 
and entrepreneurship.  
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Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee (2005) analyse the US consumer using 
Surveys of Consumer Finances and find that financial exclusion declined from 
1989 to 2001. They find that socioeconomic characteristics play an important 
role in access to financial institutions. Their results indicate that account 
ownership increased for low to moderate income households which can be 
considered as decline in financial exclusion. 
In a UK-specific study, Devlin (2005) investigates the influences on the 
financial exclusion for a wide range of financial services and finds that the most 
consistent and important influences are employment status, household income 
and housing tenure followed by marital status, age, and education level. He 
also states that non-white households are at greater risk of financial exclusion 
when they are compared to white households. 
Simpson and Buckland (2009) report similar results for Canada from 1999 
to 2005. They develop a model that identifies observable measures of credit 
constraint and financial exclusion and relate them to consumer characteristics. 
They find that the financial exclusion increases as income and wealth fall. They 
also find potential important links between financial literacy, formal education, 
asset building and the financial exclusion. 
Similarly, Carbo, Gardener and Molyneux (2007) analyse the financial 
exclusion within the European Union (EU). They find that after intense 
deregulation and globalisation pressures within the process of completing the 
internal market and the development of European monetary union, the 
financial exclusion emerged as a major issue. They suggest that this issue should 
be addressed by taking the institutional context of different countries in 
consideration.  
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Financial exclusion among individual entrepreneurs is also discussed in 
the literature. Various studies find that individual entrepreneurs face obstacles 
to access to credit they need. Therefore, the lack of capital is considered as one 
of the most important impediments to entrepreneurship.  
In an early study, Evans and Leighton (1989) analyse the process of 
selection into entrepreneurship using US data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Young Men (NLS) for 1966–1981 and the Current Population Surveys 
for 1968–1987. They find that entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints. 
Similarly, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) investigate the functions of 
entrepreneurship and find that liquidity constraints bind, and a potential 
entrepreneur must bear most of the risk inherent in his or her business. The 
data suggest that wealthier people are more likely to be entrepreneurs. One 
may argue that this could be so because the wealthy tend to make better 
entrepreneurs, but their analysis rejects this explanation. Instead, they point 
to liquidity constraints. Capital is essential for starting a business, and liquidity 
constraints tend to exclude those with insufficient funds at their disposal 
regardless of their entrepreneurial talent. 
Furthermore, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) use microdata on 
entrepreneurship and find the existence of capital constraints on potential 
entrepreneurs. They also report that potential entrepreneurs state in the 
interview surveys that raising capital is the main problem. Consistent with the 
existence of capital constraints on potential entrepreneurs, their results imply 
that the probability of self-employment depends positively on whether the 
individual ever received an inheritance or gift. 
Blanchflower and Shadforth (2007) examine the causes and consequences 
of changes in the incidence of entrepreneurship in the UK. They compare the 
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self-employed with employees and find that the median earnings of the self-
employed is less than that of employees. They also show that the self-employed 
individuals are more likely to be males, immigrants, work in London, work in 
construction and financial sectors. They also state that due to the capital 
constraints, self-employment depends on whether the individual ever received 
an inheritance. 
There is also growing literature on the consumer bankruptcy31 and its 
implication. Many researchers have studied bankruptcy to understand why 
consumers file for bankruptcy and why filings have increased dramatically. 
Some researchers focus on consumers’ financial situation and their bankruptcy 
decision. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) find that consumers with more credit 
card debt are more likely to file for bankruptcy. Similarly, Gross and Souleles 
(2002) find that bankruptcy rates are associated with the delinquent debt.  
On the other hand, some researchers focus on the relationship between 
adverse events such as unemployment, health problems and divorce, and 
consumer bankruptcy decision. In an early study, Sullivan, Warren and 
Westbrook (1989) find that adverse events lead to consumer bankruptcy by 
decreasing consumers’ ability to repay. Himmelstein et al. (2005) survey 
consumer bankruptcy filers and find that 28.3% of the filings were due to illness 
or injury and 46.2% of the filings are related to major medical causes.  
Moreover, a part of the literature on consumer bankruptcy is devoted to 
social stigma and information costs. In their empirical analysis, Sullivan, 
Warren and Westbrook (2006) find that increased filings result from increased 
financial distress rather than declining bankruptcy stigma. Cohen-Cole and 
 
31 A detailed literature on consumer bankruptcy is discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, 
the literature is summarised here, and it focuses on the relationship between the consumer 
bankruptcy and entrepreneurship. 
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Duygan-Bump (2008) study a large sample of individual credit information 
provided by a US credit bureau and argue that the increase in consumer 
bankruptcy filings is more likely associated with the decreased information costs 
rather than the decreased in social stigma. Fay, Hurst and White (2002) also 
find that households live in districts which have higher bankruptcy rates are 
more likely to file for bankruptcy which implies that locality is an important 
determinant on bankruptcy decision.  
Another implication of consumer bankruptcy is the effect on the 
unsecured consumer credit on individual entrepreneurs. It is argued in the 
literature that if a country has a pro-debtor bankruptcy law, it will encourage 
the entrepreneurial activity (Lee and Yamakawa, 2012). A pro-debtor 
bankruptcy law provides lower exit barriers to failed entrepreneurs by making 
the bankruptcy procedures easy. This situation in turn lowers the entry barriers 
and encourages entrepreneurs to take risk to start a new business.  
Lee and Yamakawa (2012) examine the relationship between the 
bankruptcy law and the rate of new firm entry using a cross-country database 
of 28 countries spanning 15 years. They find that providing failed entrepreneurs 
a fresh start bankruptcy encourages new firm entry, hence boosts the economic 
activity. The main reason is that a forgiving bankruptcy law encourages the 
entrepreneurs to take more risks because if the entrepreneurs fail in their 
entrepreneurial activity, they can file for a fresh start bankruptcy which will 
allow them to discharge the unsecured debts.  
On the other hand, this phenomenon may force creditors to decrease the 
credit availability to individual entrepreneurs (Berkowitz and White, 2004). 
Because, if a firm is unincorporated, the firm’s debts are personal liabilities of 
its owner, so that lending to the firm is legally equivalent to lending to its 
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owner. If the entrepreneur fails in the business activity, he can personally file 
for consumer bankruptcy to discharge debts. This may cause capital loss for 
creditors. Thus, in a more forgiving bankruptcy law, creditors see the individual 
entrepreneurs riskier, tighten the credit availability for entrepreneurs because 
of the potential risk of default. 
Berkowitz and White (2004) investigate the relationship with the 
consumer bankruptcy law and small firms’ access to credit in the US and they 
find that the higher the exemption level, the greater is the incentive to file for 
bankruptcy. They show that the credit supply falls and demand for credit rises 
when unincorporated firms are located in states with higher bankruptcy 
exemptions. They also find that small firms in the states with unlimited rather 
than low homestead exemptions are more likely to be denied credit, thus they 
receive smaller loans with higher interest rates. 
This chapter aims to examine the role entrepreneurial activity on the 
access to consumer credit. It analyses the credit availability to the 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and test whether or not the entrepreneurs 
are excluded from the consumer credit markets. 
4.3 Data and Variables 
The data used in this study is the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) 
which was provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) that allowed 
legal access to the special use data under the Approved Researcher Scheme. 
Since the extensive information about the data is provided in Chapter 2, this 
section summarises the data and explain the specification process in this 
section. 
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4.3.1 Data Summary 
The WAS launched in 2006 and is a biennial longitudinal survey which 
focuses on the economic well-being of households in Great Britain by collecting 
data on assets, savings, income, and debt of individuals and households. This 
survey measures the well-being of households and individuals in terms of their 
assets, savings and debt and planning for retirement.  It is sponsored by a 
group of government departments: Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills, Department for Work and Pensions, Financial Services Authority, HM 
Revenues and Customs, HM Treasury, Office for National Statistics, and the 
Scottish Government. Office for National Statistics has also undertaken the 
fieldwork. Interviewers working on the survey refer to it as the Household 
Assets Survey. 
Since the survey covers only private households, it excludes people in 
retirement homes, nursing homes, prisons, barracks or university halls of 
residence, and also homeless people. The WAS estimates financial, physical and 
private pension wealth by asking households about their assets, liabilities and 
pension schemes. It also includes demographic data about households and 
individuals such as age, sex, employment status, education level etc. 
The first wave interviews were carried out from July 2006 to June 2008, 
covering about 53,300 adult individuals32 and 30,500 households. For the second 
wave, same households were interviewed again from July 2008 to July 2010. 
Due to the attrition, interviews were achieved with approximately 34,500 adults 
and 20,000 households. In the third wave, addition to follow-up respondents at 
Wave 1 and Wave 2, a new cohort was introduced, which is a new random 
sample of around 12,000 addresses. Wave 3 covered from July 2010 to June 
 
32 Adult’ is defined as the respondents aged 16 and over. 
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2012 and was achieved with about 40,400 adults and 21,400 households. Finally, 
the fourth wave interviewed 38,300 adults and 20,200 households from July 
2012 to June 2014.  
The results of the WAS are used by various government departments as 
well as academics. The data provides a greater understanding of the financial 
conditions of the households and the levels and distribution of wealth in terms 
of pensions, property, financial and physical assets as well as indebtedness. 
The survey estimates are designed to be representative of the population 
of Great Britain, therefore the WAS uses a ‘probability proportional to size’ 
(PPS) method of sampling cases.  In addition to the geographical distribution, 
the WAS sample is also designed to be representative of the population in terms 
of characteristics of individuals and households such as age, sex, marital status, 
employment status and education level. All interviews have a two-yearly 
interval between waves, therefore providing estimates of change in relation to 
the same period of time33.  The WAS estimates physical wealth, property 
wealth, financial wealth, and private pension wealth by asking households 
about their assets, liabilities and pension schemes. It also includes household 
and individual demographics, socioeconomic characteristics, and measures of 
financial attitudes, behaviours, and difficulties. 
4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is Credit Access which is defined as the value of 
accessible unsecured credit available to the consumer. The WAS asks 
 
33 For example, Wave 1 interviews conducted during July 2006 would be repeated for 
Wave 2 in July 2008. It is important that this gap remains constant so that estimates of change 
are comparable from wave to wave. 
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individuals whether or not they have access to unsecured consumer credit such 
as credit cards or store cards. If they have access to credit, it also asks the 
value of the available credit.  
4.3.2.2 Explanatory Variable 
The main explanatory variable is Entrepreneurship. The study first 
identifies the individuals based on their access to credit. The WAS asks 
individuals whether or not they have access to unsecured consumer credit. A 
‘credit user’ is defined as an individual who uses and has access to consumer 
credit, while a ‘non-credit user’ is an individual who has never used and has no 
access to credit.  
The analysis focuses on the consumer credit availability to the 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and test whether or not the entrepreneurs 
are excluded from the consumer credit markets. Therefore, we then identify the 
credit users based on their entrepreneurial activity. If a person owns an 
unincorporated company, i.e. a sole trader, the person is identified as an 
‘entrepreneur individual’. The entrepreneur individual takes its own risk to do 
business. The firm’s debts are personal liabilities of the firm’s owner, so that 
lending to the firm is legally equivalent to lending to its owner. If the firm fails, 
the owner has an incentive to file for consumer bankruptcy. Both the debts of 
the firm and the unsecured consumer loans can be discharged under the 
consumer bankruptcy law34. On the other hand, a ‘non-entrepreneur individual’ 
is employed by another company or institution in return for a salary. The non-
 
34 If the company is incorporated, i.e. limited liability company, its debts can be 
discharged under the corporate bankruptcy law. In this case, the owner or partner of the 
company is not personally liable to its debts, so they cannot be discharged under the consumer 
bankruptcy law. 
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entrepreneur individual does not engage with the business activity directly and 
takes no entrepreneurial risks.  
4.3.2.3 Control Variables 
Income indicates the annual income of the consumer. Formal Loans 
indicate the total value of loans from a financial intermediary, while Informal 
Loans indicate the total value of informal loans taken from friends and 
relatives. The distinction between formal and informal loans is important 
because only formal loans can be discharged under the consumer bankruptcy 
law.  
The other control variables include mostly demographic variables. Age 
represents the age of the consumer. Since we only analyse the adult individuals, 
this variable takes the minimum value of 16 which the defined minimum age 
for an adult in the survey. Education Level is the educational attainment of 
the consumer. It takes the value of 1 if the consumer has a first degree or above, 
0 otherwise. Marital Status indicates the marital status of the consumer 
categorised as couple (including married and civil partners) or single (including 
divorced, separated and widowed). Family Size indicates the number of persons 
in the household. Ethnicity is the racial origin of the individual and it takes the 
value of 1 if the individual’s racial origin is white, 0 otherwise. Gender indicates 
the sex of the individual and it takes the value of 1 if the individual is female 
or 0 if the individual is male.  
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4.4 Econometric Approach 
4.4.1 Credit Access Model 
Following the empirical method designed by Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump 
and Montoriol-Garriga (2013), the study defines the cost of entrepreneurial 
activity on the access to consumer credit as the difference between the credit 
access for each individual who owns an unincorporated business and the credit 
access that would have been if they had not been an owner of an unincorporated 
business. This requires the estimation of a counterfactual credit access for 
individuals who own an unincorporated business. The study estimates the 
credit cost of entrepreneurship on individuals who own an unincorporated 
business. The study proceeds in three steps. First, using the sample of non-
entrepreneur individuals, it estimates the following simple model for the 
availability of credit using observables as follows: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖    (4.1)  
where 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 denotes the accessible credit available to individual 𝑖 who 
does not own an incorporated business, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖 denotes the income of the 
individual 𝑖. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 represents the total value of formal loans whereas 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 represents the total value of informal loans both for individual 𝑖. 
Moreover, 𝑿𝑖 is the vector of control variables, and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term. 𝑿 
includes the covariates for the individual characteristics such as age, education 
level, marital status, family size, ethnicity and gender which are mainly drawn 
from the previous empirical studies on the financial exclusion such as Cohen-
Cole, Duygan-Bump and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and Kara and Molyneux 
(2017).  
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The study now predicts the credit access for the individuals who own an 
unincorporated business by using the aforementioned model. This estimates the 
credit access that would have been available if they had not owned the business. 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝚤𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠̂ 𝑗 = 𝛽1̂𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽2̂𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽3̂𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4̂𝑿𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗   (4.2) 
 
where 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝚤𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠̂ 𝑗 is the predicted credit access for individuals who own an 
unincorporated business. Similarly, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑗 denotes the income of the individual 𝑗. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗 represents the total value of formal loans whereas 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗 
represents the total value of informal loans both for individual 𝑗. 𝑿𝑗 is the 
vector of control variables, and 𝑢𝑗 is the error term. The difference between the 
actual credit access and the predicted access is the cost of entrepreneurial 
activity on the access to consumer credit which can be shown as follows:  𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗 = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗 − 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝚤𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠̂ 𝑗 (4.3) 
 
where 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗 denotes the cost of entrepreneurial activity, 
which takes a negative value if the individual obtains less credit due to being 
owner of an unincorporated business. The study employs the propensity score 
matching (PSM) method to estimate the aforementioned model.  
4.4.2 Propensity Score Matching 
The study aims to analyse the following question: 
Are the entrepreneur individuals, ceteris paribus, less likely to access to 
consumer credit than non-entrepreneur individuals with similar characteristics? 
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Since it analyses the credit access of entrepreneur individuals compared 
to non-entrepreneur individuals, a potential selection bias problem might be 
the case; because being an entrepreneur is likely to be endogenous and might 
be related to other observable characteristics. To alleviate the endogeneity 
problem, if any, the study follows Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and uses the 
propensity score matching (PSM) to reduce the selection bias.  
Following a similar structure with Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), this 
study defines the sample of entrepreneur individuals as the treatment group, 
denoted as 𝐷 = 1, and non-entrepreneur individuals as the control group, 
denoted as 𝐷 = 0. Then, the treatment group is matched with the control 
group based on its propensity score which is a function of observable 
characteristics of the individuals:  𝑝(𝑋) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷 = 1|𝑋) = 𝐸(𝐷|𝑋) (4.4)  
where 𝑋 denotes the individual characteristics drawn from the existing 
literature (Jagtiani and Li, 2015). If it is assumed that there is no significant 
difference in the unobservable variables between the matched groups, the 
difference in access to consumer credit stems from having the treatment which 
is being an entrepreneur individual in this case35. Following Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002), the study matches the individuals based on the nearest neighbour with 
the replacement and propensity scores are estimated with a probit model. As 
robustness checks, it also matches the individuals using radius, kernel and 
 
35 It is acknowledged that the limitations of this assumption which relies on the selection 
on observables and PSM only corrects the selection bias among included observable 
characteristics. While this study controls for a set of covariates to explain access to consumer 
credit, it cannot be completely ruled out that the existence of unobservable characteristics may 
still bias the treatment effect (Berkovec et al., 1996; Pager and Shepherd, 2008; Han, 2011). 
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stratification methods with common support. The details of these matching 
methods are discussed in the following subsection. 
 The treatment effects are calculated comparing the outcomes 𝑌  between 
the treated and the control observations: 
 𝑌 = {𝑌1 if 𝐷 = 1𝑌0 if 𝐷 = 0} (4.5) 
 
The fundamental evaluation problem arises because only one of the outcomes 
is observed for each individual. The unobserved outcome is called 
counterfactual outcome.  
Average treatment effect (ATE) is the difference between the outcomes 
of treated and control observations:  𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(Δ) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑋,𝐷 = 1)−𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋,𝐷 = 0) (4.6) 
 
where Δ = 𝑌1 − 𝑌0. This can be estimates with a simple test between the 
outcomes for the treated and control groups. For random experiments, ATE is 
sufficient, but for observational studies like this one, the results may be biased 
if treated and control observations have different characteristics. 
 This requires the estimation of average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). ATT is the difference between the outcomes of treated and the 
outcomes of the treated observations if they had not been treated:  𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(Δ|D = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑋,𝐷 = 1)−𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋,𝐷 = 1) (4.7) 
 
The second term is unobservable, so it is counterfactual, and it needs to be 
estimated. Instead of the counterfactual, we find a close match using the control 
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observations and use their outcome. After matching on propensity scores, we 
can compare the outcomes of treated and control observations: 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(Δ|𝑝(𝑋),𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑝(𝑋),𝐷 = 1)−𝐸(𝑌0|𝑝(𝑋),𝐷 = 0)   (4.8) 
 
One possible identification strategy is to assume, that given a set of observable 
covariates 𝑋 which are not affected by treatment, potential outcomes are 
independent of treatment assignment:  𝑌0,𝑌1  ⊥  𝐷|𝑋 (4.9) 
 
A further requirement besides independence is the common support condition. 
For each value of 𝑋, there are both treated and control observations, and for 
each treated observation, there is a matched control observation with similar 𝑋.   0 < 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷 = 1|𝑋) < 1 (4.10) 
 
Additionally, balancing condition requires that assignment to treatment is 
independent of the 𝑋 characteristics, given the same propensity score:  𝐷 ⊥  𝑋|𝑝(𝑋) (4.11) 
 
For a robust estimation of the propensity score, a balancing property 
above must be satisfied. Lee (2013) states that the main purpose of the 
propensity score estimation is to balance the observed distribution of covariates 
across the treatment and the control groups. The quality of matches is assessed 
by comparing the situation before and after matching to check whether there 
is any difference after conditioning on the propensity score. If the differences in 
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the covariates in the two groups are eliminated, then the matched control group 
can be considered a plausible counterfactual.  
In addition, Sianesi (2004) recommends additional assessments of the 
matching quality which requires the comparison of pseudo 𝑅2 and  𝑝-values of 
the likelihood ratio test before and after matching the samples. After matching, 
there should be no systematic differences in the distribution of covariates 
between the two groups. The matching procedure balances the covariates very 
well if the pseudo 𝑅2 after matching is fairly low and the 𝑝-values of the 
likelihood ratio are insignificant which means that the joint significance of 
covariates are rejected. 
4.4.3 Matching Methods 
In the propensity score matching, for each treated observation 𝑖, we need 
to find matches of control observation(s) 𝑗 with similar characteristics. There 
are different matching methods based on the way the neighbourhood for each 
treated individual is defined, how the weights are assigned to these neighbours 
and how the common support problem is handled. 
Nearest neighbour matching is the most common and straightforward 
matching estimator. The individual from the control group is matched with an 
individual from the treated group that is closest in terms of propensity score. 
Nearest neighbour matching with replacement means that each control 
observation can be used as a match to several treated observations, whereas 
nearest neighbour matching without replacement means that each control 
observation is used no more than one time as a match for a treated observation. 
If the replacement is allowed, the average quality of matching will increase, and 
the bias will decrease (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
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Figure 4.1: Nearest Neighbour Matching with Replacement 
 
Figure 4.1 is an illustration of the nearest neighbour matching with 
replacement. For each treated observation 𝑖, we select a control observation 𝑗 
with the closest propensity score, min |𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗|. Instead of one to one matching, 
matching to more than one neighbour is also suggested. Even though multiple 
matching increases bias that results from on average poorer matches, it reduces 
variance, resulting from using more information to construct the counterfactual 
for each participant (Smith, 1997). 
Radius matching is one form of multiple matching. If the closest neighbour 
is far away, the nearest neighbour might be a bad match. To avoid this 
problem, radius matching imposes a maximum propensity score distance 
(radius). As Dehejia and Wahba (2002) suggest, radius matching uses as many 
comparison units as are available within the radius, hence avoids the risk of 
bad matches. Each treated observation 𝑖 is matched with control observation 𝑗 that falls within a specified radius, |𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗| < 𝑟. For this study, we choose 𝑟 = 0.1 which is commonly used in the literature. However, Smith and Todd 
(2005) states that it is difficult to know the reasonable propensity range 
(radius) beforehand. 
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Kernel matching uses the weighted average of all individuals in the control 
group instead of some observations from the control group. A major advantage 
of this method is the lower variance because more information is used. However, 
its disadvantage is that observations used are possibly bad matches. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Kernel Matching 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the kernel matching. Each treated observation 𝑖 is 
matched with all control observations, with weights inversely proportional to 
the distance between treated and control observations. 
Stratification matching partitions the common support of the propensity 
score into a set of intervals and compare the outcomes within these intervals 
(blocks). The main question to be answered is how many intervals should be 
used in the analysis. Studies such as Imbens (2004) and Cochrane and 
Chambers (1965) note that five intervals are often enough to remove most of 
the bias associated with all covariates.  
All these matching methods are defined in the region of common support. 
Matching with common support restricts matching only based on the common 
range of propensity scores as illustrated in Figure 4.3. The common support is 
determined by the minimum and the maximum propensity score of each group. 
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Simply, observations whose propensity score is less than the minimum and 
greater than the maximum in the other group are deleted. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Matching with Common Support 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 4.1. Columns 
report both mean values and standard deviations for the total sample, non-
entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs, respectively. The total sample includes 
77,502 adult individuals, 66,819 of them are non-entrepreneurs and 10,683 of 
them are entrepreneurs. It means that 14% of the total sample is identified as 
entrepreneur. It is observed that there are some differences as well as 
similarities between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Entrepreneurs) 
 
 
Entrepreneur individuals have lower incomes than the non-entrepreneurs. 
The annual income of a typical individual is £27,237 while on average, it is 
£16,455 for an entrepreneur individual. On average, the entrepreneurs have 
less access to consumer credit than non-entrepreneurs. Total value of unsecured 
credit limit is £1,216 for an average non-entrepreneur, while it is £971 for an 
average entrepreneur. The entrepreneurs have also less formal debt than the 
non-entrepreneurs. On average, an entrepreneur individual has £1,897 of 
unsecured formal debt, while it is £2,141 for a non-entrepreneur individual. 
However, a typical entrepreneur holds approximately 40% more informal debt 
than a typical non-entrepreneur. The limited access to consumer credit may 
deter entrepreneurs to accumulate formal loans but leads to demand more 
informal loans from friends and relatives.  
Non-entrepreneurs are slightly younger than entrepreneurs. A typical 
non-entrepreneur in the sample is 42.9 years old, while a typical entrepreneur 
is 49.7 years old. There is slight difference in marital status. 29% of non-
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Entrepreneur (=1)                                       0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Income 27236.96 24625.78 29760.13 24529.33 16455.29 18634.21
Total credit limit (£) 1137.59 3795.00 1216.20 3684.05 971.42 3424.15
Total value of formal loans (£) 2107.04 9534.72 2140.63 9078.96 1896.92 11997.21
Total value of informal loans (£) 103.29 2120.11 97.66 1783.56 138.53 3565.36
Age                                              43.87 12.86 42.94 12.66 49.70 12.60
Education (degree or above) (=1)         0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
Family size                                     2.91 1.29 2.92 1.28 2.84 1.31
Single (=1) 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.21 0.40
White (=1)                                    0.92 0.27 0.92 0.27 0.93 0.26
Female (=1)                                   0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.32 0.47
Number of Observations
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey
Total Sample Non-entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs
77,502 66,819 10,683
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entrepreneurs are single (including divorced, separated and widowed) while 
21% of entrepreneurs are categorised as single. There is a striking difference in 
gender. Even though around half of the sample and non-entrepreneurs are 
female, only one third of the entrepreneurs are female.  
Apart from all these differences, entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
have some similarities. Both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs have similar 
educational level, 30% of them have a bachelor’s degree or above. The family 
size is also similar for both groups.  On average, the number of individuals in 
the household is 2.84 persons for entrepreneurs and 2.92 persons for non-
entrepreneurs. Both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are similar in terms 
of ethnic origin and gender.  93% of entrepreneur and 92% of non-entrepreneur 
are white. 
4.5.2 Estimation Results 
The study present propensity score estimations for entrepreneurs in Table 
4.2. The results show that entrepreneur individuals are more educated and 
slightly older that non-entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are more likely to have 
slightly lower incomes and higher formal loans as well. Entrepreneurs 
individuals are also more likely to be male and married than non-entrepreneurs 
with a statistically significant confidence at 1% level and are more likely to 
have more informal loans with 5% statistical significance. The findings are 
similar to Blanchflower and Shadforth (2007) who compare the self-employed 
with employees and examine the causes and consequences of changes in the 
incidence of entrepreneurship in the UK.  
As a robustness check, a variation of model (4.1) is also estimated. A 
variable for credit access is included in the probit regression to estimate the 
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counterfactual. The results of this modified model are reported in Appendix C. 
The results are robust to this variation and consistent with the main model.  
 
Table 4.2: Propensity Score Estimations 
 
 
The matching quality indicators are presented in Table 4.3 which shows 
substantial reduction in absolute bias for bankrupts, income gleaners and fresh 
starters. The last two columns of the table indicate that there is a significant 
total bias reduction and the mean standardised bias after matching is below 
the 20% level of bias as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The 
standardised mean difference for overall covariates used in the propensity score, 
which was 21% before matching, is reduced to about 8-9% after matching. This 
reduces total bias around 60% through matching and indicates that the 
covariates were significantly balanced as a result of the propensity score 
Variables Coef. (Std. Err.) Margin z P>|z|
Income -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** -85.72 0.000
Total value of formal loans 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** 2.89 0.004
Total value of informal loans 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** 2.55 0.011
Age                                              0.016*** (0.001) 0.002*** 28.01 0.000
Education (degree or above)      0.310*** (0.014) 0.104*** 21.78 0.000
Family size                                     0.085*** (0.006) 0.001*** 14.73 0.000
Single -0.320*** (0.017) -0.115*** -18.93 0.000
White 0.139*** (0.024) 0.043*** 5.71 0.000
Female              -0.468*** (0.013) -0.214*** -36.26 0.000
Constant -1.254*** (0.047) -26.65 0.000
Number of Observations 77,502
Notes: The numbers reported are the coefficients and marginal effects of the probit model 
estimating the propensity score, defined in this case as the probability of being 
entrepreneur. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and we use the usual convention 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate whether independent variables are 
statistically significant.
Entrepreneur
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matching procedure. Furthermore, as suggested by Sianesi (2004), pseudo 𝑅2 
after matching is fairly low and  𝑝-values after matching are insignificant, 
suggesting that the overall results from the matching procedure are satisfactory 
in balancing the covariates between the two groups (entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs).  
 
Table 4.3: Matching Quality Indicators Before and After Matching 
 
 
Employing propensity score matching, the study analyses the impact of 
being an entrepreneur on the access to consumer credit. It matches the 
entrepreneur individuals with corresponding non-entrepreneur individuals using 
nearest neighbour with the replacement, radius, kernel and stratification 
matching methods. Table 4.4 reports the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). As robustness checks, ATT is estimated using different 
matching methods. The results are also consistent in all matching methods and 
all of them are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  
 
 
 
Outcome
Matching 
Method
Pseudo .      
before 
matching
Pseudo . 
after 
matching
p-Value  
before 
matching
p-Value  
after 
matching
Mean 
standardised 
bias before 
matching
Mean 
standardised 
bias after 
matching
Total % 
|bias| 
reduction
NNM 0.213 0.051 0.000 0.267 21.345 9.213 56.8
KM1 0.213 0.042 0.000 0.287 21.345 8.339 60.9
KM2 0.213 0.040 0.000 0.283 21.345 8.311 61.1
NNM: Nearest neighbour matching with replacement and common support.
KM1: Kernel matching with bandwith 0.06 and common support.
Entrepreneurship
KM2: Kernel matching with bandwith 0.03 and common support.
𝑅2 𝑅2 
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Table 4.4: Propensity Score Matching: Average Treatment Effect 
 
 
The results show that there is a negative relationship between being an 
entrepreneur and the access to consumer credit and it is statistically significant 
at 1% confidence level. The results suggest that the credit access for 
entrepreneurs are approximately £500 less than the credit limits that would 
have been if they had been employed by another firm or institution. This is the 
cost of the entrepreneurial activity on the access to consumer credit. The results 
are consistent in all matching methods and all of them are statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. The findings support Berkowitz and 
White (2004) who investigate the relationship between the consumer 
bankruptcy law and entrepreneurs’ access to credit in the US and they find 
that in more forgiving bankruptcy environment, entrepreneurs are more likely 
to be denied credit, thus they receive smaller loans with higher interest rates. 
The study has several policy implications. The results may help 
policymakers to assess the effectiveness of the current bankruptcy law in 
encouraging the entrepreneurial activity. The 2002 bankruptcy reform in the 
UK has made the consumer bankruptcy more pro-debtor by reducing the 
discharge of debts no later than one year which was previously three years. The 
Matching method ATT (Std. Err.) t No. of treat. No. of contr.
Nearest neighbour matching -524.443*** (23.653) -22.172 10,683 6,686
Radius matcing -512.317*** (27.258) -18.144 10,683 19,319
Kernel matching -462.905*** (29.622) -15.627 10,683 66,804
Stratification matching -494.588*** (40.057) -12.347 10,683 66,804
Number of Observations
Notes: The numbers reported are the results for the propensity score matching estimates of the 
average treatement effect (ATT) of being an entrepreneur on the access to credit. Robust 
standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parentheses. We use the usual convention *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate the statistical significance.      
77,502
Entrepreneur
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main objective was to boost the economic activity by encouraging 
entrepreneurial activity providing a partial insurance to entrepreneurs. 
However, our findings and other studies in the literature show that individual 
entrepreneurs are excluded from the credit markets when they are compared 
with the non-entrepreneurs with similar characteristics. Even though a pro-
debtor bankruptcy law encourages the entrepreneurship to boost the economic 
activity, it may also tighten the credit availability to individual entrepreneurs, 
and a pro-debtor bankruptcy law may decrease the credit supply and increase 
the interest rates. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Access to financial services such as a bank account and financial products 
such as a consumer loan is generally considered as a financial necessity, but the 
ability of individuals to access the credit varies dramatically. The literature on 
access to finance focuses on two dimensions; access based on economic and non-
economic grounds. Using the entrepreneurial activity as an economic ground, 
this study investigates the role of entrepreneurship on the access to credit. 
In the UK, a major reform in the bankruptcy law is introduced by 
Enterprise Act 2002 to boost the economic activity by encouraging the 
entrepreneurial activity. This reform has made the consumer bankruptcy more 
forgiving by introducing a fresh start bankruptcy. Before the bankruptcy 
reform, only income gleaning bankruptcy was available in the UK. 
This reform has caused a debate on its effectiveness in providing sufficient 
credit to entrepreneurs. In the literature, it is discussed that when a bankruptcy 
law is more forgiving in providing entrepreneurs a greater opportunity for a 
fresh start, it will boost the entrepreneurial activity and hence the economic 
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activity (Lee and Yamakawa, 2012). The main rationale behind this argument 
is that a pro-debtor bankruptcy law encourages the potential entrepreneurs to 
take risks because the fresh start bankruptcy provides a partial insurance in 
case of fail by discharging the debts.  
However, it is also argued in the literature that a pro-debtor bankruptcy 
law may decrease the credit supply to the individual entrepreneur. Even though 
a pro-debtor bankruptcy law encourages the entrepreneurship to boost the 
economic activity, it may also tighten the access to credit for entrepreneurs. A 
more forgiving bankruptcy environment will increase the risk of default from 
the creditors’ perspective; thus, the creditors will be reluctant to provide credits 
to risky individuals. Even if they provide loans, they would demand higher 
interest rates (Berkowitz and White, 2004). 
This study contributes to this debate on whether or not entrepreneur 
individuals are excluded from the consumer credit markets. It investigates the 
role of entrepreneurial activity on the access to consumer credit markets for 
approximately 77,500 consumers in Great Britain. Employing propensity score 
matching, it analyses the credit availability to the entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs and test whether or not the entrepreneurs are excluded from the 
consumer credit markets. The study compares the credit availability to 
entrepreneur individuals and non-entrepreneur individuals with similar 
characteristics and finds that entrepreneur individuals are indeed excluded from 
the credit markets to some extent. A typical entrepreneur is likely to receive 
approximately £500 less consumer credit than a typical non-entrepreneur with 
similar characteristics. This is considered as the cost of the entrepreneurial 
activity on the access to consumer credit. The findings show that individual 
entrepreneurs are indeed excluded from the credit markets when they are 
compared with the non-entrepreneurs with similar characteristics. The findings 
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of this study support Berkowitz and White (2004) who investigate credit 
availability for entrepreneurs in a pro-debtor bankruptcy law in the US and 
find that in more forgiving bankruptcy environment, entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be denied credit, thus they receive smaller loans with higher interest 
rates. 
The reasons behind limited access to consumer credit for entrepreneurs 
are unclear and beyond the scope of this study. However, being aware of the 
link between access to credit and the entrepreneurial activity, policy makers 
should seek to develop policies accordingly.  
One possible explanation for this exclusion may be the default risk of 
entrepreneurs. With the 2002 consumer bankruptcy reform, the bankruptcy law 
was made more pro-debtor. The main rationale was to encourage the 
entrepreneurial activity. Even though a pro-debtor bankruptcy law encourages 
the entrepreneurial activity, it may also tighten credit availability to individual 
entrepreneurs due to the increasing risk of default. Because, when a firm is 
unincorporated, its debts are personal liabilities of the firm’s owner. If the firm 
fails, the owner has an incentive to file for consumer bankruptcy.  
The models presented in this study are simplified to analyse the 
relationship between access to credit and the entrepreneurial activity. As it is 
case for all models, these models have some limitations. Even though they do 
not capture all relevant aspects of the access to credit, entrepreneurial activity 
and the consumer bankruptcy, the findings of this study may help policymakers 
to assess the effectiveness of the current bankruptcy law in encouraging the 
entrepreneurial activity.  
The entrepreneurship is believed to play an important role in the 
economic activity, hence in the process of economic growth. Reducing financing 
 
 
143 
constraints for potential entrepreneurs should be an important goal for 
policymakers worldwide. The findings of this study may help to weigh the 
trade-off between the entrepreneurship and the credit availability. A fair 
consumer bankruptcy system is necessary to encourage the entrepreneurial 
activity but should not deter the creditors to provide loans otherwise it may 
harm the credit markets and cause interest rates to increase.  
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4.7 Appendix C 
Table 4.5: Propensity Score Estimations (v.2) 
 
  
Variables Coef. (Std. Err.) Margin z P>|z|
Income -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** -83.64 0.000
Credit Access -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** 2.76 0.004
Total value of formal loans 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** 2.87 0.004
Total value of informal loans 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** 2.45 0.011
Age                                              0.015*** (0.001) 0.002*** 27.19 0.000
Education (degree or above)      0.369*** (0.017) 0.111*** 21.33 0.000
Family size                                     0.075*** (0.005) 0.001*** 14.98 0.000
Single -0.309*** (0.016) -0.109*** -19.03 0.000
White 0.122*** (0.022) 0.048*** 5.65 0.000
Female              -0.454*** (0.013) -0.236*** -36.19 0.000
Constant -1.165*** (0.047) -26.43 0.000
Number of Observations
Entrepreneur
77,502
Notes: The numbers reported are the coefficients and marginal effects of the probit model 
estimating the propensity score, defined in this case as the probability of being 
entrepreneur. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and we use the usual convention 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate whether independent variables are 
statistically significant.
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Table 4.6: Propensity Score Matching: ATT (v.2) 
  
Matching method ATT (Std. Err.) t No. of treat. No. of contr.
Nearest neighbour matching -536.238*** (22.624) -21.789 10,683 6,686
Radius matcing -523.517*** (27.397) -18.905 10,683 19,319
Kernel matching -474.547*** (28.902) -14.954 10,683 66,804
Stratification matching -507.219*** (39.387) -12.678 10,683 66,804
Number of Observations
Entrepreneur
77,502
Notes: The numbers reported are the results for the propensity score matching estimates of the 
average treatement effect (ATT) of being an entrepreneur on the access to credit. Robust 
standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parentheses. We use the usual convention *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 to indicate the statistical significance.      
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Summary 
This chapter summarises the main findings of the empirical chapters and 
concludes the thesis. It comprises three inter-related but stand-alone empirical 
chapters and analyses the implications of consumer bankruptcy and access to 
consumer credit on approximately 50,000 individuals using Wealth and Assets 
Survey (WAS) which is longitudinal data from a representative sample of 
households in Great Britain. The first empirical chapter investigates the effects 
of the bankruptcy benefit and adverse events on the consumer bankruptcy 
decision. The second empirical chapter examines the effects of the consumer 
bankruptcy on the access to credit after bankruptcy. The third empirical 
chapter analyses the role of entrepreneurial activity on the access to consumer 
credit markets. 
5.2 Empirical Findings 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, analyses the implication of the 
consumer bankruptcy to address the following research questions: 
• Are consumers more likely to file for bankruptcy when the 
bankruptcy benefit is higher?  
• Are they more likely to file for bankruptcy when they face an 
adverse event?  
• Does the consumer bankruptcy decision change according to the 
bankruptcy type? 
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In the debate on the consumer bankruptcy, the literature focuses on two 
theories, the strategic behaviour and the adverse events. Using zero inflated 
ordered probit (ZIOP) model, the study presents estimates of the effects of the 
bankruptcy benefit, which is simply equal to debts that can be discharged 
minus eligible assets for liquidation under bankruptcy procedures, and adverse 
events on the consumer bankruptcy decision using new data from the Wealth 
and Assets Survey which is a longitudinal survey that specifically focuses on 
the economic well-being of individuals in Great Britain. 
For the strategic behaviour theory, the study first tests whether the 
consumers are more likely to enter into any bankruptcy proceedings when the 
bankruptcy benefit increases. The findings show that that the bankruptcy 
benefit is positively and significantly related to the bankruptcy decision. 
However, when the study tests the dischargeable debts and eligible assets 
separately as the two main components of the bankruptcy benefit instead of 
testing the bankruptcy benefit alone, it finds that the dischargeable debt is the 
dominant factor in the consumer bankruptcy decision.  
For the adverse events theory, the study tests the effects of adverse 
events which are commonly used in the literature. These adverse events are 
becoming unemployed (job loss), getting divorced or separated and the onset 
of a serious health problem which limits the physical activity. The findings 
suggest that becoming unemployed is the dominant factor among adverse 
events in the bankruptcy decision. Our results complement earlier works such 
as Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) and Zhang, Sabarwal, and Gan (2015). 
As the major contribution of this study, it also tests the strategic 
behaviour and adverse events according to the bankruptcy type which is either 
the discharge of debts or the reorganization of debts. These bankruptcy types 
 
 
148 
are named as ‘fresh start’ and ‘income gleaning’, respectively. The findings 
show that the bankruptcy benefit is positively and significantly related to the 
bankruptcy decision regardless of the bankruptcy type. When the bankruptcy 
benefit is separated as the dischargeable debts and eligible assets, the 
dischargeable debts are the dominant factor for both types of bankruptcy. 
These estimates are consistent with the strategic behaviour theory. 
The study also tests the effects of adverse events and finds that 
becoming unemployed is significant for both types of bankruptcy. However, the 
onset of health problems is significant for the income gleaning but insignificant 
for the fresh start. This result suggests that individuals who experience the 
onset of health problems are more likely to choose the income gleaning 
bankruptcy type. The main reason may be that the health problems may reduce 
the income dramatically and increase health care expenses, but they do not 
affect the wealth directly. Therefore, the individuals face the health problems 
prefer the reorganisation of debts instead of the fresh start.  
In contrast, the findings suggest that getting divorced or separated is 
significant for the fresh start but insignificant for the income gleaning. This 
result suggests that individuals who get divorced are more likely to choose the 
fresh start bankruptcy type which is the discharge of almost all debts. Since 
the judge decides how to share the accumulated wealth and debts after the 
divorce decision, some individuals may end up with a huge debt but a little 
wealth. This situation may force them to file for the fresh start bankruptcy as 
their wealth decreases dramatically.  
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 3, analyses the relationship 
between the consumer bankruptcy and access to credit to address the following 
research questions: 
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• Are consumers more likely to be excluded from the credit markets 
after consumer bankruptcy compared to non-bankrupts? 
• Does the financial exclusion change according to the bankruptcy 
type? 
Chapter 3 contributes to the debate about whether or not bankrupt 
individuals are excluded from credit markets. Employing difference in 
differences (DID) estimation, it analyses the effects of the consumer bankruptcy 
on the access to consumer credit for approximately 30,000 consumers in Great 
Britain. The study compares the credit availability to bankrupt individuals and 
non-bankrupt individuals and finds that bankrupt individuals are indeed 
excluded from the credit markets to some extent both in the short and the long 
term and the exclusion increase over time from one year to three year after the 
bankruptcy filing. 
The study also analyses the existence of financial exclusion, according 
to the bankruptcy types, fresh start and income gleaning. Both bankruptcy 
types are excluded from the markets but in a different manner. Since the debts 
are discharged in a year in the fresh start bankruptcy, the exclusion from the 
market is quick and severe. However, the fresh starters regain access to markets 
after one year. On the other hand, since the debts are reorganised and partially 
discharged in the income gleaning bankruptcy, the exclusion process is slow, 
but the exclusion increases three years after the filing.  
The third empirical chapter, Chapter 4, analyses the relationship 
between the entrepreneurial activity and access to credit to address the 
following research question: 
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• Are individual entrepreneurs more likely to be excluded from the 
consumer credit markets compared to non-entrepreneurs with 
similar characteristics? 
Chapter 4 contributes to debate about whether or not entrepreneur 
individuals are excluded from the consumer credit markets. It investigates the 
role of entrepreneurial activity on the access to consumer credit markets for 
approximately 77,500 consumers in Great Britain. Employing propensity score 
matching, it analyses the credit availability to the entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs and test whether or not the entrepreneurs are excluded from the 
consumer credit markets. It compares the credit availability to entrepreneur 
individuals and non-entrepreneur individuals with similar characteristics and 
finds that bankrupt individuals are indeed excluded from the credit markets to 
some extent. A typical entrepreneur is likely to receive approximately £500 
less consumer credit than a typical non-entrepreneur with similar 
characteristics. This is considered as the cost of the entrepreneurial activity on 
the access to consumer credit.  
5.3 Limitations, Policy Implications and Future 
Research 
The models presented in Chapter 2 are simple models to represent the 
main aspects of the bankruptcy decision. As it is the case for all models, these 
models have some limitations and do not capture all relevant aspects of the 
consumer bankruptcy such as the role of social stigma, information, access to 
credit after bankruptcy, entrepreneurial activities and work incentives. 
However, data limitations prevent to analyse all these related aspects. Even 
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though Chapter 3 and 4 addresses some of these issues, some of them still need 
to be addressed. For further studies, it is possible to modify the models to 
address some of these topics in a reduced form by including parameters for 
access to credit markets in the future, or utility penalties in case of bankruptcy, 
but it is unclear whether such additions would yield tractable models. 
The findings of Chapter 2 may help to weigh the trade-off between the 
strategic behaviour and the adverse events theories. A fair consumer 
bankruptcy system is necessary to smooth the consumption after adverse events 
to protect ‘honest but unfortunate’ individuals but should deter the 
strategically oriented individuals at the same time because otherwise it may 
harm the credit markets and cause interest rates to increase.  
Access to credit is generally considered as a financial necessity, and the 
inability of individuals to access the credit may harm the economic activity. 
Even though data limitations prevent to analyse all aspects of the relationship 
between the consumer bankruptcy and the financial exclusion, Chapter 3 
contributes to the literature to better understand this relationship.  
The study acknowledges the limitations of the assumptions which relies 
on the selection on observables and PSM only corrects the selection bias among 
included observable characteristics. While this study controls for a set of 
covariates to explain the access to consumer credit, it cannot completely rule 
out the existence of unobservable characteristics. 
Therefore, the reasons behind limited access to consumer credit for 
entrepreneurs are unclear and beyond the scope of Chapter 4. However, being 
aware of the link between access to credit and the entrepreneurial activity, 
policy makers should seek to develop policies accordingly.  
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One explanation for this exclusion may be the default risk of 
entrepreneurs. With the 2002 consumer bankruptcy reform, the bankruptcy law 
was made more pro-debtor. The main rationale was to encourage the 
entrepreneurial activity. Even though a pro-debtor bankruptcy law encourages 
the entrepreneurial activity, it may also tighten credit availability to individual 
entrepreneurs due to the increasing risk of default. Because, when a firm is 
unincorporated, its debts are personal liabilities of the firm’s owner. If the firm 
fails, the owner has an incentive to file for consumer bankruptcy. The findings 
of this research may help to weigh the trade-off between the entrepreneurship 
and the credit availability.  
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